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Abstract
This thesis examines the American citizens who enlisted voluntarily and served in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States entered the First World War. 
This study provides an overview of the CEF’s recruitment of Americans, the motives and 
consequences for Americans enlisting in the CEF, the CEF’s five “American” overseas 
infantry battalions, named the “American Legion,” which were designed to recruit 
American citizens, and the combat experiences of Americans serving in the CEF on the 
Western Front from 1914-1917. This thesis was based on the Canadian Department of 
Militia and Defence’s records of the CEF, Canadian war service records, the CEF’s 
enlistment records, American Department of State documents, personal papers and letters, 
autobiographies, and published accounts.
While the United States government remained neutral during the First World War, 
Canada’s expeditionary force to France and Belgium provided an opportunity for at least 
forty-one thousand American citizens to serve in an Allied army. Americans provided the 
CEF with a supplemental source of voluntary manpower, but their presence also raised 
political and military issues in Canada, diplomatic agitatations between Great Britain, 
Canada, and the United States, and American citizenship questions for the CEF’s 
American volunteers. The Americans who served in the CEF before April 6, 1917, 
represented those citizens of the United States who disagreed with the Wilson 
administration’s decision to remain neutral for the first thirty-two months of the war.
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to thank the National Archives of Canada and the Canadian 
National Library in Ottawa, Ontario. While researching at the National Archives of 
Canada, their research and reading room staff, particularly Tim Wright, were instrumental 
in providing information and guidance to sources. Without their tireless assistance and 
direction this master’s thesis would not have been possible.
I would also like to give a special thanks to Dr. Bruce M. Garver from the 
Department of History at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, who was enthusiastic 
about my project, advised and monitored my progress, and served as precise proofreader. 
Members of my thesis committee also need to be recognized for their contribution. From 
the University of Nebraska at Omaha Dr. Harl A. Dalstrom and Dr. Walter M. Bacon Jr. 
and from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln Dr. Peter Maslowski. For preparing me to 
write academic papers, I would like to thank the entire Department of History faculty from 
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, especially Dr. Oliver B. Poliak, Dr. Jerold L. 
Simmons, and Dr. Dale A. Gaeddert.
Many relatives and friends provided me with financial and moral support during 
the months of researching and writing this thesis. I would like to thank my father, James 
A. Harris, who traveled with me to Ottawa and aided me with my research there, and my 
mother, Anna Mae Harris, who repeatedly encouraged me to “shoot the wolf closest to 
me.” Finally, I acknowledge a great indebtedness to Kristy Vanderhoof who had to 
endure my daily frustrations and in turn pacified my anxieties.
Table of Contents
Introduction.......................................................................................1-12
Chapter One...................................................................................... 13-54
The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 
Recruitment of American Citizens
Figure 1 - CEF Recruiting Advertisement.................. 40
Chapter Two......................................................................................55-91
Enlistment of Americans in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force: Motivations,
Consequences & Numbers
Table 1 - Number of Americans in the CEF................60
Figure 2 - CEF Attestation Paper.........................75
Chapter Three................................................................................... 92-126
The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 
“American Legion,” 1915-1917
Chapter Four.....................................................................................127-159
American Combat Experiences in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1915-1917
Conclusion......................................................................................... 160-167
Appendix............................................................................................ 168-169
Concise History of the CEF’s 
American Legion
Endnotes.............................................................................................170-197
Bibliography 198-213
1Introduction
This thesis discusses the American citizens who volunteered and served in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States government entered the First 
World War on April 6, 1917. By examining the Canadian government’s administration of 
enlisting and recruiting American citizens in the CEF, the motivations and consequences 
for enlisting in the CEF, the history of the CEF’s “American Legion,” and the combat 
experiences of Americans fighting for the CEF in France and Belgium, this thesis aims to 
resurrect an important aspect of World War I that has heretofore received insufficient 
attention from historians.
In relation to the other scholarly works on this subject, three authors specifically 
address the history of the American citizens in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. 
Numerous publications account for the Americans who served in foreign armies other than 
the CEF in the First World War, and a sparse collection of American and World War I 
histories refer to Americans who enlisted into Canada’s armed forces, but the latter’s 
descriptions infrequently go beyond acknowledging the fact that Americans did serve in 
the CEF.
Fred Gaffen’s Cross-Border Warriors recounts the history of Canadians and 
Americans who served in one another’s armed forces from the American Civil War to the
Persian Gulf War. Gaffen provides a limited amount of material covering the Americans 
in the CEF. Most of his text contains extensive sections of quotations from one wartime 
memoir and several Canadian war records of Americans who fought for the CEF. Ronald 
G. Haycock’s article in Military Affairs, however, provides an admirable history of the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force’s “American Legion,” which was organized to exclusively 
recruit American citizens. The same author’s subsequent book about the Minister of 
Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, reiterates the same information 
about the CEF’s “American Legion.” Both accounts briefly detail the history of the 
American Legion’s five overseas infantry battalions and the Canadian Department of 
Militia and Defence’s inability to mobilize these five regiments as an example of Hughes’ 
inept administration of the Department of Militia and Defence. Eric Smylie’s master’s 
thesis, “Americans Who Did Not Wait: The American Legion of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 1915-1917,” examines the five American Legion battalions and the 
diplomatic and political controversy this formation caused the Canadian government. 
Smylie makes good use of Canadian newspapers, accurately relates the conflict between 
Canada’s Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden and the Governor-General, H. R. H. Arthur, 
the Duke of Connaught, and thoroughly describes the organization and administration of 
the Canadian Militia before the First World War. But he does not account for, among 
other questions, American motivations for enlisting in the CEF, other than the sinking of 
the Luisitania, the consequences American citizens faced as a result of their enlistment, or
3that the American Legion represented less than seven percent of the number of Americans 
who served in the CEF.
This thesis goes beyond existing published material by making a comprehensive 
overview of the Americans who volunteered and served with the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, which includes: explaining the CEF’s 
recruitment of American citizens, determining the number of Americans who enlisted into 
the CEF, describing the motivations and consequences for serving in the CEF while the 
United States government remained neutral, surveying the experiences of Americans in the 
CEF who fought on the Western Front, expanding previous discussions concerned with 
the government of Canada’s policy of administering the Americans in the CEF, particularly 
the American Legion, and the political and diplomatic repercussions the American Legion 
created between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. The Americans who 
served with the Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy, and Canadian armed 
forces in either Mesopotamia (Iraq) or Russia will be not be studied in this thesis because 
men enlisting in these two branches of service served directly in the British armed forces 
or were not considered a part of Canada’s expeditionary force to France.
The essential primary sources utilized to complete this thesis were the Department 
of Militia and Defence’s documents which reveal the Canadian military’s administration of 
the American citizens serving in the CEF. Compiled by the Canadian War Records Office, 
these records address the recruitment, mobilization, training, and various administrative 
correspondence of the American Legion’s five battalions - the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th
4and 237th Overseas Infantry Battalions. The private papers of Sir Robert Laird Borden 
and the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock additionally include information essential to 
understanding the American experience in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Borden’s 
papers document the diplomatic quarrels between Canada, Great Britain, and the United 
States, and the political debate between Borden and the Governor-General. The papers 
and scrapbooks of Bullock, who served as a recruiting officer for all five American Legion 
battalions and commanded the 237th, offer additional evidence of CEF recruiting 
practices, the administration and formation of all the American Legion battalions, 
correspondence between Bullock and Hughes, and the backgrounds of several American 
Legionnaires. In order to identify the American citizens who served in the CEF, the 
Nominal Rolls or enlistment records of the CEF indicate who enlisted in the CEF, a 
volunteer’s place of birth, and other information which reveal a volunteer’s nationality.
The above materials are located in the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, Ontario.
The CEF’s War Service Records, also housed at the National Archives of Canada, 
and publications by Americans who served in the CEF offer historians an opportunity to 
get some insight into individual soldiers’ motivations for enlisting in the CEF and also their 
experiences on the Western Front. The leading Canadian advocate for Americans serving 
in the CEF was the Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes. 
Some of his correspondence dealing with the American Legion is in the Edwin Pye papers 
housed at the Department of National Defence’s Directorate of History in Ottawa,
Ontario. Pye’s papers were examined, but unfortunately for this thesis, Hughes’ private
5papers had been recently donated by his family and were in the process of being compiled 
and indexed by the National Archives of Canada and were not available for examination. 
The government records of the United States, such as the Congressional Records„ V  S, 
Statutes at Large, and the Department of State’s Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations o f the United States, provide valuable original sources concerning the 
expatriation of an American as a result of serving in the CEF before the United States 
government entered the First World War. These American records also provide the 
United States government’s diplomatic responses to the CEF’s recruitment of American 
citizens.
The first chapter of this thesis examines the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 
recruitment of American citizens. Also included in this chapter is a discussion of the 
international agreements and American enlistment and neutrality laws that prohibited the 
CEF from recruiting in the United States. Furthermore, this section contains an 
explanation of the CEF’s recruitment of American volunteers and the American Legion’s 
recruiting practices, particularly its violations of American neutrality, which aggravated 
the Wilson administration.
Chapter two identifies and discusses the motivations that prompted American 
citizens to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This chapter also explains the legal 
consequences faced by Americans who attempted to return to the United States after 
having enlisted in the CEF. Also ascertained will be how many American citizens 
volunteered for the CEF. The author has discovered new information and employs a new
6method to determine which Americans misrepresented their nationality at the time of their 
enlistment.
Chapter three recounts the history of the five American Legion battalions from 
October 22, 1915 to March 21, 1917. Furthermore, this section details the diplomatic 
tension the CEF’s American Legion created between Canada, Great Britain, and the 
United States, and the political and military quarrels about the American Legion among 
the staff of the Department of Militia and Defence and Canadian authorities and between 
the Canadian Prime Minister and Governor-General.
The last chapter discusses the combat experiences of American citizens who served 
in the CEF on the Western Front from the Second Battle of Ypres on April 22, 1915 to 
Vimy Ridge on April 9, 1917, and describes their adventures, memories, and military 
achievements in the trenches. This chapter also covers what many Americans on the 
battlefields thought about the United States government’s neutrality up to April 1917 and 
the prospects of American entry into the war.
Immediately after Germany’s invasion of Belgium in August 1914, the British 
Empire excitably prepared to assist the military efforts of Great Britain, who had declared 
war on Germany and its allies on August 4th. In the absence of any statutory obligation to 
support its mother country the Dominion of Canada instantaneously offered its military 
services to Great Britain. The Canadian government promised immediately to dispatch a 
battalion - Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry - to serve in the British Army on the
7European continent and a division would be delivered at a subsequent date. On August 6, 
1914, Canada’s Minister of Militia and Defence, later Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, 
summoned the nation to volunteer for an overseas contingent, which was officially named 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
The Canadian Expeditionary Force mobilized as a volunteer force, and as an 
independent army distinct from the Militia of Canada. The CEF was organized and 
administered by the Department of Militia and Defence and fought under the command of 
the British Expeditionary Force. Throughout the First World War the CEF raised over six 
hundred thousand men and transported more than four hundred thousand of them to the 
Western Front. The CEF participated alongside the British Expeditionary Force on the 
battlefields in France and Belgium and distinguished itself in combat as a fighting force at 
the battles of Ypres, Festubert, Saint-Eloi, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Passchendaele, Arras, 
and Amiens.
The hundreds of thousands of former British subjects residing in Canada and the 
native-born Canadians who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force were joined by 
approximately forty-one thousand Americans. This occurred despite the growth in pre­
war years of a Canadian sentiment of anti-Americanism to the United States government’s 
expanding economic and political strength. In J. L. Granastein’s Yankee Go Home?, he 
asserted that the two “governments may have been cooperating, but anti-Americanism [in 
Canada] flourished on a popular level.”1 Although the exact number of 35,612 was 
determined by the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Directorate of History, this
8investigation did not account for a number of Americans who misrepresented their place 
of birth when enlisting in the CEF.
Each belligerent in the First World War accepted citizens of the United States for 
military service, but most Americans sympathized with three Western Allies - Great 
Britain, France, and Canada. This attitude, as well as the proximity of Canada to the 
United States and the CEF’s offering the highest daily wage of any army in the war, 
persuaded tens of thousands of American citizens to enlist into the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force. But, these three incentives alone do not explain why such a flood of 
Americans, some with successful and promising careers, left the United States to enlist in 
Canada’s army at the risk of losing their American citizenship.
Although a number of circumstances and reasons can cause an individual to decide 
upon a specific action, at least three general reasons help explain why an American would 
enlist into a foreign army while the United States remained neutral: outrage at Germany’s 
war atrocities, a desire to defend a common culture and ancestral homeland, and a wish to 
experience the adventure of war. Americans volunteered themselves for military service in 
Canada from outbreak of the war until the entrance of the United States at differing rates 
and times. But from 1915 to 1916 the majority of Americans enlisted in the CEF. In the 
spring, summer, and fall of 1915 many enlisted on account of the sinking of Luisitania on 
May 6, 1915, which outraged nearly all Americans, and in 1916, the Canadian Minister of 
Militia and Defence began authorizing battalions which were to be predominately filled 
with American citizens either living and working in Canada or from the United States.
9Hughes’ plan to mobilize “American battalions” took shape as early as August 
1914, given the abundance of volunteers from the United States - nearly eight hundred 
American-born soldiers served in the CEF’s 1st Division. Despite difficulties in gaining 
approval from Great Britain and Canada, because the American formations violated the 
United States government’s Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818 and threatened the neutrality 
laws of the United States, Hughes managed to implement his plan for the creation of a 
brigade of Americans to be called the “American Legion.” The American Legion 
consisted of five battalions: 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th and 237th Overseas Infantry 
Battalions, respectively headquartered in Toronto, Ontario; Vancouver, British Columbia; 
Winnipeg, Manitoba; St. Catherines, Ontario; and Sussex, New Brunswick.
In 1915 and 1916, the CEF aggressively recruited for American Legion volunteers 
both in Canada and the United States. This violated instructions from the governments of 
Great Britain and Canada to Hughes not to recruit outside of the Dominion. Besides 
Hughes, the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock, an American citizen residing in Toronto, 
helped promote this aggressive recruitment. Bullock repeatedly solicited men in the 
United States and Canada to enlist into the American Legion and authorized other CEF 
recruiters to do the same. Canadian officers were arrested for violating the neutrality of 
the United States, and Germany accused the United States of showing partiality towards 
the Allies. After initial recruiting successes, the American Legion quickly degenerated on 
account of insufficient numbers of volunteers, desertion, and inappropriate conduct by its 
recruits. The inability to mobilize the American Legion and the agitation the Legion
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caused the Canadian government with the United States prompted the CEF’s military 
hierarchy to disband this recruiting experiment. The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion 
came the closest to participating in the war, but during its final training maneuvers in 
England it was demobilized and its troops were assigned to other CEF battalions as 
reinforcements.
Despite the failure of this American Legion, thousands of Americans honorably 
served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. For example, seventy-six CEF soldiers were 
awarded the Victoria Cross - the most prestigious military award of the British Army - 
and five of the seventy-six were American citizens. In addition to the Americans who 
earned a Victoria Cross, other Americans served with distinction in the CEF before the 
United States government entered the war - Tracy Richardson, Herbert McBride, Bob 
Elston, and Edwin Austin Abbey. Although not as famous as Alan Seeger of the French 
Foreign Legion or Arthur Guy Empey of the British Expeditionary Force, these men and a 
few additional “Yanks” authored articles and books about their experiences in the CEF in 
post-war publications. The experiences of the Americans in the CEF on the Western 
Front exemplify what most soldiers on the Western Front encountered: constant shelling; 
fear of mines, sniper fire, and gas attacks; intolerable trench conditions; and the frustration 
of ineffectual offensive campaigns.
Excluding the horrors every soldier faced in the First World War, American 
citizens serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force encountered another more 
troublesome problem after they either completed their military service or were wounded in
11
action. The dilemma was the prospect of legally reentering the United States. This 
seemingly simple task was complicated by the laws of the United States which prohibited 
American citizens from taking an oath of allegiance when enlisting or accepting a 
commission in a foreign army. The Citizenship Act of 1907, an addition to the Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1818, stated “that any American citizen shall be deemed to have 
expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its 
laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.”2 Upon entering the 
CEF, all recruits, including Americans, were required to take an oath of allegiance to King 
George the Fifth. Thus, every American who enlisted into the CEF before April 6, 1917, 
expatriated himself. As an example, the petition to the State Department from Edward 
Dempster Griffin, an American who enlisted into the CEF on July 14, 1916, helps explain 
the legal intricacies connected with an American serving in a foreign army while the 
United States government remained neutral. Griffin’s federal court case reveals how the 
American judiciary interpreted the laws governing American citizens who had enlisted in 
the CEF and attempted to return to the United States before April 6, 1917.
When the United States government’s policy of neutrality crumbled upon 
Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, Americans 
fighting overseas became excited about the prospect of serving under the Stars and 
Stripes. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany and its allies, but 
the U. S. Army was not sufficiently mobilized to be able to participate immediately in the 
war. Understanding that the U. S. Army would not go into combat for several months,
12
the majority of Americans in the CEF decided to remain there until the American 
Expeditionary Force mobilized in France. If an American decided to transfer to the AEF 
he would seek a discharge from the CEF. Each transfer was settled on a case by case 
basis. Nonetheless, not all Americans in the CEF decided to wait for the AEF to be 
mobilized. Some requested an immediate discharge in order to serve as experienced 
military instructors.
The American citizens who volunteered and served in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force before the United States government entered the First World War represent a small 
portion of the United States’ population that not only supported the Allied war effort 
thirty-two months before the Wilson administration did so, but physically put their lives at 
risk in acting upon their convictions. American volunteers assisted the Dominion of 
Canada’s efforts to provide the Allies with needed manpower on the Western Front during 
some of the greatest and most casualty-stricken offensives in British and Canadian military 
history. From August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, thousands of Americans offered their lives 
for Canada in a war that the United States government did not then want to fight.
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Chapter One
The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s Recruitment of American Citizens
On August 4, 1914, Great Britain declared war against Germany and its allies 
when Germany violated Belgian neutrality after Belgium refused to permit the German 
Army to pass through its territory to France. This British action compelled the British 
Empire of numerous dominions, commonwealths, protectorates, and colonies to support 
Great Britain’s decision to fight the central powers of Europe. Each of the Empire’s 
political entities endorsed Britain’s declaration of war, including the Dominion of Canada.
Great Britain’s largest remnant of its continental North American possessions, 
Canada, formerly British North America, had organized as an independent governing 
nation in 1867, and “enjoyed virtual autonomy despite having a governor-general 
appointed by the British crown, who retained the right to veto legislation considered 
harmful to the British Empire’s interests.”3 Canada’s Governor-General was not only the 
representative of the crown, but the head of state representing the Dominion of Canada. 
The Governor-General retained the executive power of the Governor-In-Council, 
receiving advice from the Canadian Privy Council, the most important part of which is the 
Cabinet, and signing Orders-In-Council. The Prime Minister of Canada is the head of 
government who represents the political majority of the Canadian Parliament’s House of
14
Commons.4 After Confederation, the Governor-General was empowered to govern 
according to the wishes of the Prime Minister in all domestic issues.
Under the 1904 Militia Act, the Governor-General and his appointed cabinet had 
retained the authority to make any decision to proclaim a state of war and to deploy 
Canadian citizens abroad for military service. The Militia Act stated that the “Governor in 
Council may place the Militia, or any part thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, 
and also beyond Canada, for the defence thereof, at any time when it appears advisable so 
to do by reason of emergency.”5
Years before the outbreak of the Great War, Canadian authorities unofficially 
decided to support the military endeavors of the mother country. In 1910, Prime Minister 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier proclaimed, “‘When Britain is at war, Canada is at war. There is no 
distinction.’”6 Accordingly, on the same date Great Britain announced its declaration of 
war against Germany, Canada entered the European war without issuing any official 
declaration of war. The Dominion’s decision to support Great Britain’s war against 
Germany occurred not because it was legally obligated to do so by His Majesty’s 
Government; rather the Canadian government had predetermined that it would 
systematically “contribute a force to Imperial defence abroad,” while retaining the 
privilege to determine the “nature and extent of its own [military] contribution.”7 On 
August 6, 1914, Great Britain acknowledged Canada’s participation in the war in a 
telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Andrew Bonar Law, to Canada’s
15
Governor-General, H. R. H. Arthur William Patrick Albert, the First Duke of Connaught 
and Stratheam:
With reference to my [Bonar Law] telegram of August 4th, His Majesty’s 
Government gratefully accept your [Connaught’s] offer to send [an] 
expeditionary force to this country [England], and would be glad if it could be 
despatched as soon as possible.8
Most of Canada’s contributions to Great Britain’s war effort consisted of 
furnishing manpower for the Empire’s armed forces. Despite Canada’s meager population 
of 7,206,643 - a population less than the state of New York, and dwarfed by an American 
population over one hundred million - the Dominion provided Great Britain with 628,964 
soldiers, 458,218 of whom served overseas 9 Nearly all Canadians who enlisted for 
overseas service served in infantry, artillery, cavalry and specialized units in France and 
Belgium. Canadians also served in the Royal Canadian Navy and ground forces stationed 
in Russia and Mesopotamia (Iraq).10 Furthermore, because no Canadian air service 
existed until mid-1918, more than twenty thousand Canadians up to that time enlisted into 
the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, the two air formations 
subsequently combined to form the Royal Air Force.11 Canadians also enlisted directly 
into the Royal Navy and British Army.
Not only did one out of every eleven Canadians serve in Canada’s armed forces, 
but Canada contributed mightily to the Allied war effort. Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific 
seaports offered the Royal Navy an opportunity to repair and refit its fleet, and the Royal 
Canadian Navy helped Great Britain coordinate and execute naval deployments against 
German submarines. Furthermore, Canada produced armaments, munitions, and raw
16
materials to sustain the war effort. Over one billion dollars worth of munitions was 
exported from Canada to various Imperial armies.12 Furthermore, Canada provided Great 
Britain with 709 million dollars in established credit to purchase commodities and 
foodstuffs.13 As a result of Canada’s support of the Allied war effort, the Canadian 
treasury gained more than nine million Pounds in its gold reserves from 1913-1919.14
After Great Britain accepted Canada’s offer of an expeditionary force to the 
British Army on August 6, 1914, Canada’s Minister of the Department Militia and 
Defence, then Colonel Sam Hughes, summoned Canadian men to volunteer for the first 
overseas “contingent” - officially designated as the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This 
CEF formed as a component of the British Army to be exclusively deployed to serve in 
France and Belgium. Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden “readily agreed that strategy and 
the conduct of operations were matters for London, not Ottawa, to decide.”15 Similarly to 
the armed forces from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, the CEF was an 
Imperial army allied with and subject to the authority of the British High Command.16
During the First World War, the Department of Militia and Defence recruited, 
mobilized, and trained four CEF divisions, totaling 628,964.17 The CEF was organized 
and administered under the authority of the Department of Militia and Defence, but on the 
battlefield served under the commander-in-chief of the British Army, British Expeditionary 
Force in France, Field Marshal Sir John D. P. French until December 1915 and thereafter 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Because the CEF was under British command, tbe 
Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, created during the war, acted as the
17
liaison between the Canadian government and Great Britain’s War Office. The Canadian 
Ministry of Overseas Military Forces primarily directed the administrative affairs of its 
expeditionary force in England, but as the CEF developed into a formidable part of the 
British Army, the Ministry labored to increase the Canadian government’s authority of 
administering the military strategies of the CEF on the Western Front.18
From the Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination on June 28, 1914, to the 
opening of hostilities in early August, Canada and Great Britain corresponded with each 
other regarding how to proceed if war erupted. On July 28, 1914, Great Britain notified 
Canada to adopt preliminary measures concerning mobilization and recruitment of troops 
for overseas military service. But, on August 4, 1914, British authorities advised the 
Governor-General that “there seemed to be ‘no immediate necessity for any request on 
our part for an expeditionary force from Canada,’ although it would be wise to ‘take all 
legislative and other steps’ which would enable such a force to be provided without delay 
if required.”19 Despite that dispatch, the Department of Militia and Defence hastily began 
formulating plans to send a contingent overseas.20 In addition to the Department of 
Militia and Defence’s mobilization schemes, on August 3, 1914, Captain Hamilton Gault, 
“a wealthy Montreal militia officer and veteran of the South African War,” proposed to 
raise and finance a unit of former Canadian Militia men for overseas service.21 When the 
Canadian proposal for an expeditionary force was accepted on August 6, Minister of 
Militia and Defence, later Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, summoned the nation to 
enlist in the new overseas army. Canadian authorities accepted Gault’s proposal on
18
August 8, but commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Farquhar to mobilize the unit 
named Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry after the Governor-General’s 
daughter.22
The Canadian Expeditionary Force mobilized and recruited as a new military unit 
separate from Canada’s Active and Reserve Militias. The Active Militia, sub-divided into 
Permanent and Non-Permanent, was the military defense for the Dominion guarding 
Canada against foreign invaders and training for future conflicts. The Reserve Militia 
never organized as an armed force before the First World War due to an insufficient 
number of volunteers. Before the outbreak of the war, Canada’s Permanent Active Militia 
consisted of only 3,110 professional soldiers - the Royal Canadian Regiment and two 
cavalry regiments: Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse - and 74,213 
Canadians served in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. Although not attached to the 
CEF, the Canadian Active Militia aided the recruitment of volunteers for the new overseas 
contingent. Both the Militia and the CEF were subordinate to the Department of Militia 
and Defence.
Throughout August 1914, Canadian authorities - particularly the Governor- 
General, the Duke of Connaught, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, and Minister of 
Militia and Defence Hughes - administered the policy for recruiting men into the 
expeditionary force. Hughes exercised most of the authority over mobilizing the CEF, 
although Connaught, as Governor-General, was commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed 
forces. Excluding Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, in which eleven hundred
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men enlisted in three weeks, the Department of Militia and Defence attempted to raise an 
overseas expeditionary force consisting approximately of 25,000 men to be transferred to 
the Western Front immediately. Militia Orders Number 372, issued by Hughes from 
Militia Headquarters in Ottawa on August 17, 1914, determined that the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force would contain one division23 of infantry and artillery, plus certain 
units supporting the requirements of the contingent. Furthermore, the Department of 
Militia and Defence asserted that the expeditionary force “will be Imperial and have the 
status of British regular troops” in accordance with British Army Act, Sections 175 and 
176.24
Before the First World War, and in conjunction with the precedent set during the 
Boer War when nearly seven thousand Canadians served in the British Army, the 
Department of Militia and Defence enrolled men into its expeditionary force strictly based 
on the “voluntarist principle so enshrined in British military culture.”25 This point was 
originally emphasized in a August 6, 1914, telegram from the Adjutant-General, Brigadier- 
General V. A. S. Williams, to the officers commanding Canada’s military divisions and 
districts: “Regulations to govern raising of a contingent for Overseas Service will be as 
follows Stop . . . .  Enrolment [sic] will be voluntary for all ranks. . . .”26 The voluntary 
enlistment policy was publicly reiterated in an article appearing in the Montreal Gazette 
which quoted a speech by Defence Minister Frederick Borden: “I call for volunteers - 
volunteers mark you. I have insisted that it shall be a purely volunteer contingent. Not a 
man will be accepted or leave Canada on this service but of his own free will. . . .”27
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Recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force was entrusted to the Minister of 
Militia and Defence. Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, Minister from October 10,
1911 to November 9, 1916, deviated from the existing mobilization plan, Memorandum 
C.1209, established in 1911 on account of shortcomings Hughes perceived in the plan. 
The mobilization plan, established under then Militia and Defence’s mobilization officer, 
later the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, 
required local militia commanders to raise volunteers from the militia regiment’s 
respective geographical section in the event of war. Therefore, instead of mobilizing 
existing militia units for overseas service, Hughes mobilized volunteers into new, 
geographically based battalions, although Hughes did mobilize certain overseas battalions 
“almost exclusively from militia units.”28 Hughes believed that the mobilization of 
Canada’s overseas expeditionary force should be independent from the Militia because the 
Militia’s involvement would impede a necessary, rapid formation of the contingent. 
Therefore, on July 31, 1914, Hughes secretly instructed the officers commanding the 
military divisions and districts to consider the mobilization plan outlined in Memorandum 
C. 1209 as “purely tentative.”29
Throughout August 1914, Hughes frequently ignored established channels of 
communication, and he dispatched conflicting orders to local militia commanders by 
continually altering their authority to recruit and changing the requisite number of troops 
each military district was to recruit. Regardless of Hughes’ complicated administrative 
procedures, which frustrated his superiors as well as his subordinates, during the first six
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months of the war, a high number of anxious and patriotic volunteers flooded the 
recruiting stations across the country. For instance, the Department of Militia and 
Defence determined that 25,000 soldiers would be the required minimum number of 
troops for the first overseas division of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, yet by 
September 8, 1914, 32,665 volunteers had enlisted for military service abroad.
The initial mobilization endeavors of Hughes are best explained by his biographer, 
Ronald Haycock, who described Hughes as an “egotistical and grand improviser.” 
Although Hughes’ mobilization ventures as Minister of Militia and Defence were a “one 
man show” with “little order and less administration,” his genuine enthusiasm for creating 
a national army provided the CEF recruitment process with tireless leadership that 
produced hundreds of thousands of Canadian recruits from a sparsely populated country 
during the Great War. Hughes directed the recruitment and mobilization of the only four 
divisions ever to constitute the CEF.30
The CEF’s recruitment of volunteers centered around its local recruiting stations. 
From the beginning of the war until the autumn of 1915, Canada’s Militia regimental 
commanders of each military district and division directed the recruiting process for each 
new CEF overseas battalion; afterwards each CEF overseas battalion was responsible for 
its own recruitment. Each CEF recruiting station enlisted volunteers for a specific 
overseas battalion. For example, either a Militia or CEF officer responsible for enlisting 
soldiers from a specific military district31 recruited potential citizens to enlist into an 
overseas battalion, usually by inciting their patriotic fervor. CEF recruiters were aided by
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local recruiting leagues, numerous Canadian patriots, and the influence of Militia officers, 
who frequently “were drawn from the local elite,” and ordinarily “Canadian bom and 
raised, often in the town, city, or county in which they recruited a CEF battalion.”32 
Additionally, every overseas battalion’s regimental name and most of the recruits’ places 
of residence could be found within with the military district. For instance, the military 
district of central Ontario recruited for the 20th Overseas Infantry Battalion, whose 
regimental name was the Central Ontario Regiment, and the majority of whose volunteers 
had lived in central Ontario before enlisting.
The recruiting system for the Canadian Expeditionary Force functioned as an arm 
of the military. Historian Paul Maroney has observed that the process of enlisting a 
potential recruit “was as simple as an officer . . . setting up shop in the local armoury, 
making arrangements for medical examinations, and placing a sign in the window:
‘Recruits wanted for overseas service.’”33 As soon as a volunteer decided to enlist into 
the CEF, the recruiting officer was responsible for administering his transition from 
civilian to soldier. The CEF did not accept each man who presented himself before a 
recruiting station. Numerous volunteers willing to fight for Canada were rejected for not 
living up to the CEF’s regulations of enlistment, usually for failing the medical 
examination. In 1914, 4,945 volunteers were “struck off strength”34 at the first site of 
mobilization, Valcartier Camp, near Quebec City, Quebec, over two thousand for being 
medically unfit,35
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Reasons for rejecting a volunteer varied from being under age or refusing 
inoculations to having a spouse who protested her husband’s enlistment. Each volunteer 
for overseas service was required to pass a physical examination and fill out attestation 
papers. A medical examination, administered by a local physician or a CEF Medical Corps 
officer, examined a volunteer’s health and ascertained whether or not the volunteer met 
the CEF’s qualifications - being between 18 and 45 years old, and at least 5 feet 3 inches 
tall, excepting artillery men and machine gunners who had to be 5 feet 7 inches or taller. 
Initial mobilization orders from Hughes required that volunteers have previous military 
experience, but my examination of the CEF’s Nominal Rolls36 shows that this standard 
was not strictly enforced. Volunteers were accepted in their order of arrival upon 
completing a physical examination, but during the first year of recruiting, applicants were 
selected first from unmarried men, then from married men without dependents, and finally 
from married men with families. Wives of volunteers could cancel the enlistment of their 
husbands, although this regulation along with the height requirement were rescinded after 
July 1915, when Prime Minister Borden asked the Department of Militia and Defence to 
raise more recruits to reinforce the battalions who had fought at the Second Battle of 
Ypres.
Volunteers who met all physical qualifications filled out an attestation paper to 
enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This double-sided document was divided into 
six sections. The first section asked twelve37 general questions: name, country of birth, 
name and address of next of kin, date of birth, occupation, martial status, and previous
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military service. Of the twelve questions, “Do you understand the nature and terms of
your engagement?” and “Are you willing to be attested to serve in the Canadian Over-
Seas Expeditionary Force?” were the two most important. The next section, “Declaration
To Be Made By Man On Attestation,” required the volunteer to acknowledge by signature
his action of enlisting. The declaration of attestation reads:
I,__________, do solemnly declare that the above answers made by me to the
above questions are true, and that I am willing to fulfil [sic] the engagements by 
me now made, and I hereby engage and agree to serve in the Canadian Over- 
Seas Expeditionary Force, and to be attached to any arm of the service therein, 
for the term of one year, or during the war now existing between Great Britain and 
Germany should that war last longer than one year, and for six months after the 
termination of that war provided His Majesty should so long require my services, 
or until legally discharged.
The declaration of attestation was followed by the oath of allegiance to “His Majesty King
George the Fifth,” also acknowledged by the volunteer’s signature. At the bottom of the
document a magistrate certified the legality of the enlistment - co-signed by the magistrate
and recruiting officer. On the backside of the attestation paper was the certificate of the
medical examination, the volunteer’s religious denomination, and verification from the
officer commanding the unit.39
Every volunteer was required to complete the above process of enlistment,
including those men transferring from Canada’s Militia to the CEF. Upon acceptance into
the CEF, the recruit went to the mobilization center designated for his battalion, which
varied according to the battalion’s division. At the battalion’s mobilization point, the
recruit received his clothing, equipment, and basic military training and instructional
exercises consisting of “physical training, musketry instruction, foot and arms drill and
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entrenching.”40 Hereafter, the battalion waited until being transported to Salisbury Plain, 
England, to receive additional training before finally being sent to the Western Front.41
Because the Canadian Expeditionary Force recruited volunteers, a collection of 
volunteers often from certain geographic regions or ethnic groups would ask the 
Department of Militia and Defence to be organized into their own battalion. Irish and 
Scots, either subjects residing in Canada or Canadian-born descendants of immigrants, 
were the two groups who most frequently inquired about forming their own battalions. 
Similar requests also came from volunteers inhabiting a particular region of Canada. For 
example, the Department of Militia and Defence authorized the formation of the 236th 
Overseas Infantry Battalion, New Brunswick Kilties, on July 15, 1915, which consisted of 
Scots from the province of New Brunswick.42 Furthermore, Militia Headquarters 
mobilized battalions that recruited nationally, but were dominated by one ethnic group, 
such as the 197th and 223rd Canadian-Scandinavian Overseas Infantry Battalions. 
French-Canadian battalions were received with enthusiasm on account of their low 
enlistment numbers. Non-Caucasian battalion schemes proposed to the Department of 
Militia and Defence, however, were neither as frequent nor readily accepted. Historian 
Desmond Morton explained that “for racial reasons, offers by Japanese Canadians to form 
a battalion were rejected, although Japan was one of Britain’s allies.”43 Canadians of 
African descent received similar treatment, but North American Indians were usually 
accepted without difficulties, many of whom were mobilized into the 114th Overseas 
Infantry Battalion.
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The Canadian Expeditionary Force was an army of many nationalities - seventy 
percent of the first contingent entered their place of birth on their attestation paper as a 
country outside of Canada. CEF volunteers were born in countries as far away as Poland, 
Russia, and India. Because these three nations were adversaries of Germany, their support 
for Canada’s armed forces was understandable. But citizens of the United States 
intriguingly enlisted while their country of birth abstained from participating in the First 
World War until April 6, 1917.
In contrast to Canada’s immediate support for the Allied war effort, the United 
States remained neutral for thirty-two months. During the first week of the war, President 
Woodrow Wilson issued a series of identical proclamations which stated that “the United 
States is on terms of friendship and amity with the contending powers. . . ,”44 In theory 
the United States government’s neutrality was recognized by the belligerents from The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which “established extensive rules designed to 
reduce the horror of war once it erupted and put into place neutrality regimes to inhibit the 
spread of war to other states.”45 From August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, the United States 
persistently attempted to maintain its policy of neutrality, despite being tested by German 
submarines sinking passenger liners and merchant ships. Notwithstanding the debate 
between some American citizens and the Wilson administration about the desirability of 
neutrality, approximately forty-one thousand Americans violated the neutrality acts of the 
United States to enlist into the CEF.
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The Neutrality Proclamations issued by President Wilson reaffirmed the laws of the 
United States pertaining to neutrality. Wilson’s declaration was in accordance with 
“certain provisions of the act approved on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1909, commonly 
known as the ‘Penal Code of the United States.’”46 A public circular issued by the U. S. 
Department of State on August 15, 1914, reiterated these provisions by stating that 
“citizens of and persons within the United States are under legal duty to observe neutrality 
during the war in Europe; this duty is demarked in the neutrality laws and in the 
President’s proclamation.”47 An American who voluntarily enlisted into the CEF violated 
the first two provisions of the Neutrality Acts:
1. Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents 
by land or by sea against the other belligerent.
2. Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a 
soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, 
or privateer.
The punishment for violating this law was a fine of three thousand dollars or 
imprisonment. Canada was considered a belligerent as defined by the August 5, 1914, 
American Proclamation of Neutrality, Number 1272, which indirectly identified Canada as 
a dominion of Great Britain and defined Great Britain as a belligerent by declaring 
“whereas a state of war unhappily exists between Germany and Great Britain.”48 
Nonetheless, this and subsequent legislation, as well as the Neutrality Proclamations, 
proved to be ineffectual in deterring citizens of the United States from enlisting in foreign 
armed services.
Americans who volunteered for military service in Canada either enlisted into the
CEF on their own initiative or had been persuaded to do so by CEF recruitment efforts.
American volunteers had to present themselves, at their own expense, before a recruiting
officer in Canada. Once an American offered his services to the CEF, he was accepted
based on the same standards and regulations as any Canadian or British subject. On
account of the CEF’s recruiting stations dispersed across Canada, Americans enlisted at a
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number of locations, but frequently they volunteered at a recruiting station just inside the 
Canadian border. Thus, as American citizens volunteered for enlistment at a variety of 
locations, they correspondingly were relegated to serving in any of the CEF’s overseas 
infantry, cavalry, artillery, or supporting regiments.
- Although CEF enlistment records reveal that nearly every unit of the CEF 
contained some American citizens, most Canadian Expeditionary Force recruiters made no 
specific attempt to enlist Americans for service in any overseas regiment. The exception 
to this was the exclusive recruitment of Americans for the CEF’s American Legion49 and 
the occasional CEF recruiter whose recruiting district bordered the United States and who 
crossed into the United States to induce Americans to enlist in any CEF formation. This 
concept of recruiting American citizens originated with the Minister of Militia and 
Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes.
>. Hughes’ plan to recruit Americans into the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a 
distinct battalion originated twenty-five days after the outbreak of the war on August 29, 
1914. A trans-Atlantic cablegram from Hughes to Field Marshal, Horatio Herbert, First
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Earl Kitchener of Khartoum and then British War Minister, offered “sixty thousand good 
fighting men from neighboring Republic anxious to help Britain and liberty” later adding 
that “they [Americans] would make a splendid legion.”50 Hughes developed a plan to 
enlist thousands of Americans from the United States without violating the neutrality laws 
of the United States. Kitchener responded by indicating that the Imperial Forces “shall be 
proud to have the help of men who wish to fight with us against the forces of military 
despotism,” but also reminding Hughes not to enlist or recruit any Americans outside of 
Canada.51
- Despite their need for manpower, British authorities remained hesitant about
accepting Hughes’ plan because Great Britain neither wanted to compromise the neutrality
of the United States nor risk losing a future ally and a great source of war supplies and
financial assistance. In response to Hughes’ recruitment plan, the British Foreign Office
advised Hughes to “respect the traditional [neutrality] policy of the United States
Government;” however,
His Majesty’s Government will of course reserve to themselves the right to 
accept as a recruit any United States citizen who may present himself for 
enlistment in British territory, but they should, in Sir E. Grey’s opinion, 
give no encouragement to any offers of enlistment received from 
Americans resident in the United States, however gratified they may feel by the 
spirit shown in such offers. .. ,52
Furthermore, the Foreign Office informed Hughes that the final decision of accepting
American citizens as recruits in the Canadian Expeditionary Force would be delegated to
the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.53
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In a letter from British Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law to the Governor- 
General, the Duke of Connaught, Bonar Law decided to leave the decision up to 
Connaught, whom Hughes disliked and mistrusted.54 Before this correspondence, 
evidence suggests that Connaught and other Militia department officers knew nothing of 
Hughes’ concept to raise an overseas “legion” composed of foreigners. In view of Bonar 
Law’s and the British Foreign Office’s decisions to entrust Connaught with the authority 
over the proposed “legion,” Hughes embarked to England in order to gain personal 
authority over his plan from higher ranking Imperial authorities. Sometime during his visit 
to England in October 1914, Hughes managed to win support for his “American Legion” 
scheme from Kitchener, then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, Acting High 
Commissioner for Canada Sir George Perley, and King George the Fifth. One 
contingency of this prominent group’s approval of Hughes’ plan was that the recruitment 
of American citizens for collective service in one military unit would not endanger 
relations with the United States so long as no Americans were recruited on American 
soil.55
British authorities insisted that no American citizen would be recruited or enlisted 
within the United States because they recognized that American laws prohibited any 
belligerent from actively recruiting on a neutral nation’s territory. This recognition was 
based on the United States’ Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, the British Army Act, and 
the neutrality acts recently reiterated by President Wilson in his Neutrality Proclamations. 
Hughes’ recruitment plan, which relied upon Americans volunteering for enlistment into
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the Canadian Expeditionary Force, conflicted with American neutrality and foreign
enlistment laws. As a result, the enlistment of Americans into a single battalion proved
diplomatically complex for Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.
In response to the War of 1812, during which Great Britain had actively attempted
to persuade Americans who were British sympathizers to enlist into the British Army, the
United States government enacted a law on April 20, 1818, forbidding Americans from
accepting commissions or entering a foreign army while the United States government
remained neutral. The wording of the Act, similar to the neutrality laws passed a hundred
years later by Congress stated
that if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, 
enlist or enter himself or hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself, or 
to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be 
enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or 
people, as a soldier or as a marine or seaman, . . . every person so offending shall 
be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding one 
thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding three years . . .  [as long as] the 
United States shall then be at peace with such foreign prince, state, colony, district, 
or people.56
The British government appreciated this fact. For example, a letter to Hughes from the 
British Foreign Office stated that “Sir E. Grey [British Foreign Minister] understands that 
United States Law on this subject is still governed by the United States Foreign Enlistment 
Act of 1818. . . ”57 Great Britain further hesitated to accept Hughes’ American recruiting 
plan on account of the unfortunate experience of attempting to raise troops for the British 
Army on United States territory during the Crimean War. The United States vehemently 
refused to allow this to happen.j8 Section 6 of the 1818 Foreign Enlistment Act hindered
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CEF recruitment endeavors of American citizens as well by prohibiting “any person . . . 
within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States . . . [from organizing] any military 
expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against, , , any foreign prince or 
state, or of any colony, district or people, with whom the United States are [at] peace.59
Just as the neutrality laws and the 1818 Foreign Enlistment Act of the United 
States forbidding Americans from enlisting or accepting a commission from a foreign army 
with whom the United States government was at peace, the same neutrality laws of the 
United States also prevented foreign armies from entering American territory to recruit its 
citizens. Sections three through seven, nine, and eleven (almost identical to Section 6 of 
the 1818 Act) of the neutrality laws enforced by the Department of State and issued by 
President Wilson prohibited a foreign army, such as the CEF, from recruiting or enlisting 
American citizens within the boundaries of the United States. Provisions three through 
seven differed from the 1818 Act as follows:
3. Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service in the 
service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on 
board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.
4. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United 
States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.
5. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent 
to be entered into service as aforesaid.
6. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with 
intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.
7. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with 
intent to be entered into service as aforesaid.60
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The neutrality laws applied to any American citizen or resident, including those who 
remained a citizen or subject of one of the belligerents.
The Minister of Militia and Defence’s plan to recruit and enlist Americans also 
violated international agreements which restricted Canada from recruiting American 
citizens. It is unclear if Hughes or Canadian authorities were aware of the agreement, but 
the provisions applied to Hughes’ plans to recruit Americans. At The Hague Convention 
of 1907, the leading governments of the world convened at the request of German 
Emperor Wilhelm II to adopt certain international agreements. On October 18, 1907, the 
assembly endorsed “The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land,” which defined the position of neutral nations and individuals “in their relations 
with the belligerents.”61 Article 4 of the convention’s pamphlet stated that a “Corps of 
combatants can not be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral 
Power to assist the belligerents.” This provision forbade the CEF from recruiting in the 
United States until the American government entered the war. Interestingly, Great Britain 
failed to ratify the international measures approved at the 1907 The Hague Convention, 
although not because of this section of the agreements.62
Hughes neglected to consider the British Army Act of 1870, which regulated 
among other British military questions, the procedures of recruiting and enlistment.63 
Section 95 (1) of the Act prohibited the British Army from organizing a “separate corps of 
foreigners for service in His Majesty’s Army.” Britain’s Army Council informed Hughes 
that “various offers of the services of ‘foreign legions’ have been made to the Army
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Council and have been declined for the reason that altogether apart from the terms of 
Section 95 (1) of the Army Act, the recruiting regulations for the Army prohibit the 
enlistment of all foreigners.” Furthermore, the Army Council added, this applied to all 
Imperial Forces “whether as part of the Canadian Expeditionary Force or otherwise.”64 
Although discussed and approved by Kitchener and “His Majesty” in the early 
stages of the war, the recruitment of Americans for the CEF’s American Legion failed to 
materialize until October 1915. Hughes’ competing obligations as Minister of Militia and 
Defence and most Canadian and some British authorities’ reluctance to aggravate the 
neutrality of the United States government delayed measures to recruit Americans for a 
single military unit. Recruiting for the American Legion started two months before the 
Department of Militia and Defence recognized the Legion’s first battalion - the 97th 
Overseas Infantry Battalion.65 Unofficially the battalion began organizing on October 22, 
1915, but Hughes did not authorize the formation as a CEF overseas battalion until 
December 22, 1915, under the command of Major A. B. Clark.66 Headquartered at 
Toronto, Ontario, the 97th organized on account of Hughes’ ingenuity for the concept and 
“as a result of a steadily increasing demand on the part of former American citizens living 
and doing business in Canada to have some distinctive part in the present war.”67
The restrictions restraining Hughes’ recruitment of American citizens at first 
obliged him to concentrate on enlisting Americans who resided in Canada. But this 
recruiting endeavor resulted in low numbers of Americans enlisting into the new battalion 
during the first two months. The addition and coordination of Toronto’s American Club
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under President Asa Minard and the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock enhanced the 
recruiting efforts of the 97th. Before the American Club’s involvement with the 97th, it 
received little attention either from the CEF’s administration, Canadians, or Americans, 
yet once the Department of Militia and Defence “secured the cooperation of the American 
Club of Toronto . . . that the public began to know about the 97th.”68 The American 
-fXlub, primarily composed of wealthy Americans residing in Ontario, financially assisted 
and aided the battalion’s recruiting efforts by compiling the names of Americans currently 
living in the Dominion.
Although the contribution of the American Club helped the recruitment of
Americans into the CEF, the addition of Reverend Bullock to the Canadian Expeditionary
Force proved to be the most important. Bullock, minister of Ottawa’s Congregational
Church of Our Father, was born in Cold Springs, New York, had served with the 1st
Cavalry of Illinois Volunteers during the Spanish-American War. First commissioned as a
Captain of the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, Bullock served as the battalion’s first
chaplain and recruiting officer “to raise a battalion of American citizens ostensibly resident
in Canada for service overseas.”69 His recruitment headquarters was in Toronto’s Strand
■ *Theatre at 103 Yonge Street. Bullock’s main activity as a recruiter for the American 
Legion was speaking at recruiting rallies where American residents in Canada were 
encouraged to enlist, and where speeches were given and American, Canadian, and British 
patriotic songs were sung. In his speeches, Bullock enthusiastically asserted the political 
importance of the American Legion in Canada’s army, stating that it would “be a pledge of
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North America to the world’s democracy.”70 Thirty recruits enlisted after hearing Bullock 
speak at a recruiting rally at Toronto’s Hippodrome Sportsmans Association on January 1, 
1916. In addition to speaking at recruiting rallies at a variety of locations in Ontario, 
Bullock recruited American citizens in the United States. This violated American 
neutrality laws and The Hague Convention’s provisions, and endangered the relations 
between Great Britain and Canada with the United States. Bullock and a number of other 
CEF officers traveled through the United States recruiting Americans to serve in the 
CEF’s American Legion, despite the British government’s specific instructions to Hughes 
not to permit the recruitment of American citizens in the United States. As a reward for 
his recruiting efforts, Hughes promoted Bullock to Lieutenant-Colonel and commanding 
officer of the fifth American Legion overseas infantry battalion - the 237th.71
From December 1915 to February 1916, the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion 
enlisted 1,449 American citizens into the Canadian Expeditionary Force and rejected 451 
others for being medically unfit.72 On account of the 97th’s success of filling its ranks, on 
February 15, 1916, Hughes created three more overseas infantry battalions - the 211th, 
212th and 213th - reserved for American volunteers. As the 97th was authorized to 
recruit in Toronto, Ontario, each of the new American Legion battalions was assigned a 
particular region: Alberta and British Columbia to the 211th; Manitoba to the 212th; and 
St. Catherines, Ontario - near the New York State border - to the 213th. Several months 
later, a fifth American battalion - the 237th - was formed on July 15, 1916, to recruit in 
New Brunswick and eastern Canada. All five American Legion battalions recruited
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American citizens for the remainder of 1916, except for the 212th and 237th which were 
amalgamated to the 97th Overseas Battalion on September 12, 1916. The American 
Legion enlisted a total of 2,746 American citizens from October 30, 1915, until the last of 
its battalions disbanded on March 16, 1917.73 This figure fell far short of Hughes’ 
optimistic estimate of sixty thousand American citizen volunteers.
The number of Americans who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 
American Legion represented only seven percent of the total number of Americans who 
enlisted in the CEF.74 Yet recruiting Americans for the Legion’s five battalions 
represented almost all of the CEF’s recruitment of American citizens. Recruiting for the 
American Legion’s battalions caused difficulties with the United States government 
because the recruiting tactics aggravated the Wilson administration, embarrassed some 
British officials, and frustrated Canada’s Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff Major-General 
Willoughby G. Gwatkin, and Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Major-General Sir 
Eugene Fiset.
The Canadian Expeditionary Force recruited American citizens in ways similar to 
those used to recruit Canadians and British subjects residing in Canada. The battalion’s 
commanding officer was entrusted by the Department of Militia and Defence to enlist 
volunteers under army regulations until all ranks were occupied. The American Legion’s 
battalions recruited volunteers in the same manner, except that its recruiting stations and 
officers commonly violated CEF regulations prohibiting the recruitment of Americans in
38
Canada and the United States. CEF recruiting efforts in the United States were conducted 
by varied means such as posters, billboards, and personal letters from American 
Legionnaires to American citizens. Advertising in American newspapers, recruiting in the 
United States, and displaying American flags and national emblems at recruiting stations 
typified the American Legion’s violations of the United States government’s neutrality.
As early as January 27, 1916, - three months after the 97th Overseas Infantry 
Battalion began recruiting - violations by the American Legion surfaced in the United 
States. According to a letter to Hughes from an unidentified Canadian authority, Sir Cecil 
Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador at Washington, was informed by a State Department 
employee that the United States government understood that Americans were actively 
being recruited for the CEF. As evidence the State Department employee, identified as 
Polk, presented Spring-Rice with a flyer that read: “AMERICANS. ATTENTION. We 
want 500 fellows like you for the 97th Overseas Battalion and we want you now.
Forward! To Recruiting Station 103 Yonge Street.” The letter warned Hughes that the 
“State Department are becoming a little unhappy about this recruiting . . . [furthermore] I 
think you ought to know this as there might be trouble with the American Government on 
the subject.”75
Just as this notice reached the U. S. State Department, countless recruiting 
materials advertising for the American Legion’s battalions appeared in newspapers across 
the United States. Usually appearing in the sports section of a newspaper, an 
advertisement romanticized the experience of serving in the CEF’s American Legion and
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frequently the recruiting ads promoted the CEF’s high wages and “separation allowances”
for his family respectively provided by the Canadian government and the Canadian
Patriotic Fund.76 For example, an announcement appealing to the emotions of American
citizens - titled “Here’s Your Chance Americans!” - declared
THE BIGGEST ADVENTURE IN THE WORLD is open to you!...but THE 
UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR! You are not being called on to directly 
defend your homes, to directly defend your flag. The call is even broader and 
bigger. It has put aside nationalism - for this has become more a war of principles 
than of nations, of good against bad, or right against wrong. . . .  IN YEARS TO 
COME the ‘American Legion’ men of today will be looked upon as heroes - not 
only of Canada, not only of the United States, but of the world. . . . The time has 
come - THE CALL TO ARMS - To FIGHT, FOR LIBERTY - as TRUE 
AMERICANS . . . real men are not afraid! It’s better to die a glorious death 
than live in inglorious idleness when the WORLD NEEDS YOU! You will be 
well clothed, well fed and well paid - honored, respected and loved by every 
Canadian.77
Advertisements as elaborate as the above example or simpler ones that merely stated 
“Wanted - 300 active, able-bodied men at once. No. 2. Cromwell Street, Sarnia. Office 
open Sundays and Evenings,” appeared in newspapers across the nation, particularly in the 
states bordering the Dominion.78 Advertisements listing the locations of recruiting stations 
appeared in Canadian newspapers as well, “so that Americans whose inclinations lead 
them to join the American Legion coming from the U. S., know where to go.”79 While 
traveling in the United States, a staff member from the Governor-General’s office 
observed that the advertisements appeared “from one end of the country to the other.”80 
Newspapers in the United States printed more than CEF recruiting offers. Often 
articles warned young Americans not to be enticed by the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 
American Legion. An editorial in the Grand Rapids News on April 20, 1916, cautioned
Figure 1
An example of a CEF recruiting advertisement inducing Americans to volunteer.
T-H
T H E  BIG G EST A D V E N T U R E  IN T H E  W O R L D  . of C anada, not only of the U nited States, but of the
is open to y o u l A great' chance to show  yourself a 
m an—to m ake a name for yourself—ntake:your people 
proud of you — give yourself som ething to look back 
to w ith pride an d  pleasure 1
Rem em ber when you were a boy, how the 'G rand 
Arm y Men looked to you ? E very .m an  a hero—and. 
prouder o f his G .A .R . button than  any th ing  else? 
W ell, they d id  their DU TY —they fought fo r-the ir 
flag, defended  their homes, upheld  the Union. Is it a 
DUTY tha t faces you today, A m ericans?. No, a priv ­
ilege! No one on earth  can CO M PEL you to enter 
this fight — and no one W A N T S  you to enter it. 
U N LESS YOU W A N T  T O  G E T  INTO T H E  THING 
Y O U R SELF, because you know tha t it is the R IG H T 
THING T O  DO I You know the story of the war— 
that G erm any is the foe of liberty  and civilization, 
that G erm any has violated international law, and  is a 
m enace to the  w elfare of hum anity. You know th a t— 
.bu t T H E  UNITED S T A T E S  IS N O T A T  W A R ! 
You are not being called on to directly defend yotir 
homes, to directly  defend your flag. T he call is even 
broader an d  b igger. It has put aside nationalism — 
for this has becom e more a w ar of principles than  of 
nations, of good against bad, or righ t against wrong.
Because C anada  was fighting  for those very p rin ­
ciples of liberty  w hich every true A m erican loves, 
thousands of A m ericans have flocked to her aid, en-- 
listing in regu lar C anad ian  battalions. T hey  are 
help ing  to repay the debt of g ra titude to C anada for 
jthe  48,000 C anad ians who fought for the  North in the 
Civil W ar. A nd  now, to further cem ent the friend­
ship of C anada and  the U nited S tates, there has come 
into being  " T H E  AM ERICAN LEG IO N ," a full 
b rigade of A m ericans, N ative Born, or N aturalized, 
who are going overseas in distinctive  units, officered 
front their own num ber, and who are to m ake history.
IN Y E A R S T O  COM E the ’‘ A m erican L eg io n "  
men of today will be looked upon as heroes—not only
world. • E very  man w illib e  a ■ member of " T H E ;  
M I L I T A R Y  ORDER"* O F  T H E 'A M E R I C A N  
L E G IO N ," and  the insignia of that order is destined 
to becom e as famous as that of the G .A . R.; only it 
■will be much rarer. T he organization is already 
form ed—a fraternal body, sworn to eternal friendship, 
the re lief and support of unfortunate members, and as 
a body to perpetuate  the  great purpose and the  great 
fight its m em bers fought, “ FO R  HUMANITY AND 
JU S T IC E !"
EOYS — M EN — H E R E 'S  YOUR CHANCE1 If 
the  red blood of m anhood is in your veins, you cannot 
sit id ly  b y ! You must realize that the ba ttle  line of 
F lan d ers  is the  bulw ark of civilization — that if it 
were to give way, not only C anada, but the- United 
S tates, would surely be drenched in blood ? Do you 
want G erm an savagery  on North A m erican soil?  Do 
you w;ant a line of G erm an forts on what is now the 
peaceful border line betw een the United S tates and 
C an ad a?  NO — NO — NO — Not if you are R E A L  
M EN! T h e  tim e has come—T H E  C A L L  T O  A R M S' 
- T o  FIG H T . FO R  L IB E R T Y -a s  T R U E  AM ERI­
CA N S! You arc not going just on a picnic, boys. 
Some of you will not come back. But the real men 
are  not a f ra id !  It’s be tte r to die a glorious death 
than  live in inglorious idleness when the W O R L D  
N EED S Y O U !
Come O verseas with the A m erican Legion. W e . 
will m ake you one of u s l Each of us has started  as 
you will be doing. Each has an equal chance of 
w inning  prom otion. T here  are vacancies for 100 
officers an d  several hundred non-commissioned offi­
cers. T hese  will be  filled from the ranks', if you 
have the  right stuff in you, you can get ahead. But 
w hether you are  private  or officer YOU A R E  AN 
AM ERICAN LEGIONER1 You will be well clothed, 
well fed and  well p a id —honored, respected and loved 
by  every C anad ian . THE CALL TO ARMS HAS 
COM E. G E T  IN T O  THE S C R A P RIGHT AWAY, 
A N D  DO M O R E  THAN YOUR DUTY. .
ccfiecoaoacaoiaeow cciois&icaow eac oM Osaoccoeioocoococccccoeo ieoaeeocoioecocoeoMooeGoo
The American Legion is Officered by Men 
Promoted from the Ranks!
A Square Deal and Equal Chance to Every Man Joining 
TLis literature is donated by William T. Gregory, of Leamington, Ontario.
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the youth of America that the Canadian government was conducting a campaign to lure 
young Americans to Canada by tempting them with lucrative employment opportunities, 
then persuading the youth to enlist into the CEF. Although the Department of Militia and 
Defence denied the charges of “misleading inducements falsely . . .  to American citizens to 
come to Canada as CEF recruits,” the accusations were true. A letter from the Duke of 
Connaught to Borden exemplified the Governor-General’s grievance with this practice by 
condemning CEF recruiters of inducing “American citizens to cross into Canada, 
nominally for harvesting, but in reality to endeavor to persuade them to enlist for 
Overseas.”82
Despite the Department of Militia and Defence’s denial of misleading Americans to 
enlist in the CEF, it should be noted that CEF recruiters adopted a variety of recruiting 
methods, both legal and illegal, covert and overt, to fill the ranks of the American Legion. 
The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion’s publication, The American Legion Magazine, 
reported that “if a man is in Canada, then he will be asked to become a member of the 
Legion if he is considered to be a suitable man, but he must be in the Dominion before he 
can be invited.”83 Prime Minister Borden issued a statement to discount similar rumors, 
declaring that Americans residing in the United States who visit Canada would not 
experience any more difficulties than they encountered on previous travels.84
Newspapers and other weekly publications not only contained advertisements 
inducing Americans to cross the border to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, but 
covered the recruitment of Americans in the CEF. Beginning in August 1914, the New
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York Times periodically reported that thousands of Americans were enlisting in Canada’s
armed forces for overseas service. For the remainder of the war this paper included
articles about the CEF recruitment of American citizens and their service in the war and
after the United States entered the war published casualty listings of Americans in the
CEF. On May 28, 1916, the New York Times printed a two-page feature article explaining
the American Legion’s formation and highlighting the lives of several American
Legionnaires. Popular periodicals, such as Outlook, Literary Digest, and New Republic,
occasionally published articles about the Americans in the CEF. Both types of
publications and circulars were pro-Allied and often published articles bordering on
propaganda. For instance, one article asked:
‘Why aren’t you in the [Canadian] army?’ ‘Oh,’ said I, ‘I’m an American.’ ‘That’s 
no excuse,’ the boy continued. ‘Americans are fighting too, thousands of them.
We used to think they were afraid, but they’re just as brave as we are, after 
all.’85
Canadian recruitment of American citizens went beyond advertisements in 
newspapers and periodicals, as some Canadian officers traveled to various points in the 
United States in order to recruit volunteers. Although this policy was regarded by 
Connaught, Major-General Gwatkin, and Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Major- 
General Sir Eugene Fiset, and most British authorities as irresponsible and contrary to 
Kitchener’s instructions governing such policy, Hughes must have known CEF recruiters 
where recruiting in the United States, but failed to act because he most likely approved or 
unofficially authorized Bullock and other American Legion recruiters to recruit Americans 
in the United States. Evidence appears to contradict this assumption as Hughes was
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ordered “in plain terms than no efforts to recruit may be made in the United States ”86 
Bullock, the most ardent American Legion recruiter, and other CEF recruiters either 
disobeyed Hughes’ order prohibiting CEF recruiters from inducing American citizens to 
enlist outside of Canada or Hughes never made the order. Most likely Hughes did not 
instruct American Legion recruiters forbidding their recruitment in the United States, 
although he may have made a “lame duck” order to CEF recruiters in order to protect his 
involvement with the CEF’s recruitment of Americans in the United States.87
The appearance of CEF recruiters in the United States frustrated the United States 
government. The United States responded by prosecuting CEF recruiters for illegally 
inducing American citizens to enlist. This situation caused the U. S. Department of State 
to clarify what belligerent actions were permissible in the United States. The majority of 
the inquiries received by the State Department centered on charges by the German 
Ambassador at Washington, Count Otto von Bernstorff, accusing the United States of 
partiality towards the Allies. Replies explained the Wilson administration’s position 
concerning former belligerent subjects residing in the United States and their obligation for 
military service. Both Secretaries of State during the First World War - William J. Bryan 
and Robert Lansing - repeatedly attempted to pacify Bernstorff by reaffirming the strict 
dedication of the United States to neutrality. As for foreign residents in the United States, 
the State Department notified American immigration authorities that the transportation of 
former subjects from any of the belligerents through the United States to points outside of 
the country for military service was permitted; however, the United States government
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was under no international commitment by “which persons of foreign origin residing in 
this country may be compelled to return to their countries of origin for military service, 
nor is there any way in which persons may be forced into foreign armies against their will 
so long as they remain in the United States.”88
Despite the United States government’s neutrality laws or The Hague Convention 
of 1907’s agreements prohibiting foreign armies from organizing or recruiting within the 
United States, officers of the CEF, such as Reverend Bullock, nevertheless recruited in the 
United States by soliciting American citizens to voluntarily enlist into the CEF or its 
American Legion. Often at the expense of the Department of Militia and Defence, 
American citizens journeyed north to enlist after CEF recruiters gave them money and 
directions to recruiting stations in Canada. Crossing the U.S.-Canadian border was 
sometimes precarious because the Canadian government feared incursions from German- 
Americans and Austrian-Americans.89 On one occasion a Canadian border patrol guard 
killed two American fisherman who unintentionally crossed the international line near 
Niagara Falls.90 To combat this paranoia, Hughes “persuaded Canadian immigration 
authorities to relax substantially the entrance requirements for new arrivals.”91
Although The American Legion Magazine’s first issue stated that the Legion’s 
recruiting officers “have been enjoined strictly to refrain from violating the laws of 
neutrality by urging or inviting men to cross the border” to enlist voluntarily, examples 
abound of CEF recruitment activity in the United States.92 Recruiting efforts differed in 
degrees of discretion, as often recruiting agents appeared in “mufti” to personally
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approach a prospective American volunteer, yet occasionally, as British Ambassador 
Spring-Rice informed Secretary Bryan, “uniformed Canadian soldiers wearing filled 
cartridge belts” frequently appeared in Detroit, Michigan 93 The majority of recruiting 
endeavors occurred undetected primarily because they were private conversations between 
undercover CEF recruiters and American citizens. For example, one American citizen 
reportedly crossed the border to enlist after a conversation with two CEF officers, who, 
having arranged to legally purchase munitions for the Canadian Army, advised him that if 
he enlisted in the CEF he would be granted a commission.94 And Bob Elston of the 
American Legion’s 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion recruited in Niagara Falls and 
Buffalo, New York, in order to “round up the rookies the padre [Bullock] had told to 
congregate at the border.” Elston searched the bars near the border for those Americans 
who had heard of the American Legion and wished to enlist in the CEF. He often gave 
them money for transportation to Toronto and provided them with directions to the 97th’s 
recruiting station.95 Additionally, some Americans, who served in the CEF on the 
battlefields, returned to recruit in the United States as is evident by an unidentified Arizona 
man who gave recruiting speeches in the United States “like the appeals of a hot 
gospeller.” His efforts resulted in the enlistment of twenty-three Americans before he 
stopped recruiting due to the wounds he had suffered in the war.96
The most publicized account of recruiters soliciting American citizens for overseas 
service occurred when two British subjects, Dr. Thomas Addis and Ralph K. Blair, were 
convicted for violating the Neutrality Acts in the summer of 1915. Before being indicted,
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Addis and Blair, considered the “ringleaders” of British recruitment of American citizens, 
had successfully recruited 155 American volunteers for service in the British Army, but 
were finally caught when federal agents intercepted thirty-two of those men traveling from 
San Francisco to New York in route to embarking for England for enlistment. The 
incident - accentuated by German Ambassador Bernstorffs scornful correspondence to 
the State Department accusing the British of violating American neutrality - marked an 
increasing trend of Allied recruiters covertly soliciting Americans to enlist into their armed
97services.
Similarly to Addis’ and Blair’s recruiting efforts, special agents of the U. S. 
Department of Justice arrested Canadian Expeditionary Force recruiters for violating the 
neutrality laws of the United States. On June 9, 1916, Captain H. J. Thomson was 
arrested for recruiting American citizens in Seattle, Washington, for the American Legion, 
presumably for the 211th Overseas Infantry Battalion headquartered at Vancouver, British 
Columbia. A few weeks later, the CEF’s Lieutenant Ernest Austin was charged in Seattle 
with violating the neutrality laws of the United States. Enlistment papers and 
advertisements found in Austin’s temporary Seattle residence and evidence demonstrating 
his active engagement of recruiting American citizens led to his prosecution for the 
infractions.98 Furthermore, a Militia and Defence Memorandum dated February 19, 1917, 
cited a recent recruiting endeavor by “an unidentified man [who] brought 178 men from 
California to Vancouver [for enlistment] at $1.00 a head.”99 Although CEF recruitment in 
the United States focused on enticing Americans of Anglo-Saxon heritage, the CEF
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actively recruited African-Americans. For example, on October 21, 1916, W. G. R.
Humphrey sent a letter to S. M. Maxwell encouraging African-American citizens from
New York to cross the border and enlist in the CEF’s No. 2 Construction Battalion, an all
black formation, and inquired “would it not be possible for you [S. M. Maxwell] to induce
one or more colored men to join you and come to Halifax [Nova Scotia]?”100
CEF recruiters operated in a number of northern American states and cities, such
as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Montana, Vermont, and Minnesota, in order
to solicit American volunteers for enlistment, and in doing so each time risked
incarceration by American authorities. In addition to prosecution by the United States
government, a CEF recruiter possibly faced hostile encounters with Americans who
wanted to maintain the neutrality of the United States government. For example, “some
hyphenated fanatic in Detroit” wrote a letter to Lieutenant C. N. Moore threatening his
life for having recruited American citizens in the city.101 Nonetheless, these threats must
not have been effective on account of a letter from Horace Nugent, the British Consul in
Chicago, to Prime Minister Borden which stated:
It seems astonishing that orders forbidding attempts at recruiting in the United 
States which have been issued so frequently should continue to be disregarded. I 
must ask once more that effective steps be taken to prevent any recurrence of such 
incidents.102
This correspondence appeared in Ottawa two days after Borden’s message to the CEF’s 
Adjutant General, Major-General W. E. Hodgins, requesting “that the instructions in this 
matter should be clear and ambiguous so that no action of any kind whatever should be 
taken to induce residents of the United States to come to Canada for enlistment.”103
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Canadian authorities discovered that they needed to strengthen the measures
prohibiting CEF recruiters from soliciting American citizens within the United States. A
week after the United States government asked Spring-Rice that Canada disband its
American Legion, on May 15, 1916, Connaught, who had been informed of American
objections from Spring-Rice, asked Borden if he would “pressure” Hughes to “discontinue
the recruiting of American subjects.”104 Recruiting continued throughout the summer and
into the fall of 1916, despite Connaught’s request and notwithstanding three of the five
American Legion battalions being disbanded from September to October 1916. An official
circular letter from the Governor-General to all recruiting stations issued on November
20, 1916, attempted to eliminate the recruiting practice, declaring
on no account are advertisements to be published in the United States papers for 
recruits, and no inducements are to be offered by way of traveling expenses or 
otherwise to citizens of the United States to enlist in the Canadian forces, nor are 
any such to be solicited or approached to enlist; and any officer disregarding these 
instructions will be subject to immediate dismissal.105
Before Connaught’s instructions no punishment existed for a CEF recruiter inducing
Americans in the United States to enlist. CEF recruiters were merely informed that this
practice was not permitted under any circumstances.106
The recruitment of American citizens in the United States by the Canadian
Expeditionary Force was not the only CEF recruiting method to aggravate American and
Canadian authorities. At various American Legion recruiting stations, American flags and
emblems were displayed. This practice of exhibiting American patriotic symbols was
designed to influence American citizens to enlist voluntarily in the CEF, but this created
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diplomatic tensions between the Dominion and its southern neighbor because the United 
States government wanted to give every appearance of strictly observing neutrality with 
no show of partiality towards any belligerent.
According to Sir John Willison, the editor in chief of The Toronto Daily News, 
displaying the “Stars and Stripes” in Canada was not unknown. He contended that for 
every British flag unfurled in the United States, a hundred American flags are flown in 
Canada, and “over many Summer cottages in Canada the American flag flies constantly, 
sometimes, one thinks, without due regard for Canadian susceptibilities.”107 Nonetheless, 
the U. S. State Department and the Governor-General of Canada requested the removal of 
all American flags from CEF recruiting stations.
After being informed by the U. S. State Department that American flags were 
being made for the CEF’s American Legion by a Chicago flag manufacturer, on April 10, 
1916, Spring-Rice appealed to the Governor-General to stop associating the Stars and 
Stripes with Canadian armed forces.108 The telegram from Spring-Rice also indicated the 
United States government’s grievance with American Legion battalions, specifically the 
212th Overseas Infantry Battalion, carrying American flags while parading and recruiting 
posters in Canada using the American flag. The Duke of Connaught replied by denying 
that the American Legion paraded or will parade with the American flag and notified 
Spring-Rice that “the recruiting posters upon which that emblem is inscribed are being 
canceled/’109
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A couple of months later, the CEF’s Adjutant-General, Major-General W. E. 
Hodgins, instructed the 212th, which had displayed an American flag crowned with a 
British flag, that “nothing can be permitted in any shape or form to claim any International 
connection of the 212th Battalion with the United States.”110 On June 8, 1916, U. S. 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing dispatched a letter to British Ambassador Spring-Rice 
indicating that American Consuls throughout Canada had observed recruiting stations 
displaying American flags alongside British flags “for the purpose of enlisting additional 
forces in the military unit known as the ‘American Legion.’” Lansing requested that this 
“misuse of the American flag” should cease.111
As recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force increased during the summer 
months of 1916, American Legion recruiting stations continued to disregard orders 
instructing them that “no American flags, banners or designs are to be displayed at 
recruiting offices where men are enlisted for American Overseas Battalions.”112 No 
Canadian official seemed to possess enough authority to restrict the displaying of the 
American flag. While traveling through Calgary, Alberta, the Governor-General witnessed 
a CEF recruiting station advertising as an “American Recruiting Office” for the 211th 
Overseas Battalion and exhibiting an American flag with the Union Jack. The 21 lth’s 
recruiters were immediately instructed to remove the flag.113 Furthermore, Clyde I. 
Webster, U. S. District Attorney in Detroit, Michigan, protested to the Department of 
Militia and Defence that American flags were repeatedly being displayed at the recruiting 
station in Windsor, Ontario.114
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The most infamous incident of the “misuse of the American flag” occurred at a
recruiting station in Niagara Falls, Ontario. On May 30, 1916, James H. Goodier, the
American Consulate Officer at Niagara Falls, observed a recruiting station for the 213th
Overseas Battalion displaying an American flag and immediately protested to E. F.
Morrison, the lieutenant in charge. Later that day, Goodier found the flag in exactly the
same position as before. Goodier discretely beckoned Morrison “quietly to one side,” and
once more asked him to remove the flag from the recruiting area. Morrison rebutted by
justifying the display of American flags on the grounds
that all the men joining the so-called ‘American Legion’ were Americans, that they 
had a right as such Americans to display the national emblem, and that in any 
event the flag was being utilized in all the recruiting stations for the American 
Legion, and was a necessity as part of their advertising campaign for recruits.
Despite Morrison’s defense, Goodier persuaded him to take down the flag. While
Goodier watched the flag being removed from the tent, a private, F. R. Yearwood,
sarcastically referred to the flag as “this ‘glorious’ rag” and insulted the United States
government for its neutrality. Several hours later, Goodier returned to find the flag
displayed inside the tent, “plainly visible from the outside.” Goodier “entered a verbal
protest against the mere subterfuge of changing the flag’s position.” The following day
Goodier returned to the recruiting station and found the flag still visible. Private
Yearwood, who was the only soldier on duty, contemptuously inquired “Well what are
you going to do now, take us across [the border] and have us shot at sunrise?” The State
Department protested and the CEF investigated the station’s recruiting practices.
Morrison was court martialed for his role in the altercation and Yearwood deserted.115
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By the summer of 1916, the CEF’s voluntary system of recruiting began to outlive 
its usefulness as enlistment numbers decreased. Various developments contributed to this, 
but the mounting casualties due to the aggressive Allied offensive campaigns on the 
Western Front in 1916 and competition for manpower from the industrial and agricultural 
sectors caused the Canadian authorities to make changes. The first move involved 
dismissing Hughes from his position as Minister of Militia and Defence on November 9, 
1916, because his irregular recruiting methods had become increasingly disruptive to 
Prime Minister Borden, who disagreed with Hughes’ philosophy that a volunteer army 
was the most effective military organization for Canada.116 Less than one year after 
Hughes’ discharge, Prime Minister Borden’s Government enacted the Military Service Act 
on August 29, 1917, which authorized military conscription for Canada.
Although conscription developed from the decreasing number of volunteers 
enlisting into the CEF and the absolute need to reinforce the overseas divisions, one 
unstated element that may have affected the recruitment situation that led to military 
conscription in Canada was the absence of American citizens enlisting. Never mentioned 
in the discussions of 1917 or in post-war publications as a factor for Canadian 
conscription, the United States government’s entry into the war conceivably could have 
affected the recruiting numbers enough to accelerate this conscription policy. Evidence 
for this assertion is purely circumstantial; however, the United States entered the war on 
April 6, 1917, and only one month later, Prime Minister Borden publicly advocated for 
military conscription. Also, the Canadian government continued to recruit Americans
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after April 6, 1917, indicating Canada’s need for Americans as volunteers, although this 
time with the consent of the Wilson administration. On May 8, 1917, President Wilson 
signed a bill that permitted Canadians as well as British recruiters to solicit Canadians, 
Britons, and Americans in the United States for service in their armed forces - this was 
known as the British and Canadian Recruiting Mission.117 Therefore, because the United 
States government was unsure of its immediate military contribution to the Allies and 
because the United States armed forces would require some time to mobilize and train its 
forces, eager and motivated American citizens continued to cross the Canadian border in 
order to volunteer for the CEF. Unfortunately for Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Dennis, the 
head Canadian member of the recruiting commission, and the Canadian recruiters in the 
United States, their efforts were counteracted by the United States government’s 
enactment of the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, which implemented the draft for 
American citizens and all but negated the need for the British and Canadian Recruiting 
Mission, as Americans would now be required to enlist in the armed forces of the United 
States.118 Consequently, the removal of American citizens, who had been six to eight 
percent of the CEF’s volunteers before April 6, 1917, would have adversely affected the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force’s recruitment and enlistment and may have contributed to 
the Canadian government’s decision to enact conscription.
Recruiting American citizens as volunteers for the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
proved to be a frustrating task for the Department of Militia and Defence and Canadian 
authorities. From October 22, 1915 to April 6, 1917, the CEF’s American Legion actively
recruited Americans in the United States, which violated America’s neutrality laws and 
Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, and The Hague Convention of 1907. Furthermore, CEF 
recruiting methods aggravated the United States government because American Legion 
recruiters solicited American citizens in the United States and associated American flags 
and emblems with Canada’s armed forces. Violations of the neutrality laws of the United 
States by CEF recruiters caused the Wilson administration to protest to the British Foreign 
Office and British Ambassador Spring-Rice about the CEF’s recruitment of American 
citizens. The recruiting controversy ended when Canada’s Governor-General and Prime 
Minister jointly decided to disband the American Legion’s battalions in part because the 
Legion’s recruiters had been the leading violator of American neutrality laws.
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Chapter Two 
Enlistment of Americans in the CEF: Motivations, Consequences, & Numbers
Before the Canadian government enacted the Military Service Act on August 29, 
1917, to authorize the Dominion to conscript men between the ages of 18 and 45 for 
military service “beyond Canada, for the defence thereof,” the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force actively recruited volunteers to enlist.119 From August 4, 1914 to August 29, 1917, 
filling the ranks of the CEF’s infantry, cavalry, artillery, and specialized units relied on 
individual volunteers, whether Canadian or American citizens, to enlist. What motivated a 
volunteer to enlist in the CEF? The reasons why a Canadian or British subject resident in 
the Dominion would enlist in the CEF appear to be understandable, foremost among 
which was to fulfill a patriotic duty to serve “His Majesty’s Government.” But citizens of 
the United States, whose government decided to remain neutral during the first two and 
half years of the First World War, had somewhat more complicated motivations for 
voluntarily enlisting in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
What primarily motivated American citizens to enlist in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force were aggressive CEF recruitment and individual objectives. This 
chapter examines the different motives of the Americans who enlisted in the CEF in order 
to discover why more than forty-one thousand American citizens deliberately left the
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United States from August 4, 1914, to April 6, 1917, to fight in the CEF. Although each 
American who enlisted in the CEF was driven by his own personal ambitions, common 
motivations for enlistment are nonetheless evident. In addition to surveying the enlistment 
motivations of American citizens, this chapter addresses the consequences, particularly 
that of expatriation, for an American who enlisted in a foreign army during the First World 
War while the United States remained neutral. Finally, this chapter will ascertain the 
aggregate number of Americans who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force by 
utilizing original sources heretofore neglected by American and Canadian historians.
Before the United States entered the First World War on April 6, 1917, thousands 
of American citizens had volunteered to serve in foreign armies, paramilitary 
organizations, and humanitarian endeavors. Excluding the involvement of American 
financial institutions and corporations, and the loans or grants by American citizens to the 
Allied governments, each of these volunteers tried to help the Allies defeat Germany by 
volunteering for military service, by offering medical assistance, or by organizing 
philanthropic relief for Allied citizens under German occupation. Although the United 
States government remained neutral until April 6, 1917, and insisted that its citizens 
observe impartiality toward all belligerents, thousands of Americans opted to contribute to 
the war effort, customarily at their own expense and frequently in favor of the Entente 
Powers.
No known figure or source accounts for the number of Americans who voluntarily 
enlisted and served in the armies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire,
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Belgium, Italy, or Russia. The documentation of American military service in these 
belligerents’ armies, at best, remains superficial. On March 16, 1915, The New York 
Times printed an article about an American citizen who enlisted in the Belgian Army and 
participated in the defense of Liege.120 Outside of brief references like this, few materials 
exist which account for the small number of Americans who served in the armed forces 
other than in France, Great Britain, or Canada. A letter to the editor of the New York 
Times from a man from Buffalo, New York on October 5, 1916, questioned American 
newspapers’ biased coverage of Americans in Allied armed forces, complaining about the 
misrepresentation of Americans in the Germany Army: “I fail to find any mention of the 
myriad o f ‘Americans’ who are fighting in the German ranks - men of German origin, but
191none the less ‘American’ citizens.” Despite this assertion that a “myriad” of Americans 
served in the German Army, evidence suggests that American citizens preferred to enlist in 
the armed forces of the Allies. As a New York Times article asserted on April 1, 1915, 
“there are no known cases of American officers, meaning officers of the United States 
Federal army, resigning to join the Germans, but there is more than one case of 
resignations to join the British forces.”122
In the armed forces of Great Britain and France, American citizens abounded 
before the entrance of the United States into the war. No known study has investigated 
the exact number of Americans who served in the French or British armed forces, but 
hundreds of Americans enlisted and served in the British Army and Navy, particularly the 
British Expeditionary Force then serving in France and Belgium.123 Canada’s Directorate
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of History of the National Defence Headquarters ascertained that 455 American citizens 
served in the Royal Flying Corps, Royal Naval Air Service, and Royal Air Force.124 The 
most notable Americans serving in British Army during the war were Arthur Guy Empey, 
John P. Poe, and Dillwyn P. Starr. Great Britain accepted each American who volunteered 
for military service on the same terms under which it enlisted British citizens or Imperial 
subjects, provided that each American volunteer presented himself for service within 
British-controlled territory.
American citizens desiring to volunteer and serve in the French armed forces were 
obliged to join the French Foreign Legion because French law forbade the French Army 
from accepting soldiers from neutral countries. Military historians Douglas Porch,
Howard Swiggett, and John Baffin’s estimates vary from seventy to two hundred 
Americans who served in the French Foreign Legion (Legion Etrangere), which was 
officered by French nationals and whose ranks consisted mainly of foreign volunteers.125 
Famous Legionnaires from the United States who served in the First World War included 
Alan Seeger, Henry Farnsworth, and Charles Sweeney. Unlike the British Army, 
Americans tended to be assigned to certain units in the French Foreign Legion. John 
Laffin observed that the “1st Regiment [of the French Foreign Legion] was so 
Americanized that it became something of a tourist attraction and was probably visited by 
more French generals than any other unit.”126 Moreover, American volunteers 
distinguished themselves in the aviation squadrons of the French Air Force (Service 
Aeronatique), particularly the celebrated Lafayette Escadrille. This squadron consisted of
59
thirty-eight Americans and four French officers, and was unofficially considered by French 
military authorities and its aviators as an American formation.127
American citizens also volunteered to serve foreign nations in paramilitary128 and 
humanitarian work during the First World War. Paramilitary service, including that in 
military hospitals and ambulance services, offered Americans an opportunity to assist the 
Allied armies in non-combat activities. The American volunteer ambulance sections of H. 
Herman Haijes, Richard Norton, and A. Piatt Andrew allowed Americans, typically 
young, college-aged men, to participate in the war first-hand by transporting wounded 
soldiers from the front lines to dressing stations or hospitals.129 Additionally, hospitals, 
often converted chateaus, like the American Military Hospitals in France and the British 
Red Cross, accepted American doctors and nurses as volunteers. Furthermore, American 
citizens volunteered to serve in philanthropic humanitarian organizations that aided 
Europeans displaced or rendered indigent by the war by arranging food, clothing, and 
temporary housing. They served in such organizations as the American Hostels for 
Refugees and Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Commission.130
Notwithstanding the courageous and benevolent voluntary efforts of American 
citizens in the aforementioned armies and medical and philanthropic organizations, 
Americans enlisted in Canada’s Army in numbers far exceeding those in any other 
belligerent’s armed forces. In 1927, Canada’s Directorate of History for the Department 
of National Defence calculated that 35,612 Americans had enlisted and served in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, which included sixty-three American women who served
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as nursing sisters in the CEF’s Medical Corps.131 This figure updated a previous 
government investigation researching the numbers of foreign nationalities in the CEF; in 
1922, the total for American citizens who had served in the CEF was thought to be 
35,599.132 Based on the 1922 calculations, 19,966 Americans served in the CEF on the 
Western Front - 2,138 of whom died while fighting for the Dominion.133 Out of the 
628,964 soldiers enlisting in the CEF, nearly six percent were bom in the United States. 
Americans in the CEF also represented four percent of the CEF who served overseas and 
four percent of the CEF’s deaths.134 However, according to several varying estimations 
by publications and new research, these figures are short of the actual number of 
Americans who enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
Table 1
Americans in the Canadian Expeditionary Force
Total Number of Canadian Percentage of
Americans In The Expeditionary Force Americans In The 
CEF Totals CEF
Total Estimate135 35,612 628,964 0.057
From Previous
Research
Author’s Estimate136 41,078 628,964 0.065
Of Total Based On 
New Research
Served On The137 19,966 458,218 0.046
Western Front
Deaths On The138 2,138 61,112 0.035
Western Front
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What caused so many Americans to travel to Canada with the intention to enlist in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force? What motivated so many individuals from the United 
States to unnecessarily risk their lives in a war in which their country refrained from 
participating? Lastly, why would American citizens knowingly jeopardize their citizenship 
in order to fight for Canada in a European war against central European nations that 
regarded the United States on peaceable terms?
The relationship between the governments of the United States and Canada had 
been friendly since the War of 1812, and especially peaceful since the settlement of the 
border dispute between the Oregon Territory and British North America in 1848.
Although no war developed, Canadians’ anti-Americanism sporadically surfaced 
throughout the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth century, but this 
sentiment never escalated beyond infrequent Canadian political rhetoric aimed at the 
United States government’s expansion across the North American continent.139 In the 
years immediately preceding the war, American and Canadian citizens freely and easily 
crossed each other’s borders without passports or visas, usually with the intention to 
work, immigrate, or travel. For example, in 1913, more than eleven thousand Americans 
emigrated to the Dominion, approximately four times as many as the next most numerous 
immigrant - Russians.140 Nonetheless, in August 1914 it was remarkable how “two North 
American countries, living side by side and sharing many attitudes, should differ so sharply 
in their initial reaction to the war, the one thankful for three thousand miles of ocean 
between her and the conflict, the other eager to use the ocean as a highway to reach the
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fighting.”141 As the CEF’s casualties continued to increase during the war, many 
Canadians regarded the American government with contempt for its neutrality, but usually 
disguised this animosity from those Americans who were enlisting in the CEF.142
Despite Canada’s early entry into the war and the United States government’s 
neutrality, over forty-one thousand Americans enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force. One American citizen who was working on a ranch in British Columbia 
disregarded the different war policies of the governments of Canada and the United 
States, and when asked if he was going to enlist in the CEF he laughed and replied “‘What 
do you mean go to war?’. . . I wasn’t English; I wasn’t Canadian. I was from the good 
old U. S A. and from all we [American cowboys working in Canada] could understand the 
States were neutral.” He enlisted one week later in Vancouver.143 For some Americans, 
the neutrality of the United States government clearly was not a concern, as one American 
at an American Legion recruiting rally in Toronto declared, “‘Of course . . . the United 
States Government is neutral, but I have yet to find an American who is neutral.”144 
Nonetheless, the neutrality of the United States caused some Americans to hesitate before 
enlisting, such as Edwin Austin Abbey. In a letter to his parents, Abbey described the 
“impossible position” of the United States: “Honor demands that we enter the war, 
humanity that we stay out. I will do nothing until the United States [government’s] course 
is definitely decided.”145
The most obvious explanation why so many Americans were able to join Canada’s 
armed forces was the close proximity of Canada to the United States. It should not be
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underestimated that Canada, which immediately entered the war on August 4, 1914, 
provided American citizens with an opportunity to enlist in Canada’s armed forces without 
exhausting their financial resources. Entering the armed forces of the remainder of the 
belligerents involved procuring passage across the Atlantic Ocean, an expensive and 
dangerous voyage during the First World War. Historian Gaddis Smith pointed out that 
had “Canada not existed, it would have been far more difficult for volunteers, especially 
men without funds, to have enlisted from the United States.”146 One volunteer - Edwin 
Austin Abbey - decided that his best chances to enter military service was in Canada 
instead of his “original plan of going to England” because it was cheaper than arranging 
transportation to Great Britain.147 The greatest concentration of Americans resided in the 
northern states, which meant that Americans often had only short distances to travel to 
volunteer for the CEF. For example, in southern Ontario, American enlistments made up 
twenty percent of all volunteers prior to April 6, 1917.148 Evidence from CEF enlistment 
records indicate that the majority of Americans in the CEF resided in states in the 
Northeast, Northwest, and around the Great Lakes, although a number of Southerners, 
particularly from Virginia and Texas, enlisted in the CEF as well.149 On October 28, 1914, 
The Times reported that at the recruiting stations bordering the United States “nearly half 
the recruits are Americans.”150 The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion’s The American 
Legion Magazine further emphasized the point by stating “a citizen of the United States . .
. presents himself at the recruiting station at Windsor [Ontario], through which port of
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entry the majority find it most convenient to come because of the fact that Detroit is 
across the river, only 5 minutes by ferry; the candidate is greeted with open arms.”151
Americans joining Canada’s armed forces also encountered few cultural barriers 
because most American customs and traditions resembled those of their northern 
neighbors. A principle difficulty for American citizens in the French Foreign Legion arose 
from most Americans’ poor comprehension of the French language, which frustrated 
French officers and complicated training exercises and combat operations.152 Except for 
French Canadians, Americans and Canadians spoke a common language. Therefore, 
American citizens enlisting in the CEF failed to experience the confusion of a different 
language that occasionally hindered Americans serving in the French Foreign Legion. 
Additionally, the ancestral ties of many Americans to Britain motivated many Americans 
to enlist in the CEF. In the 1995 film, Legends o f the Fall, an American college student 
complains to his father that their family’s relatives were dying in the trenches on the 
Western Front, and consequently, he and his brothers were going to Canada to fight in the 
war. Although a fictional reference, this example displays how some American citizens 
identified with their heritage as a motivating factor for service in the CEF. The American 
Legion’s recruiting effort concurred with this sentiment, exemplified in a recruiting 
pamphlet entitled “American Legion Shows Blood Thicker Than Water.”153 But as 
historian James Hudson observed “several [Americans] joined because they had a real 
desire to help save the English people.”154 No doubt many of the Americans enlisting in 
the CEF were recent immigrants from the United Kingdom or its Empire, which offered an
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additional connection or perceived allegiance to “His Majesty’s Government.” An 
American Legionnaire in the CEF was quoted as saying that the Americans in the CEF 
“are responding to the call of duty to fight with our own.”155 Americans understanding of 
Canada and Great Britain caused thousands of Americans to identify with the Dominion’s 
and Empire’s participation in the war, producing a number of Americans who wanted to 
uphold their values by serving in their armed forces. For example, American CEF 
volunteer, Joseph Smith, acknowledged Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality, but 
enlisted in the CEF, because he was convinced that Canada’s decision to enter the war 
was justified. In his autobiography, Smith wrote, “I trusted the [Canadian] government to 
know what it was doing.”156 Additionally, Captain John V. Frazier of the American 
Legion’s 213th Overseas Infantry Battalion recalled that he had enlisted for “call of the 
wild.” When Frazier’s interviewer “suggested that he could satisfy ‘the call of the wild’ as 
well fighting for Germany as for the Allies,” Frazier snorted at the notion and walked 
away.157
American volunteers, particularly the educated and affluent, identified with French 
ideals and persuaded many Americans, who also sympathized with the defense of France 
and its civilization, to enlist in a foreign army.158 Most Americans who showed these 
sympathies served in one of the branches of France’s armed forces, but a modest number 
of Americans, many from the Ivy League Colleges and Universities, enlisted in the armies 
of Allies, including the CEF. Philip Sidney Rice, an American ambulance driver, described
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why Americans voluntarily enlisted and served in the armies of Great Britain and Canada 
in order to defend France: “a love for the country and its refined culture.”159
Similar governmental values and institutions also motivated Americans to enlist in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Americans who volunteered for the CEF envisioned 
themselves as defenders of democracy because Great Britain and France also had 
popularly elected representative governments; on the other hand, Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, the perceived aggressors, were authoritarian monarchies, whose governmental 
authorities were subject to the crown and not to parliamentary majorities. Consequently, a 
number of Americans believed that Germany was the instigator of the war and therefore 
concluded the Allies’ war effort a just cause. Defending liberty and democracy was a 
common motivator for many American volunteers including those who enlisted in the 
CEF. For example, after purposely failing the entrance examinations to West Point 
Military Academy, Sylvester Chahuska Long Lance, a native American, enlisted in the 
CEF because he wanted to fight “under the colors of an army that was upholding” 
democracy.160
For many Americans the decision to voluntarily enlist in the CEF evolved because 
of Germany’s inhumane war record, especially its submarine attacks on neutral merchant 
ships and passenger liners and the atrocities it committed in Belgium like the execution of 
British nurse Edith Cavell on October 18, 1915. An interview of Lord Northcliffe by a 
Chicago Tribune reporter revealed that Americans in a Canadian sector of the trenches 
referred to the Germans as ‘“ slantheads5 and said, ‘If our people at home only knew what
67
they [Germans] are doing to French and Belgian women and children, they [Americans]
certainly would agree that the war can’t stop until the Prussians are down and out.”161 A
CEF recruiting poster appealed to this American perception:
Germany is the foe of liberty and civilization, and is a menace to the welfare of 
humanity. . . . Canada is fighting for those very principles of liberty which every 
true American loves . . .  the battle-line of Flanders is the bulwark of civilization . . . 
[therefore] put aside nationalism - for this has become more a war of 
principles and that of nations, of good against bad, of right against wrong.162
The sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania on May 6, 1915, by a German
submarine, in which 128 Americans died, aroused many Americans’ passion to serve in the
CEF after the Wilson administration’s decision not then to enter the war incited
“widespread public indignation.”163 Influenced by CEF recruiting posters focused at
soliciting Americans, such as “Enlist Now! Remember the Lusitania,” Abbey, who was
working in Shaw’s Creek, Ontario in May 1915, expressed to his mother a deep
dissatisfaction with the United States government’s response to Germany’s unwarranted
sinking of this ship: “I am beginning to feel, as you do, that the [American] flag is
disgraced; the honor of the nation being fumbled away. The time for neutrality has
passed. Why is the United States so slow? I can think of nothing but the war. It seems
immoral to think or plan for anything else.” In letters to his parents before he enlisted in
the CEF, Abbey repeatedly identified Germany as a “terrible menace” and frequently
wrote about German abuses in Belgium.164 Furthermore, after the sinking of the
Lusitania, an unidentified CEF American Legionnaire recruit from New Jersey explained
that “All Americans are pro-Allies. There is no such thing as a German-American; we call
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them just Germans. I have come over because I felt it my duty to do something toward 
crushing the power that could ruthlessly slaughter women and children,” and asserted 
“there are many more like me itching to get into it ”165
A very typical motive of Americans enlisting in the CEF was a desire to experience 
the adventure of war. The armed forces of the United States had infrequently fought in 
wars since the American Civil War ended in 1865. The campaigns against the native 
American peoples, the Spanish-American War, and the Boxer Rebellion had been over for 
more than a decade. But because the CEF accepted volunteers up to the age of forty-five, 
a number older Americans, who had fought in Cuba, Philippines, and China, volunteered 
for the CEF. This allowed experienced American veterans to enlist in the CEF. During 
the United States government’s strict observance of its neutrality during the first thirty- 
two months of the First World War, several Americans cited the desire for military action 
as their reason for enlistment in the CEF. A month after the war started, Tracy 
Richardson, a famed American mercenary from several turn of the century Central 
American conflicts, crossed the Canadian border and enlisted in Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry in August 1914 because he was “anxious to get to the fight” 
before it ended without his involvement.166 Haskell C. Billings, a thirty-two year old 
Captain of the 47th Regiment of New York’s National Guard, resigned his commission to 
enter the CEF because “for a long time he had been anxious to see actual fighting.”167 
Herbert McBride’s motivations for leaving the Indiana National Guard as a Captain to 
enlist in the CEF reveal a sense of what many American volunteers contended:
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I am sorry I cannot say that those early stories of German atrocities, or the news of 
Belgium’s invasion impelled me to start for Canada to enlist and offer my life in the 
cause of humanity. Not at all, it was just that I wanted to find out what a ‘real 
war’ was like. It looked as if there was going to be a real scrap at last, and I didn’t 
intend to miss it this time. I had ‘lost out’ on two wars already; the Spanish- 
American and Boer War and now the opportunity was at hand I wanted to have a 
front seat.168
Each of the abovementioned motivations describe the primary reasons why an 
American would enlist in the CEF before the United States entered the war, but a number 
of other influences and factors contributed to Americans’ desire to join the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force. Knowledge of two historical events possibly persuaded some 
American citizens to enlist. First, there was the desire to repay France for the military 
achievements of the French General Marquis de Lafayette and the hundreds of French 
volunteers who had served in the Continental Army during the War of Independence. 
Second, was the desire to equal the efforts of forty to fifty thousand Canadians who had 
volunteered and served in the Union Army during the American Civil War.169 One CEF 
recruiting poster duplicated the last sentiment by indicating that Americans in the CEF 
“are helping to repay the debt of gratitude to Canada for the 48,000 Canadians who 
fought for the North in the Civil War.”170
Canadian Expeditionary Force wages, the highest in any army in the world starting 
at $1.10 per day for a private, caused several unemployed Americans to enlist during the 
harsh winter of 1915-1916. However, many of these “winter volunteers” deserted 
because they enlisted only for “a little easy money and a good place to live during the 
winter months.”171 The Germans were contemptuous of such soldiers and criticized the
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Allies for having to hire foreigners to fight their wars. American volunteers responded to 
these German jibes by stating, that the CEF wages “may have seemed a very large sum to 
the German mind . . . [but most Americans] were certainly not the kind of men who could 
be attracted by a dollar and a quarter a day into giving up their usual occupations ”172
The recruitment for the American Legion, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
motivated American citizens to enlist because Canadian recruiters bestowed Americans 
with an opportunity to serve in a CEF formation under the command of former American 
officers and graduates of West Point. This influence was heralded in the American 
Legion’s recruiting leaflets: “Yankee regiment pure and simple, commanded by a Yankee 
and manned by Yankees right down to the youngest drummer boy.”173 Furthermore, if an 
American volunteer feared for his family’s well-being while he served in the CEF, the 
Canadian Patriotic Fund, “debarred from rendering financial assistance to persons living 
outside the Dominion,” established auxiliary associations in a number of American cities 
which raised and administered “in each State the money required to place the American 
wives of Canadian soldiers on a similar footing to that of their sisters north of the line.”174 
This factor allowed American citizens to enlist in the CEF without apprehension about the 
future welfare of their families and served as a comforting feature, if not a motivating 
element, in their enlistment into the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
After an American citizen decided to enlist in the CEF, he had to go to Canada. 
Most Americans who wished to serve in the CEF proceeded directly to the Dominion, but 
because the enlistment of Americans in the CEF was not the most common event for
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Americans living in the United States, several Americans followed unusual avenues to 
enlist voluntarily. Harold E. Hartney, who later became a Lieutenant-Colonel in the U. S. 
Army, disregarded “all rules of military procedure . . . and wired Sam Hughes direct for 
permission to go over with the first unit, the wonderful Princess Pats.”175 Although 
Hartney’s request came after Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry had left Canada, 
his initiative exemplified a number of Americans who did not understand the CEF’s 
enlistment procedures which prohibited the CEF from accepting any American volunteer 
through correspondence. By the end of August 1914, the Department of Militia and 
Defence had received more than sixty thousand letters from American citizens inquiring if 
they could secure a commission in the CEF, but the Department of Militia and Defence 
informed them that the CEF only enlisted men who personally appeared before a recruiter 
in the Dominion.176 Other Americans bypassed recruiting stations and proceeded directly 
to the Minister of Militia and Defence. After brief meetings with Herbert McBride and 
Coningsby Dawson, Hughes granted each a commission in the CEF. McBride entered as 
a Captain in the 38th Overseas Infantry Battalion and Dawson enrolled in the Royal 
Military College at Kingston, Ontario, later serving as a Lieutenant in the Canadian Field 
Artillery.177 This was a unique situation because the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s rules 
of enlistment required each volunteer to enlist as a private regardless of previous military 
experience, except for volunteers who had formerly served as officers in the Canadian 
Militia or had graduated from the Royal Military College. Americans with previous 
military experience as officers in either the United States Army, Navy, Marines, or
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National Guard who entered an American Legion battalion frequently were granted 
commissions.
Whereas several factors and circumstances motivated Americans to enlist in the 
CEF, each American volunteer confronted only one significant consequence for enlisting 
in Canada’s armed forces: the prospect of legally reentering the United States after either 
completing their military service, deserting or resigning from the Canadian ranks, or 
suffering a debilitating combat wound. With the United States officially neutral, the 
voluntary entrance of Americans into the Canadian Expeditionary Force caused the United 
States government to question the status of its citizens who volunteered for foreign 
military service. This situation revolved around the interpretation of Section 2 of the Act 
of March 2, 1907, concerning the expatriation of American citizens.178 The United States 
government, specifically the Department of State, attempted to inform and warn its 
citizens that under this law the United States would consider its citizens who volunteered 
for foreign military service as expatriates, contingent upon the fact that they took an oath 
of allegiance to a foreign state while the United States remained neutral. Therefore, an 
American who enlisted in the CEF was faced with the fact that his enlistment could result 
in his expatriation from the United States, although from August 1914 to October 1917, 
this consequence was most likely unknown to the majority of the CEF’s American 
volunteers because this law was continually misunderstood and misinterpreted.
Under Article 6 of The Hague Convention of 1907, Americans wishing to enlist in 
the CEF were permitted by international agreements to cross the Canadian border and join
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its armed forces without endangering the neutrality of the United States. This provision 
stated that the “responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons 
crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents ”179 
However, on March 2, 1907, the United States government enacted a law which declared 
that
any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been 
naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken 
an oath of allegiance to any foreign state . . . And provided also, That no American 
citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.”180
Although this act failed to prohibit any American from entering the CEF while the United
States remained neutral, it presumably discouraged American citizens with the threat of
losing their citizenship from enlisting into any foreign army that required an oath of
allegiance to that nation.
For Americans enlisting in the CEF, the Expatriation Act was subject to the
Department of State’s interpretation of the phrase “an oath of allegiance” because
enlisting in a foreign army, although illegal under American neutrality laws and subject to
a fine or imprisonment, did not constitute a change of allegiance. This was based on a
number of court cases and historical precedents regarding the expatriation of Americans
who entered a belligerent’s armed forces.181 Author and lawyer J. V. Best summarized the
complicated situation stating that “as a general rule it may be maintained that the mere fact
of entering into a foreign military service does not divest either nationality or domicil.”182
Canadian Expeditionary Force volunteers from the United States encountered
difficulties with the attestation papers they signed at the time of their enlistment, in which
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they professed an allegiance to the King of the United Kingdom and Ireland. The oath,
required by each CEF volunteer, reads as follows:
I,_________ ^ do make Oath, that I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to His
Majesty King George the Fifth, His Heirs and Successors, and that I will as in 
duty bound honestly and faithfully defend His majesty, His Heirs and Successors, 
in Person, Crown and Dignity, against all enemies, and will observe and obey all 
orders of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and of all the Generals and 
Officers set over me. So help me God.183
Therefore, any American who enlisted in the CEF expatriated himself when he signed his
attestation paper, which acknowledged his oath of allegiance to the British monarch.
Furthermore, the Department of State explained that “when service in a foreign army
involves taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, an American citizen who enters
such service must be deemed to have expatriated himself.”184 Federal courts determined
that the oath of allegiance to a monarch equated an oath to a foreign state, or in this case
an oath to King George the Fifth was equivalent to taking an oath to Great Britain.185
Expatriation from taking an oath of allegiance applied not only to Americans
entering the CEF, but to Americans entering any British armed forces or Imperial army
such as India, Australia, and New Zealand, because they required an oath of allegiance to
King George the Fifth as well. On the other hand, Americans volunteering for the French
Foreign Legion joined without endangering their citizenship because the French Foreign
Legion obligated its volunteers to attest to “Legio Patria Nostra” - translated as “The
Legion is our Fatherland” - not an oath to France.186
Although the law appeared to be straightforward, several American periodicals and
newspapers, government departments, and citizens frequently misinterpreted the
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Figure 2
Edwin Austin Abbey’s Attestation Paper for the Canadian Exeditionary Force.187
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Expatriation Act or also relied on misinformation. In theory, the Act aimed to provide 
‘“the necessary legislative definition’ of the means of expatriation, [establishing] ‘an end to 
the long circuit of doubt and uncertainty over the question of expatriation.’”188 From 
August 1914 to April 1917, the Department of State repeatedly reiterated the position of 
the United States government toward those American citizens enthusiastic about serving 
in a foreign army because each citizen, whom the United States government presumed 
understood the legislation, failed to acquaint themselves with this public law. A 
November 1, 1915, circular notice from the State Department entitled, “Conditions of 
Enlistment of Americans in Foreign Armies Involving Their Expatriation,” acknowledged 
a general misunderstanding by Americans as “a number of inquiries from people in the 
United States” questioned “whether it is a breach of his duty as a citizen of the United 
States to enlist in a foreign army.”189 In this correspondence the State Department 
succinctly explained the Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907, and advised all Americans to 
observe the neutrality of the United States and avoid participating in the current war in 
Europe. Interestingly, this notice came one day after the CEF’s 97th Overseas Infantry 
Battalion, the first of five forthcoming American Legion regiments, enlisted its first six 
American volunteers.
Regardless of the clarification by the State Department, misinformation abounded 
both in the United States and Canada about the citizenship status of Americans enlisting in 
the CEF. Occasionally newspaper articles and popular periodicals fostered the ignorance 
of this law by falsely reporting that Americans enlisting in the CEF would not endanger
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their citizenship, although each publication most likely did so unknowingly. The New York 
Times published an account of the American Legion stating that Americans entering the 
CEF enlisted “without renouncing [their] American citizenship.” This article further 
alluded that taking an oath to King George the Fifth was not an act shifting one’s 
allegiances.190 A more erroneous account about the American Legion and Americans in 
the CEF appeared in Outlook, which pointed out that the CEF’s American volunteers 
were not worrying about losing their citizenship because “the officers of the [CEF’s 
American] Legion tell me [the author of the article] that the courts have already decided in 
the case of Americans who have returned to the United States after service in France that 
such conduct did not make them aliens.” Additionally, this same article indicated that 
Americans enlisting in the CEF would not violate their citizenship by taking an oath to 
serve King George the Fifth because they were “taking a special oath” which would not 
require an American to “jeopardize his American citizenship.”191 Both examples were 
negligent inaccuracies that helped to reinforce the misinformation about the status of 
American citizenship upon entering the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
In Canada, the situation of misinforming Americans continued. An American 
consular officer in Winnipeg, Manitoba, advised American citizens, who were curious 
about their citizenship status if they enlisted in the CEF, that their citizenship would not be 
jeopardized by military service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.192 However, not all 
information about American expatriation in Canada was incorrect. The American 
Consulate at Vancouver, who publicly opposed the formation of the American Legion,
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informed Americans who entered Canada “that their enlistment in the British Columbia 
battalion of the American Legion, the 211th Overseas Infantry Battalion, will cancel their 
citizenship.”193
Conflicting conclusions about the expatriation of American citizens in the CEF 
surfaced in the United States as well. An editorial appearing in the New York Times 
contended that men volunteering for the CEF were required to complete naturalization 
papers before entering the ranks, further adding that “this will prevent many an 
adventurous American from joining their [Canadian] colors.”194 Although the editorial 
inaccurately asserted that CEF volunteers needed to fill out naturalization papers, it was 
correct in assuming that Americans enlisting in the CEF would be legally reprimanded for 
their enlistment, otherwise he would not have observed the risk. On the other hand, on 
October 9, 1915, the United States Department of Labor issued instructions to 
immigration authorities along the Canadian border to “not question the American 
citizenship of an applicant because of the fact that he enlisted in the Canadian forces.”
The Department of Labor issued similar instructions to the American Pacific and Atlantic 
port officials that American citizens returning from military service in German or British 
armies would be admitted to the United States without “question at all.”195
Factual inconsistencies from the various American publications and government 
agencies repeatedly misinformed Americans about the Expatriation Act. This caused 
confusion concerning the law for the duration of the neutrality of the United States. For 
example, an article in the New York Times appearing two years after the war started
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attempted once more to reiterate the United States government’s position concerning 
Americans in foreign armies. The article stated that “Americans fighting in the European 
war who have taken an oath to a foreign State have automatically become expatriated.”196 
Clearly most Americans misunderstood or disregarded the 1907 Expatriation Act’s 
application to their citizenship. Ignoring the law appears to be the most common 
explanation because of the great numbers of Americans who enlisted in the CEF. 
Furthermore, the majority of the Americans in the CEF opined that the “worthiness of 
their project” was above their citizenship. But as Alan James contended in his historical 
analysis of American expatriation for the State Department, “some citizens who performed 
an expatriative act [before the United States became a belligerent] maintained that they did 
not do so freely,” contending “that they performed the act under duress.”197
The federal case of Edward Dempster Griffin exemplified an American who failed 
fully to understand that his enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force was an act of 
expatriation. Griffin, who enlisted in the CEF’s 156th Overseas Infantry Battalion on July 
14, 1916, was apprehended by United States immigration officers when he attempted to 
reenter the United States after deserting from the CEF on August 5, 1916. Immigration 
authorities determined that Griffin voluntarily expatriated himself when he took the CEF’s 
oath of allegiance to His Majesty King, George the Fifth, and detained him for deportation 
because the United States government now considered him an alien. Griffin claimed that 
at the time of his enlistment he was “so intoxicated” when pledging his oath of allegiance 
and completing his attestation papers that “he did not know and understand what he was
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doing, or the nature and character of his acts. .. After soberly recognizing the 
consequences of his actions, Griffin attempted to return to the United States at the first
198opportunity.
Recognizing Griffin’s right as an American to voluntarily expatriate himself, the 
court decided that taking “the oath of allegiance to the King of Great Britain and Ireland, 
or to the British Empire, runs to the king, in whom, nominally, all the executive power of 
government is centralized . . . [Therefore,] an oath of allegiance to the king is an oath of 
allegiance to the kingdom and empire.” Under the Expatriation Act of 1907, the court 
concluded that Griffin was no longer a citizen of the United States and his unlawful, 
clandestine return to the United States violated Section 36 of the Immigration Act of 
February 20, 1907, which subjected him to deportation.199 Griffin’s case resolved the 
question of “whether the act of merely swearing allegiance to a foreign sovereignty on 
entering its military service, unaccompanied by emigration from the United States, resulted 
in expatriation under the [Expatriation] act of March 2, 1907 ”200
Griffin’s case, cited as Ex Parte Griffin, established the judicial precedent for 
deporting Americans who attempted to reenter the United States after they had enlisted in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Yet, establishing an American’s identity with the CEF 
proved to be difficult for American authorities. For example, an unidentified man from 
Michigan reentered the United States after being wounded during his service in the CEF. 
He lived at his home in Detroit until a group of German-Americans “demanded that he be 
deported on the ground that he was an alien physically unfit to support himself.”201
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Numerous Americans who crossed the Canadian border and enlisted in the CEF either 
misrepresented certain information on their attestation papers or covertly reentered the 
United States in order to mislead American immigration authorities about the history of 
their enlistment. Without specifically mentioning his motive, Joseph Smith falsified his 
attestation paper, as he recalled, uby the simple expedient of moving my birthplace a few 
hundred miles north I became a Canadian and a member of the expeditionary force - a big 
word with a big meaning.”202 Smith appeared to understand the expatriation law 
surrounding his enlistment and deliberately changed his place of birth to avoid 
complications about his citizenship in the United States.
From August 4, 1914, to April 6, 1917, the United States government considered 
Americans who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force as expatriates, but because 
thousands of Americans enlisted in foreign armies, the Department of State was only able 
to moderately control the Americans violating the Expatriation Law. During American 
neutrality, the State Department constantly attempted to increase its role in detaining 
American expatriates by enforcing stricter procedures for issuing passports and 
apprehending expatriates when they reentered the country.203 But, due to the large 
numbers of American citizens in the CEF and the difficulty in detecting those Americans, 
the majority of Americans in the CEF rarely confronted obstacles in reentering the United 
States. As an example, Roy M. Berrian, an American who enlisted in the American 
Legion’s 212th Overseas Infantry Battalion, served for six weeks in the CEF before
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crossing back into the United States undetected and serving as a lieutenant in the U. S. 
Army’s punitive expeditionary force in Mexico.204
Overwhelmed with the prospect of alienating thousands of Americans who had
/
gained invaluable combat experience while the United States remained neutral for thirty-
fwO months, immediately after the United States entered the war, Congress began to take
legislative steps to repatriate Americans who had served in foreign armies, including those
in the CEF.205 On October 5, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed the bill which
repatriated any American
who may be deemed to have expatriated himself under the provisions of the first 
paragraph of section two of the [Expatriation] Act . . .  by taking, since August 
first, nineteen hundred and fourteen, an oath of allegiance to any foreign State 
engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, and who 
took such oath in order to be enabled to enlist in the armed forces of such foreign 
State, and who actually enlisted in such armed forces, and who has been or may 
duly and honorably discharged from such armed forces, may, upon complying with 
the provisions of this Act, reassume and acquire the character and privileges of a 
citizen of the United States.206
Therefore, an expatriated American, who wanted to become a United States citizen after
completing his military service in the CEF or desired a transfer from the CEF to an
American branch of service, was required to take an oath of allegiance to the United
States in the presence of an American official.
Although American citizens who enlisted in the CEF before the United States
became a belligerent eventually were permitted avenues to “reassume and acquire” the
rights of an American citizen, at the time of their enlistment the majority of Americans
entering the CEF either disregarded the consequences surrounding their citizenship or
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ignored the inconsistencies and misinformation about the position of Americans enlisting 
in foreign armies. As a result, those American citizens who enlisted in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force while the United States remained neutral constituted the largest 
number of Americans serving in any foreign army.
Throughout the First World War a number of American, Canadian, and British 
periodicals and newspapers published estimates of the numbers of Americans in the ranks 
of the CEF. Most accounts generalized their figures, stating that hundreds or thousands 
of Americans had crossed the Canadian border to enlist in the CEF’s regiments. 
Occasionally, an article or the introduction to an autobiography speculated that six, nine, 
or sixteen thousand American citizens had enlisted and served in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force. The New York Times frequently chronicled the progress of 
Americans who enlisted for military service in Canada, most likely because a large 
percentage of the Americans in the CEF had lived in New York or its surrounding states 
before the enlisting, and the CEF’s American Legion recruiters had targeted the state for 
American volunteers.
The New York Times printed numerous articles estimating the numbers of 
Americans in the CEF, particularly the enlistment statistics of the American Legion. On 
October 27, 1914, this newspaper reported that the Minister of Militia and Defence, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, believed “200,000 Americans have gone to Canada 
in the hope of joining the Canadian forces. . . ”207 Although a speculatively optimistic and 
unrealistic figure, it illustrates not only Hughes’ grandiose plot to incorporate Americans
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into the CEF, but the magnitude of Americans crossing the border to enlist. The New 
York Times revealed the numbers of Americans in the CEF through reprinting the official 
casualty listings from the Department of Militia and Defence. The casualty listings 
sporadically appeared from June 1915 to the end of the war, printing the names and 
hometowns of Americans serving in the CEF. For example, an article subtitled “More 
Americans in Last Night’s List of 102 - Seven Dead,” stated that five Americans “were 
killed in action and two died of wounds.” This brief article preceded a list of casualties - 
printed as: “Sergeant Vernon D. V. Stevens of Portland, Ore.; Privates Richard Barber of 
Ludlow Mass., Joseph Pratt of Virginia, Minn., James B. Soden of Cohoes, N. Y., and 
Sapper Walter Greenhill of Pittsburgh, Penn., are listed among the wounded.”208 
Throughout the First World War, the New York Times published hundreds of names of 
Americans who were either wounded, missing, or killed in action serving in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force. This heightened the awareness of Americans in the United States of 
the number of American citizens participating in the war.
Besides the abundant accounts that speculated on the total number of American 
citizens in the CEF, I ascertained that new research was necessary because previous 
examinations did not account for the Americans who enlisted under false pretenses and 
the Americans who left connections to the United States on their attestation papers as a 
part of the total number of American citizens in the CEF. For example, the above cited 
Joseph Smith acknowledged that he misrepresented his place of birth by falsifying his 
attestation papers, proving that Americans enlisting in the CEF consciously altered their
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enlistment documentation; accordingly, the total of American citizens in the CEF needs to 
be adjusted. Furthermore, in Harry Brittain’s book about his observations and experiences 
on the Western Front, he concluded that the total number of Americans in the CEF would 
fail to consider the “American citizens who for various reasons have given either assumed 
names or assumed places of residence at the time of enlistment.”209 The reason, most 
likely, was to avoid expatriation. In James Hudson’s book about the American citizens 
who served in the British aviation services during the war, he observed the same dilemma, 
adding that “because many of the young American flyers felt that they might lose their 
American citizenship by joining the British air forces, they sometimes listed their birthplace 
or citizenship as Canadian or English.”210 This poses ambiguities to the total number of 
Americans who enlisted and served in the CEF, or as Historian Bradley King concluded, 
“we will probably never know how many there were, as some preferred to remain known 
as ‘Canadian,’ while others were known to be Americans only by their immediate 
colleagues.”211 Consequently, identifying every American citizen in the CEF would be 
nearly impossible.
Every American in the CEF can not be accounted for because many American 
volunteers did not identify themselves as such in order to avoid being expatriated in the 
United States. The total number of American citizens who enlisted and served in the CEF 
was augmented with new research of the CEF’s enlistment records. Previous research by 
Canada’s Directorate of History for the Department of Defence used the attestation 
papers of CEF volunteers to determine their nationality. They ascertained their figures for
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American citizens from the replies given to question “Number 2” inquiring, “In what 
Town, Township or Parish, and in what Country were you bom?”212 Beyond this question 
on the attestation paper, no other CEF document revealed a volunteer’s place of birth. 
Therefore, the Directorate of History for the National Defence based their calculations 
strictly on the answers provided by the volunteer. Because American CEF volunteers, 
reporters, witnesses, and scholars acknowledged the fact that many American citizens 
falsified their attestation papers at the time of their enlistment, a connection from 
additional answers on the attestation papers of CEF volunteers was formed to determine 
which Americans possibly misrepresented their place of birth or were naturalized 
American citizens.
New research was influenced by J. V. Best’s assertion that “Some of these 
[soldiers on Allied casualty lists] no doubt. . . were bom in the United States, others 
represented men of foreign birth who had become American citizens under our 
naturalization laws, while still others possibly had been aliens resident in this country [U.
S. A.] previously to their enlistment in the foreign military service. . . .” Best concluded 
that “they were all Americans because they had gone from the United States to perform 
service in a foreign army or navy.”213 The methodology for calculating Americans in the 
CEF, previously believed to be a non-American consisted of reviewing the Nominal Rolls 
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.214 The Nominal Rolls, divided up by regiments, 
condensed the attestation papers of the regiment’s volunteers into a book format, listing a 
CEF volunteer’s name, regimental number, rank, previous military experience (catalogued
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as “former corps”), name of next of kin, next of kin’s address, country of birth, and 
enlistment date. Previously, researchers looked at a volunteer’s country of birth entry and 
if the volunteer entered “U. S. A.” he was considered an American. But the answers to 
the “previous military experience” and “next of kin’s address” questions provide 
information possibly identifying an American who entered a country other than the United 
States as his place of birth, consequently causing the Directorate of History for the 
National Defence to classify them as a nationality distinctly apart from the United States.
Any CEF volunteer who listed their next of kin with an American address, I 
deemed to be a citizen from the United States, regardless of his country of birth, because 
an American enlisting in the CEF who feared expatriation or was a naturalized citizen 
from the United States would not have been counted as an American citizen. For 
example, a man bom in England, Norway, or New Zealand who emigrated with his family 
to the United States before or during the war and became a naturalized American citizen 
before his enlistment in the CEF would have registered his next of kin with an American 
address; such as, Albert Flynn, who enlisted with the 121st Overseas Infantry Battalion on 
November 17, 1915, and was bom in Ireland, but his next of kin, James Flynn, resided in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.215
However, a problem arises with this assumption because it fails to account for the 
immigration of the volunteer’s next of kin into the United States while the volunteer could 
have remained a citizen of his country of birth. This question would definitely apply to 
any CEF volunteer bom in Canada, whose next of kin had an American address, but it
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most likely would have been unusual for a man born outside of North America to travel to 
Canada strictly to enlist into the CEF. As an example, Frank Schultz, who was bom in 
Poland and whose next of kin, Zquacy Kacyusky, lived on Warsaw Street in Detroit, 
Michigan at the time of his enlistment, entered the 1st Division’s Motor Transport Supply 
Column on September 19, 1914.216 Therefore, CEF volunteers who were Canadian-born 
and listed their next of kin with an American address were not counted as American 
volunteers, although they could have been American citizens.
Using Schultz as an example poses another problem with ascertaining Americans 
who misrepresented their identity as American citizens when enlisting. Volunteers like 
Schultz, who had affiliations to the United States which suggest they were American 
citizens, disguised their citizenship without lying on their attestation paper. For example, 
a volunteer, who was an American citizen, could have stated that he had been born in a 
country like Poland, which would have been true, because the question on the attestation 
paper only asked “in country were you bom” and not for the volunteer’s citizenship.
A Canadian Expeditionary Force volunteer who at the time of his enlistment 
entered the U. S. Army, Navy, Marines Corps, or any state’s National Guard for his 
previous military experience on his attestation paper, was in my judgment an-American 
citizen. This was ascertained because to enlist in any branch of the armed services of the 
United States, every recruit is required to take an oath of allegiance to the United States 
government, which made him a citizen of the United States. For instance, Frederick 
Oppoli, bom in Holland, served in the U. S. Navy before enlisting in the CEF on
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September 24, 1914, as a gunner in the 1st Divisional Ammunition Battalion.217 
Therefore, any volunteer who entered a country of birth other than the United States or 
Canada on their attestation paper and who either entered their next of kin’s address with 
an American residency or listed his previous military experience with any United States 
armed service on their attestation paper, I considered an American citizen.
By applying the above methodology and examining approximately eighty to eighty- 
five percent of the Nominal Rolls, I ascertained that 5,466 CEF volunteers from the 
United States enlisted from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917.218 This increases the total 
number of Americans in the CEF from 35,612 to 41,078. Before my research this group 
of CEF soldiers were considered to have been bom in a country other than the United 
States and therefore they were not thought to be Americans. This number of Americans 
who misrepresented or disguised their citizenship should be included as a part of the total 
number of Americans who enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. 
Unfortunately, the exact total of Americans in the CEF may never be known, but my new 
research reveals even larger numbers. Thus, an estimation as high as fifty thousand 
American volunteers in the CEF would not be far off the mark.
The American citizens who joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the 
United States became a belligerent on April 6,1917, proved to be nearly seven percent of 
the CEF’s volunteers. Primarily self-motivated to the extent of placing their desire to halt 
German aggression above their duty to obey an American law, these volunteers, often 
concealing their real identity, crossed the Canadian border to enlist in the CEF. That some
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forty-one thousand American citizens voluntarily enlisted in the CEF from August 4, 1914 
to April 6, 1917, demonstrated that many American citizens believed that the Allies were 
justified in fighting Germany, despite the United States government’s policy to remain 
neutral to the conflict. For instance, when President Woodrow Wilson ran for reelection 
in November 1916, on the slogan that he had kept the United States out of war, thousands 
of Americans had already experienced the horrors of trench warfare. The service of those 
American citizens in the CEF before the United States entered the war, was a speechless 
gesture to the Wilson administration that its neutrality policy was not universally accepted 
by all Americans.
American citizens who enlisted in the CEF frequently did so for the same reasons 
that the United States government later entered the war, which suggests that their 
enlistment and service in Canada both anticipated, and possibly somewhat accelerated, the 
decision of the Wilson administration to declare war on Germany. Americans often 
volunteered for service in the CEF because of German submarine attacks aimed at 
American maritime trade or ships carrying American citizens - the principal immediate 
cause for the United States government’s entry into the war on April 6, 1917. Because 
various American periodicals and newspapers celebrated or at least featured the CEF’s 
American volunteers, their participation may have affected the attitudes of Americans 
toward the Allies.
Edwin Morse, an early chronicler of the experiences of Americans who 
volunteered for the Allied war effort, asserted in 1918 that “the influence of their spirit and
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of their example upon public opinion in the United States in the first two years and a half 
of the war was beyond calculation.”219 Not only did the enlistment of Americans in the 
CEF directly aid Canada’s war effort, but it represents the fact that nearly all Americans 
sympathized with the Allies more than historians have acknowledged; particularly given 
the negligible numbers of American citizens volunteering for the Central Powers.
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Chapter Two
Enlistment of Americans in the CEF: Motivations, Consequences, & Numbers
Before the Canadian government enacted the Military Service Act on August 29, 
1917, to authorize the Dominion to conscript men between the ages of 18 and 45 for 
military service “beyond Canada, for the defence thereof,” the Canadian Expeditionary
Force actively recruited volunteers to enlist.119 From August 4, 1914 to August 29, 1917,
\
filling the ranks of the CEF’s infantry, cavalry, artillery, and specialized units relied on
\
\
individual volunteers, whether Canadian sqr American citizens, to enlist. What motivated a 
volunteer to enlist in the CEF? The reasons\lty a Canadian or British subject resident in 
the Dominion would enlist in the CEF appear to be^understandable, foremost among 
which was to fulfill a patriotic duty to serve “His Majesty’s Government.” But citizens of 
the United States, whose government decided to remain neutral during the first two and 
half years of the First World War, had somewhat more complicated motivations for 
voluntarily enlisting in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
What primarily motivated American citizens to enlist in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force were aggressive CEF recruitment and individual objectives. This 
chapter examines the different motives of the Americans who enlisted in the CEF in order 
to discover why more than forty-one thousand American citizens deliberately left the
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Chapter Three
The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s “American Legion,” 1915-1917
On October 22, 1915, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes’ plans for forming a 
Canadian Expeditionary Force battalion composed of American citizens materialized after 
months of public speculation and more than a year of postponements by Canadian officials 
reluctant to aggravate the United States government by encouraging individual violations 
of its neutrality. After discovering that thousands of Americans had enlisted in the CEF’s 
1st and 2nd Divisions from August 1914 to September 1915, the Minister of Militia and 
Defence, Hughes, authorized the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion as a regiment designed 
to recruit and enlist American citizens. By July 15, 1916, Hughes had organized five 
infantry battalions collectively designated as the “American Legion” and consisting of 
American-born soldiers.220
The administrative and organizational shortcomings and financial difficulties of this 
“Legion” will be discussed in this chapter. These problems, combined with the fact that 
the United States government did not like the Legion associating itself with the United 
States, persuaded the Department of Militia and Defence to deploy the CEF’s American 
Legionnaires to other existing regiments as reinforcements, twenty-two days before the 
United States entered the war on April 6, 1917. Although the American Legion only
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represented twenty-seven hundred of the forty-one thousand American citizens who 
would enlist and serve in the CEF, its existence caused political and military arguments 
between the Dominion’s Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, and Governor-General, the 
Duke of Connaught, and between the Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes, and the 
Militia staff, particularly the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Willoughby 
G. Gwatkin, and Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Major-General Sir Eugene Fiset. 
Furthermore, the American Legion’s presence in the CEF produced some diplomatic 
uneasiness between the governments of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.
As Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes formulated the plan of enlisting 
American citizens into separate overseas infantry units of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force. The first evidence of this scheme is his August 29, 1914, trans-Atlantic cablegram 
sent to British War Minister, Lord Kitchener, with the suggestion that sixty thousand 
Americans from the “neighboring Republic” could be enlisted in the CEF and organized 
into a legion 221 Canadian military historian Ronald Haycock observed that this action 
“was substantial for Hughes’ usual anti-Americanism.”222 Correspondence between 
Hughes and Kitchener also referred to raising separate units of Serbians and Russians, but 
there was no further action from the Canadian government to form these two nationalities 
into CEF regiments. Hughes later reported on September 11, 1914, to the British War 
Office that because thousands of Americans were enlisting in the CEF, a “Corps” of 
American citizens should be formed in order to entice more Americans to volunteer.223 
During a visit to Great Britain the following month, Hughes received personal
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authorization from Kitchener and other prominent British officials, including King George 
the Fifth, to create his “legion” of American citizens. British endorsement of Hughes’ 
scheme was contingent upon prohibiting CEF recruiters from entering the United States 
and soliciting the enlistment of Americans for service in the CEF. The British War Office 
enforced this rule because recruiting in the United States violated the neutrality laws of the 
United States government, the American Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, and 
international agreements of the 1907 Hague Convention. Hughes appealed to British 
authorities because his plan was rejected by the Governor-General, Hughes’ Deputy 
Minister, later Major-General Sir Eugene Fiset, and the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, 
Major-General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, all of whom disliked Hughes’ idea to specifically 
recruit American citizens for their own CEF infantry battalions.
Because of the disagreement between Hughes and senior Canadian officials to 
enlist Americans into separate battalions existed, constant confusion surrounded the 
British authorization to recruit Americans. The legitimacy of the proposed American unit 
remained in question because two cablegrams from Sir George Perley, Canada’s 
representative in the Colonial Office, one dated November 25, 1914, and the other dated 
December 2, 1914, authorizing Hughes to form a military unit composed of Americans, 
disappeared from the Governor-General’s files. Hughes had inferred his authority to form 
a regiment of American citizens in the CEF because British officials had accepted the idea 
of enlisting Americans into any of Canada’s armed forces. On October 9, 1914, the 
British Colonial Office sent a telegram to the Department of Militia and Defence,
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transmitting a message from the British Foreign Office, which stated “explicitly that ‘His 
Majesty’s Government will of course reserve to themselves the right to accept as a recruit 
any United States citizen who may present himself for enlistment in British territory.’” 224 
The Colonial Office reinforced the point “at the end of 1914” by dispatching a letter to the 
Governor-General that it would be “desirable to enlist Americans.”225
The Canadian desire to create an American battalion in the CEF paralleled French 
endeavors to form separate units of Americans in the French armed services. In August 
1914, a group of Americans residing in Paris and calling themselves the “Rough Riders” 
attempted to form a separate unit of American citizens in the French Foreign Legion 
comprised of veterans of the Spanish-American War and “many famous western horseman 
of America.”226 Although the “Rough Riders” failed to mobilize, Americans who enlisted 
in the French Foreign Legion attempted to form an American aviation squadron in the 
French Air Force. The Lafayette Escadrille (N-124), authorized in July 1915, formed out 
of the willingness of the thirty-eight Americans who wanted to fly in combat. Americans, 
such as Norman Prince and William Thaw, persuaded French authorities to permit an 
aviation squadron composed of Americans through their aerial combat achievements in 
other French air squadrons.227 Detaching Americans into distinct military units in the 
French armed forces differed from the CEF’s American Legion because the original 
concept came from the Canada’s Department of Militia and Defence instead of its 
American volunteers, whereas in the French formations the American volunteers proposed 
the idea to France’s military authorities.228
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Although Hughes had obtained the authority from British officials in 1914 to 
initiate his plans and mobilize units of American volunteers, he inexplicably neglected to 
create his American Legion immediately. His delay is best explained by his not having 
support from Connaught, the Department of Militia and Defence’s Deputy Minister, and 
the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, who did not grasp Hughes’ enthusiasm and who did 
not wish to violate the neutrality of the United States, from which Canada imported much 
of its war supplies, particularly munitions. Although Hughes did not implement his 
American Legion proposal in 1914, the American and British press publicly speculated 
about the idea of a Canadian military unit composed of United States citizens. On 
February 8, 1915, a Times correspondent from Toronto reported that the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force was organizing a brigade of Americans, stating that “It is understood 
that sufficient [U. S. Army] officers from across the [Canadian] border have offered their 
services to the Militia Department to command a full brigade. . . .”229 Two months later 
the New York Times noted that hundreds of U. S. Army officers were resigning to enlist in 
the Dominion and that in “Ottawa there is newspaper talk of an American ‘brigade,’ to be 
officered by Americans...  ”230 Each of these accounts alluded to the prospect of an 
American Legion in the CEF, even though Hughes continued to do nothing to authorize 
the endeavor.
Two obstacles confronted Hughes before he could authorize the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force’s American Legion: Section 95 (1) of the British Army Act and 
Article 4 of The Hague Convention of 1907. This military statute prohibited the British
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Army or any Imperial armed force, including the Canadian Expeditionary Force, from 
organizing a “separate corps of foreigners for [military] service in His Majesty’s Army.” 
Hughes and Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden were informed of this provision, which 
forbade the formation of the American Legion in the CEF, from the British War Office
231during the summer of 1915. No evidence has been found to ascertain whether or not 
Hughes was aware that his American Legion scheme would violate the agreements of The 
Hague Convention of 1907, but Article 4 of the convention’s decree stated that a “Corps 
of combatants can not be formed . . . [from] a neutral Power to assist the belligerent.”232 
Great Britain refused to ratify these agreements, and therefore, it is unlikely Hughes or any 
Canadian military or political official would have been familiar with The Hauge 
Convention of 1907’s statutes.233
Sometime before the first battalion of the American Legion began recruiting in the 
last week of October 1915, Hughes avoided the laws restricting the American Legion’s 
formation by secretly planning to prohibit it from serving on the Western Front. As 
Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes possessed the authority to determine when a 
regiment was to be sent to England for final training before being transported to the front. 
Hughes permitted the recruitment of American volunteers because he, presumably 
influenced by his superiors to avoid aggravating the United States, had no intention of 
sending the American Legion to fight as a combat unit. Thus, the American Legion’s 
recruiters unknowingly misled American citizens into believing that they would fight as a
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separate unit composed of Americans. An undated memorandum from the Department of
Militia and Defence to Prime Minister Borden indicated this sentiment:
It may be pointed out that it has never yet been proposed that the battalions in 
question should serve at the front as distinct units. Giving them the form of a 
battalion is simply, as in the case of purely Canadian battalions, a method of 
facilitating recruiting and training.
This fact was accordingly withheld from American volunteers crossing the border to enlist,
who assumed and were informed by recruiters that the American Legion’s battalions were
formed to serve in the trenches of France and Belgium.234 Evidence of this misinformation
appeared in a New York Times article which declared that “Canada is to have a complete
brigade of 5,000 Americans by birth or parentage on the fighting line in Flanders.”235
The emergence of the American Legion surfaced as one of many creative
recruiting projects instituted by Hughes at a time when Canadian citizens continued to
volunteer in great numbers for the Canadian Expeditionary Force near the end of 1915. In
connection with Prime Minister Borden’s announcement in December 1915, requesting
that the CEF be doubled to 500,000, the American Legion was authorized and designated
for the CEF’s 7th Brigade, 3rd Division.236 The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion was one
of 141 battalions authorized in 1915.237 Furthermore, Borden’s call for more CEF troops
was associated with the CEF’s difficult first year of the First World War. The CEF
experienced heavy casualties as high as thirty-seven percent at Ypres in April and May
1915 because during that year, and later in 1916, Canadian tactics aimed at sacrificing
soldier’s lives in an attempt to capture German occupied territory, whereby offensive
maneuvers were “met with bloody failure, and even successes were costly.”238
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The American Legion’s first battalion, 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, was 
authorized as an infantry unit of the Canadian Expeditionary Force on December 22, 1915, 
by General Order 151 from the Department of Militia and Defence.239 Recruitment for the 
97th started two months previously and primarily focused on enlisting American-born 
citizens of Ontario, but low numbers of recruits caused the 97th’s recruiters to concentrate 
on soliciting American citizens throughout Canada and in the United States. The 97th and 
each succeeding American Legion battalion enlisted volunteers under the CEF’s 
regulations, although it maintained one requirement, exemplified by a 97th recruiting 
poster that proclaimed, “Any man of military age - between 18 and 45 - is eligible, 
provided that he was born in the United States, was naturalized there, or whose parents, 
one or both, were Americans.”240
Hughes commissioned A. B. Clark as Lieutenant-Colonel and commanding officer 
of the 97th on October 30, 1915. For the first eight days the 97th organized under 
Colonel L. E. LaBatt, a Canadian who had commanded the 4th Overseas Infantry 
Battalion on the Western Front before being wounded, which resulted in his return to 
Canada. Clark, a former Colonel in the New York National Guard, and his staff, initially 
divided between Toronto and Hamilton, Ontario, recruited Americans for the 97th, but the 
number of volunteers presenting themselves was minimal until the American Club of 
Toronto, its President, Asa Minard,241 and Benjamin A. Gould, a prominent American 
businessman in Toronto, invested funds to promote the battalion, and Reverend Charles
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Seymour Bullock, a Unitarian minister residing in Ottawa, assumed an active role in
• • 242recruiting.
The 97th was headquartered at Toronto, Ontario, and mobilized its forces in the 
Process Building at Exhibition Camp, located outside of Toronto as a part of the Canadian 
National Exhibition military complex, but recruited throughout the province of Ontario, 
especially in the communities bordering Michigan and New York. The first three recruits 
- Duke Harding, Jack Lee, and William Irving - enlisted on October 30, 1915, at the 
Strand Theater on Yonge Street, shaking Bullock’s hand and entering the CEF as the 
original American Legionnaires. On January 15, 1916, Clark resigned his command from 
the 97th stating that he had “lost the confidence of his subordinates.”243 Correspondence 
between several staff officers of Hughes suggest that Clark resigned because he had 
embezzled the battalion’s funds.244 More than eight hundred men on January 25, 1916, 
had enlisted, although most of the recruitment was under the leadership and guidance of 
Bullock, who was commissioned as Captain and chaplain of the 97th. In an effort to 
consolidate the Americans in the CEF into one battalion, the Department of Militia and 
Defence transferred a company composed of American-born volunteers from the 101st 
Overseas Infantry Battalion to the 97th on January 28, 1916 245
Replacing Clark was Lieutenant-Colonel Wade Lytton Jolly from Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. Jolly, a thirty-eight year old graduate from Columbia University, had 
previously served in the U. S. Marine Corps for over thirteen years. He had participated 
in the Spanish-American War on Cuba and the Philippines, the Boxer Rebellion in China,
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and in Panama in 1903 and Nicaragua in 1909-1910, before leaving his “lucrative building 
business” to enlist in the CEF.246 By February 1916, the 97th had enlisted 1,449 American 
volunteers of the sixteen hundred originally allotted to the battalion. This inspired Hughes 
to authorize three more battalions designated for the enlistment of American citizens. On 
February 15, 1916, the Department of Militia and Defence permitted the formation of the 
211th, 212th, and 213th Overseas Infantry Battalions to begin recruiting and mobilizing, 
an action with which the CEF’s General Staff disagreed because they disbelieved three 
more battalions could be filled with volunteers from the United States.247 Five days later, 
on February 20, 1916, Bullock was temporarily detached from the 97th for six weeks for 
the purpose of organizing the recruitment efforts of the 211th, 212th, and 237th.248 The 
three new American Legion battalions were not officially authorized until July 15, 1916, 
under Department of Militia and Defence’s General Order 69.249
The 211th recruited in the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, the 212th in 
Manitoba, and the 213th in southern Ontario. Headquarters and mobilization camps 
materialized for the 211th at Vancouver, British Columbia under the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Sage, at Winnipeg, Manitoba under the direction of 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Bates for the 212th, and Lieutenant-Colonel B. J. McCormick 
commanded the 213th at St. Catherines, Ontario. McCormick had served for sixteen 
years in the Michigan National Guard and briefly as a Major in the BEF on the Western 
Front before returning to Canada and enlisting in the CEF. Bates was a retired Brigadier- 
General of the Michigan National Guard. Eight days after the three new American Legion
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battalions began enlisting and training volunteers from the United States, the New York 
Times announced the formation of the 211th, 212th, and 213th. The article’s sentiment 
ostensibly indicated America’s approval of the scheme and its support of the Allies’ 
endeavors 250 Despite Hughes’ optimistic belief that the three new American Legion 
battalions would fill their ranks as quickly as the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, the 
211th, 212th and 213th experienced difficulties in obtaining American volunteers as their 
recruiting numbers were, at best, one-fifth of the 97th’s enlistment by April 1916.251 Yet, 
this statistic failed to influence Hughes, who authorized a fifth American Legion battalion 
on May 15, 1916, designated as the 237th Overseas Infantry Battalion.252 For his 
achievements in recruiting for the 97th, Hughes commissioned Reverend Bullock as a 
Lieutenant-Colonel and commanding officer of the 237th. The 237th was headquartered 
near Sussex, New Brunswick and recruited in the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, and Quebec.
As the summer of 1916 approached and the British completed their plans for an 
offensive campaign in the Somme to begin in July, the American Legion’s recruitment 
stalled. By May 31, 1916, three of the American Legion’s battalions had enlisted only 482 
Americans; respectively, 211th: 293; 212th: 290; 213th: 99.253 In addition to the 
American Legion’s inability to recruit the requisite number of troops to complete the 
battalion’s ranks, administrative problems in each of the American Legion’s battalions, but 
primarily in the 97th, surfaced as a result of “many false rumors [which] had raised the 
hopes of both officers and men . . . with the impression given that they were bound for the
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front.”254 Although each of the American Legion’s battalions experienced difficulties in 
disciplining, supervising, and maintaining its forces, the 97th encountered the most 
problems, apparently because of its larger number of recruits than the other American 
Legion battalions and its longer duration which it was stationed in the Dominion.
The first problem the American Legion encountered was the inability of the senior 
officers to control their junior officers (referred to as subalterns in British or Imperial 
armed forces), non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men. No evidence indicates 
specifically what caused such general discontent among several of the CEF’s American 
Legionnaires that senior officers did not enforce military discipline. Ineffectual 
commanders appeared to be an obvious explanation, but most of the senior officers and in 
general most of the American Legionnaires had previously served in the armed forces of 
the United States and therefore, understood the need for military regimentation.
The New York Times claimed that sixty-two percent of the Legionnaires had 
enlisted and served in American armed forces.255 A confidential report from Lieutenant- 
Colonel Jolly on the officers of the 97th revealed that forty-six percent (twenty-five out of 
fifty-four) of the 97th’s officers had previously served in the armed forces of the United 
States.256 Perhaps an unequal proportion of officers to enlisted men contributed to the 
lack of discipline among the American Legion’s battalions. The Militia’s Chief of the 
General Staff, Major-General Gwatkin, suggested as much in stating that “the proportion 
of officers to other ranks is excessive” causing confusion among the ranks.257 But Bob 
Elston, the sixth man to enlist in the 97th, contradicted this and asserted his own theory:
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It will be inexplicable to veterans why so much army service in the ranks did not 
make the Legion easily amenable to discipline. It worked the other way. They felt 
they knew enough soldiering to go at once into action. The discipline of training 
chafed them raw.
Elston also insisted that because so many former American servicemen served in the 97th 
they found it difficult to adopt to the British style military 258 Furthermore, Hughes 
evidently left the organization of the Legion “to a large extent” in the hands of Reverend 
Bullock, who had experienced a short military career in the U. S. Army and feuded with 
other American Legion battalion commanding officers, especially Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly 
of the 97th, about recruiting and administering a battalion.259 Bullock’s quick ascension to 
Lieutenant-Colonel was criticized by other American Legion battalion commanding 
officers, who attributed Bullock’s close relationship with Hughes as the only justification 
for Bullock’s promotion.260 Or, as Canadian military historian Ronald Haycock suggests, 
perhaps the discipline problems of the American Legion derived from the “presence in the 
[97th] battalion of a number of former mercenaries anxious for action.”261
In my opinion, the American Legion’s battalions experienced discipline problems 
because their volunteers, many of whom were primarily motivated to enlist in the CEF 
because they wished to experience the war, were extremely anxious to get to the front and 
fight. Combined with the fact that the longer American Legionnaires remained in Canada, 
the greater the probability these men would become undisciplined, regardless of who was 
in command. As a result the experienced and highly motivated American volunteers 
became bored with training and often expressed their frustration through violence.
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The main disciplinary problem for the American Legion stemmed from disorderly
conduct outside of the camp, usually associated with public drunkenness. From January
to June 1916, in Toronto, mobilization site of the 97th, local authorities frequently
detained American Legionnaires for bar room disturbances and other violations connected
with the abuse of alcohol 262 This prompted Toronto’s Chief of Police and Mayor Tommy
Church to complain repeatedly to the Department of Militia and Defence about the 97th’s
conduct, characterizing the detachment as “the worst behaved battalion in the city.”263
Most of the trouble that the American Legionnaires encountered centered on
interregimental fights with other CEF battalions stationed in or near Toronto. Many of
these confrontations were sparked by insults from “John Canuck” about the neutrality of
the United States government. A former member of the 97th declared that “the Legion
accepted all challenges. It broke monotony. There was pride of race in our resentment of
slurs against America.”264 Bob Elston of the 97th recalled one such incident:
I was in the Tremont bar one night and elbows were lifting amid friendly bickering. 
Then a truculent Canuck remembered that President Wilson had just sent another 
note to Germany, protesting some neutrality infringement. There was a snarl:
“Aw, Yank, send me a note about it!” And the roof blew off.265
Both Hughes and Bullock believed that the drinking of alcoholic beverages
corrupted soldiers. Hughes authorized Bullock to discharge any soldier of the American
Legion who engaged in drinking or was found “guilty of immoral conduct.”266 But this
punishment must not have been applied too often because several American Legion
officers were not asked to resign their commissions after having been admonished for their
drinking, and having had their drinking deportment entered in their records. For example,
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in Captain Charles A. Botsford’s confidential report from the Department of Militia of 
Defence inquiry of the 237th’s officers, he received an overall characterization as a “Good 
Officer.” But the remaining comments stated that Bot.sford was “not always to be counted 
on” because when “drinking, [he] loses [his] temper.”267
On March 27, 1916, British Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law dispatched a 
cablegram to the Governor-General, requesting that the 97th be transported to England at 
the “first possible opportunity.” Acknowledging that the battalion’s ranks were not 
completely filled to sixteen hundred men, Bonar Law indicated that the battalion needed to 
be sent at an earlier date than originally planned because he feared the 97th’s “men will 
desert. . .  in order to fight under the Stars and Stripes in Mexico.”268 This is the only 
evidence that the British government wanted any of the American Legion’s battalions to 
be transported to England. Rumors of being transported to the Western Front quickly 
surfaced at Exhibition Camp in Toronto, where the 97th was mobilizing. The hearsay 
appeared to be justified when the battalion received orders to move from Toronto in late 
May “with the impression given that they were bound for the front.”269 Instead the 97th 
merely relocated on June 10, 1916, to Aldershot Camp at Kentville, Nova Scotia, for the 
remainder of the summer, after a brief stint in Quebec City, Quebec, where the battalion’s 
problem with the law continued. On the second day of their encampment in Quebec City, 
nine American Legionnaires were arrested for a brawl at a local tavern.270
Although unknown to the battalion or its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jolly, at the time, the 97th was prohibited from being transferred to England for further
107
training because the United States government objected to any battalion serving in the war 
under the designation of the “American Legion.” The United States government’s official 
request to withhold any CEF battalion from holding any title connected with the United 
States was sent to the British Foreign Office by the U. S. State Department on May 8, 
1916. Hughes and other Canadian authorities should not have been surprised by the this 
action. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Andrew Bonar Law, informed 
Canadian officials on April 7, 1916, that if the 97th was to be transferred to England for 
future service on the Western Front, “it should not be called the American Battalion as the 
United States Government would not like that.”271
The Wilson administration objected to more than the regimental title, “American 
Legion,” for the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th. The designation of American 
Legion was originally conceived by Hughes, who designed the name to be “comprehensive 
enough to permit expansion into any sized body.”272 The American Legion cap and collar 
badges consisted of a bronze maple leaf surmounted by the coat of arms of George 
Washington’s family bearing the number of the battalion with one ribbon extending across 
the maple leaf bearing the words “Canada” on one side of the coat of arms and “Overseas” 
on the other side, under the coat of arms, a second ribbon contained the words “American 
Legion.”273 Shoulder badges, buttons, stationery, regimental flags, and other insignia 
marked with the “American Legion” name appeared as well, all of which were 
unacceptable to the United States government. Each of these grievances were conveyed
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either to the British Foreign Office or to the British Ambassador at Washington, Sir Cecil 
Spring-Rice.274
During the summer of 1916, the 97th remained encamped at Nova Scotia while the 
other four American Legion battalions concentrated on recruiting Americans in Canada 
and the United States. From June to September, each of the American Legion’s battalion 
commanders confronted the task of not only attracting more volunteers, but more 
importantly of persuading the American Legionnaires not to desert or transfer to other 
CEF battalions. After the Department of Militia and Defence canceled the 97th’s orders 
to leave Canada for service on the Western Front in May 1916, some of the battalion’s 
officers resigned their commissions, several men deserted, and many others reinlisted in 
battalions about to be sent overseas.275 This occurred because many of the American 
Legionnaires of the 97th and a small number from the other American Legion battalions 
feared being denied an opportunity to serve in the war with the American Legion, which 
was one of the principal motivators for many American citizens who crossed the border to 
enlist in the CEF.276
Those Americans whose prospects of serving overseas with the 97th had been 
frustrated nonetheless remained committed to serving in the armed forces of Canada and 
occasionally transferred to other CEF battalions. Most often the requests to be transferred 
came from the 97th’s officer corps. American Legionnaire officers frequently wanted to 
retain their rank upon being transferred, like Lieutenant Humbert Thurston Scott- 
Hunington, who wanted to transfer to another CEF battalion because of the 97th’s
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“methodical recruitment of Americans.”277 Several officers anxious to seize any 
opportunity to serve in the trenches of France and Belgium willingly resigned their 
commissions and reinlisted in other CEF battalions as privates. The 97th’s Adjutant, who 
was also 1914 West Point graduate, Major D. M. McRae, sent a letter to CEF Adjutant- 
General, Major-General W. E. Hodgins, dated July 21, 1916, which reveals the 
disappointment of many Americans in the 97th while the battalion remained encamped at 
Camp Aldershot in Nova Scotia for the summer. McRae described his disenchantment as 
follows:
I came to Canada in the hopes of seeing active service and after seven months 
waiting I feel that I can not afford to waste any more time. The continual 
disappointments relative to our departure for England have completely killed my 
interest in my work here and I feel that my services can be of no further value to 
this Battalion.278
Members of the 97th transferred to the British Army as well, such as Lieutenant F. L. 
White who was granted a six-week leave of absence from Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly to 
“proceed to England at his own expense and risk for the purpose of obtaining a 
commission in the Imperial Army.”279
Other volunteers left the American Legion to enlist in the armed forces of the 
United States in time to meet the perceived threat of a war between Mexico and the 
United States. In the summer of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson authorized U. S. Army 
Brigadier General John J. Pershing to lead a force - named the Punitive Expedition - 
composed of U. S. Army troops, into Mexico in order to capture the border raiding, 
Mexican revolutionary General Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Unfortunately, for the
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American Legion’s recruiters, the United States needed soldiers, particularly former 
American servicemen, because the majority of American troops were stationed in the 
Hawaii, Philippines, and Panama, which left the United States Army with less than twenty- 
five thousand soldiers in the continental United States. Pershing’s expedition to Mexico 
resulted in minor skirmishes between the American contingent and the Mexican army. 
Although Hughes disliked the idea of losing recruits, especially when his management of 
CEF recruitment was increasingly criticized by officers of the Department of Militia and 
Defence and Canadian governmental officials, on June 22, 1916, he announced that “any 
[former] American National Guard officers now in Canadian Armies will be released so 
that they can serve the United States against Mexico.”280 This allowed men, such as 
Lieutenant Roy M. Berrian of the 212th, to return to the United States for service in 
Mexico because they believed defending the United States superseded fighting for Canada 
in a European war. Subsequently, Berrian reinlisted in the CEF on September 18, 1916, 
after he had participated in the fight against Mexico.281
As a result of the desertions and transfers, the 97th lost more than five hundred 
men from February to July 1916, declining from 1,449 in February to 945 on July 21,
1916. During that same time period the five battalions of the American Legion combined 
lost twenty percent of their recruits due to desertion or transfers.282 The possibility of 
enlisting the minimum of one thousand American citizens for each overseas infantry 
battalion was rapidly diminishing as Legionnaires left and fewer new volunteers were 
enlisting for the battalions of the American Legion through the summer months of 1916.
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On July 21, 1916, the remaining American Legion battalions consisted of 649 men in the
211th, 487 in the 212th, 272 in the 213th, and 162 in the 237th.283 This decrease in the
numbers of men for the American Legion’s battalions reinforced the opinions of the
Governor-General, Major-General Gwatkin, and Major-General Fiset, who originally
opposed the formation of the American Legion.
Beginning in May 1916, opposition from the Governor-General, senior
Department of Militia and Defence and CEF officers, and Great Britain’s Foreign Office to
the American Legion caused the Department of Militia and Defence to reevaluate the
concept of deploying American citizens in separate military units to the Western Front.
Five days after the United States protested to the British concerning the American
Legion’s existence on May 8, 1916, Hughes informed the British War Office on May 13,
that the 97th would be embarking for Liverpool, England within the next two weeks to
complete its training. This was preemptive move by Hughes to avoid losing Legionnaires
to the U. S. Army during the United States governments campaign in Mexico.284 Bonar
Law, Great Britain’s Colonial Secretary, sent a cablegram to Prime Minister Borden
instructing him to cancel Hughes’ orders transferring the 97th to England because the
Foreign Office feared aggravating the United States government.285 On May 15, 1916, the
Governor-General forwarded a letter to Borden in which he candidly expressed his
dissatisfaction with the American Legion and with enlisting Americans into the Canadian
Expeditionary Force on three grounds:
First, it irritates the United States Government; second it opens a field for possible 
German spies to get through and obtain information; and, third experience has so 
often shown that American citizens do not always make the best of soldiers.286
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On May 19, 1916, Bonar Law asked Connaught to revoke the 97th’s embarkation orders 
because the British government believed that the “services of the Battalion cannot be 
utilized.”287 That same day Borden instructed Major-General Fiset, Deputy Minister of 
Militia and Defence, to cancel the 97th’s sailing orders.288 It is assumed that Borden acted 
on behalf of the Governor-General and not on his own initiative because the Prime 
Minister had reservations about interfering with Hughes’ affairs.
From May to August 1916, correspondence from the Governor-General to Prime 
Minister Borden exhibited the Duke of Connaught’s discontent with the American Legion 
in which he frequently considered disbanding the five battalions. Canadian opposition to 
the American Legion gained momentum after June 5, 1916, when the formation’s leading 
British advocate, Lord Kitchener, died while traveling to Russia. As Governor-General of 
the Dominion of Canada, the Duke of Connaught was also commander-in-chief of 
Canada’s armed forces. Connaught also held the rank of Field-Marshal in the British 
Army, and subsequently believed his military experience provided him with a more 
applicable understanding of Canada’s military affairs than Borden. For three months 
Connaught and Borden argued about the American Legion and its future existence. The 
conflict eventually caused Borden to raise constitutional questions concerning 
Connaught’s and His Majesty’s Government’s position over Canadian domestic matters. 
Connaught and Borden’s strife centered on what powers were entitled to Connaught as 
Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada. On July 12, 1916, in a letter from Borden 
to Connaught he reminded the Governor-General that his powers were limited by the
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constitution.289 By August, Connaught had given up his campaign to disband the 
American Legion and on August 5, 1916, the Governor-General apologized to Borden for 
any misunderstanding 290 In October 1916, Connaught resigned as Governor-General. 
Years later Borden reflected in his memoirs that Connaught “never fully realized the 
limitations of his position as Governor-General” nor understood that as commander-in- 
chief of Canada’s armed forces his position was titular.291
The Department of Militia and Defence’s Chief of the General Staff, Major- 
General Gwatkin, expressed his dissatisfaction and apprehensions with the American 
Legion to Borden. On June 18, 1916, Gwatkin issued a detailed memorandum on the 
subject of the American Legion, whose formation he contended had exposed Canada “to 
[the] charge of disregarding the neutrality of the United States,” which embarrassed the 
British Embassy at Washington and the British Foreign Office. Gwatkin concluded by 
suggesting that the CEF disband the American Legion “before more money is wasted” on 
the endeavor. Nonetheless, the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff reserved his comments 
for the 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th only, believing that the 97th should not be 
disbanded despite its “bad reputation.”292 The financial feasibility of the American Legion 
appeared to be a concern for many Canadian authorities. A July 22, 1916, letter to 
Hughes from the Canadian High Commissioner’s Office in London expressed fear that “a 
great deal of money expended in the organization of these regiments will prove to be 
useless expenditure” and contended that if the American Legion’s battalions were “not to 
be utiiized[,] they should disbanded.”293
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In August 1916, the 97th’s ranks rapidly deteriorated, while the other four 
American Legion battalions, particularly the 212th and 237th, also failed to fill their ranks 
with the requisite number of volunteers. With the American Legion designation 
preventing the possibility of any service overseas and declining numbers of soldiers in the 
battalions, the Department of Militia and Defence’s parliamentary secretary, F. B. 
McCurdy, proposed either to reorganize the five American Legion battalions by combining 
some of the battalions together or to disband the entire American Legion distributing the 
Legion’s men to other CEF overseas infantry battalions as replacements. This scheme 
dashed Hughes’ hopes of forming a brigade composed of American citizens, which had 
been his intention since 1914. In response to McCurdy’s recommendation to Borden and 
Connaught, the commanding officers of the 97th, Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly, and 237th, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Bullock, who previously had exhibited public and private 
animosity towards one another, began to position themselves for the command of any 
future reorganized unit of Americans by insinuating that other commanding officer was an 
incompetent leader. Jolly submitted a confidential report on the officers of the 237th to 
the Department of Militia and Defence, criticizing Bullock and his subordinate’s command 
methods, challenging his claim “to have raised the 97th Battalion,”1 and adding only one 
positive comment about Bullock, “a good speaker.”294 Bullock’s reply charged Jolly with 
misappropriating battalion funds and attacked his “character and integrity as an officer and 
a gentlemen.”295 Jolly requested that a Militia Board of Inquiry address the personal
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attacks, while Bullock demanded that the 97th’s finances be examined. Neither of the 
accusations resulted in any official investigation by the Department of Militia and Defence.
On August 30, 1916, the Department of Militia and Defence recommended that 
the 97th preserve its identity as a CEF overseas infantry battalion and that the 212th and 
237th be amalgamated into the 97th.296 This amalgamation was designed to “obliterate 
the 212th and 237th” and fill the ranks of the 97th, which had been authorized to proceed 
to England on August 3, 1916, as soon as its ranks were filled.297 This British retraction 
of orders keeping the 97th in Canada occurred through the aid of the British War Minister, 
then David Lloyd George, who overruled the objections of the British Foreign Office 
which feared provoking the United States government.298 Until September 12, 1916, the 
date of the reorganization of the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, the 97th, 212th, 237th 
continued to recruit independently. The 211th and 213th remained intact and continued to 
recruit American volunteers. According to the law of the Dominion of Canada the 
authority to disband any Canadian regiment rested with the Governor-General as 
commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces. Connaught authorized Prime Minister 
Borden to disband the two battalions in question on October 8, 1916.299
Officers of the 212th and 237th were either selected for transfer to the 97th, 
permitted to go to England, unattached, to join a different CEF overseas battalion, or 
forced to resign their commission from the Canadian Expeditionary Force. All other ranks 
from the 212th and 237th transferred to the 97th.300 Certain officers of the 97th, “who 
were obliged to leave the battalion on account of their positions being given to officers of
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the 212th and 237th,” either attempted to gain an appointment with another CEF battalion 
or resigned their commission. Resigning officers from the 97th received one month’s 
salary and free transportation to any point in Canada. If any former 97th officer did not 
receive an appointment, he was automatically retired from the CEF at the end of 
September 1916, with the understanding that he could reinlist in the CEF as a private.
The 97th’s non-commissioned officers, who lost their position due to the amalgamation, 
either accepted a demotion or were discharged from the CEF.301
Therefore, the reorganized 97th, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly, 
selected officers from all three battalions to form its chain of command and combined the 
non-commissioned officers and enlisted men into one battalion. Out of the thirty-three 
officers of the new 97th, fifteen originated from the 97th, eleven from the 212th, and six 
from the 237th. The former commanding officer of the 237th, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Reverend Bullock, retained his rank and went to England as an unattached chaplain of the 
CEF. In London, Bullock established a “Vise Office” at 3 Southampton Street advising 
Canadian soldiers exposed to venereal disease and preached at various congregations 
throughout Great Britain.302 He remained in the CEF until January 20, 1920. Jolly 
offered Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Bates of the 212th the position of second in command of 
the reorganized 97th at a demotion to the rank of Major. Bates refused Jolly’s offer and 
“was given 30 days leave of absence with pay on the 20th September[;]” after that date he 
would be dismissed from the 212th Battalion.303 Two months later, Bates, unaware that 
the 212th ceased to exist as an infantry battalion in the CEF or that he had been
117
discharged from the CEF, attempted to reorganize the 212th at Winnipeg, Manitoba, but 
the Department of Militia and Defence informed him of the status of the battalion and 
again offered him a position in the 97th. Bates declined the offer, stating that “he would 
never do anything to help the 97th Battalion.”304 All debts incurred by the 212th and 
237th prior to the amalgamation were assessed to the Department of Militia and Defence.
The reorganization of the 97th occurred without Hughes, who was in England 
during the amalgamation of the three American Legion battalions, or his acknowledgment. 
This exemplified how Prime Minister Borden had been reducing Hughes’ role as Minister 
of the Militia, beginning in August 1916, because Borden believed Hughes no longer 
maintained the capacity to direct the affairs of the CEF and the Department of Militia and 
Defence. The most obvious shortcoming of Hughes’ administration of the CEF as 
Minister of Militia and Defence was his failure to arrange a method of reinforcing the 
battalions in the trenches.305 In that same month Borden restricted Hughes from 
administering any recruiting campaigns and duties of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. 
On November 9, 1916, Borden dismissed Hughes from his post.
One week after the 97th reorganized, it sailed for Great Britain aboard the S.S. 
Olympic on September 19, 1916, with thirty-one officers and 798 men. Elston recalled 
the moment of the lonely departure: “no bands, no speeches, no tears, no cheers.”306 The 
97th’s departure coincided with the removal its “American Legion” designation on 
September 12, 1916. All distinguishing insignia and badges associated with the United 
States were removed by the commanding officers of the American Legion’s battalions
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under orders from the Department of Militia and Defence. The reason for the removal of 
the “American Legion” designation was foreshadowed in a letter from Hughes to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Bullock on July 12, 1916. The Minister of Militia and 
Defence requested that the term “American Legion” be withdrawn from all references to 
the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th for “international reasons” in order to hasten the 
deployment of the battalions overseas.307 The American Legion’s new cap and collar 
badge markings read “acta non verba,” translated as “deeds, not words.”308 Replacing the 
“American Legion” designation ended the United States government’s protest to Canadian 
and British authorities concerning the formation. The Wilson administration had 
consistently objected to any foreign nation using the word “American” to designate a 
military unit, and previously had asked the French government not to use the name, 
“Escadrille Americaine.” The French complied by renaming the air squadron composed of 
American aviators to the Lafayette Escadrille.309
In England, the 97th trained until October 31, 1916, near the city of Otterpool in 
Kent County under the direction of the CEF’s 6th Canadian Training Brigade. While 
completing its final phase of military instruction, engaging in bombing, trench digging, and 
bayonet fighting drills, the mismanagement of the battalion’s finances was exposed as a 
result of the numerous outstanding debts and misappropriated funds by the officers and 
men of the 97th. From the beginning of 1916, the Department of Militia and Defence 
received a number of complaints from Toronto businessmen that members of the 97th 
repeatedly failed to pay their expenses. After the 97th moved from Toronto to Camp
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Aldershot in Kentville, Nova Scotia, on June 10, 1916, it was difficult for Toronto
businessmen to locate those soldiers who incurred debts in Toronto. For example, a
letter from the Toronto law firm Rowell, Reid, Wood & Wright to the Department of
Militia and Defence revealed the dilemma facing Toronto’s debt collectors:
You will of course appreciate the difficulties of the situation in that the 97th 
Battalion is officered by Americans, with whose financial or other responsibility we 
are in no way familiar . . . the Battalion is composed of citizens of the United 
States and has been moved from one Province to another making it impossible to 
retrieve their dues.310
Most of the unpaid accounts were from Toronto’s tailors and outfitters who furnished 
American Legionnaires supplemental uniforms, but claims from retailers of band 
instruments and sporting equipment appeared as well. On June 24, 1916, at the request of 
the 97th’s commanding officer, a Militia Board of Inquiry reported “a defiency in certain 
ordnance stores,” such as rifles, bayonets, and miscellaneous equipment. The missing 
items were charged to Jolly and his staff without further punishment.311 During the 
summer of 1916, paymaster Captain G. S. Jackson’s management of the battalion’s funds 
became increasingly troublesome as the 97th experienced a number of desertions. For 
instance, an unidentified sergeant and private stole eight battalion checques. Four of the 
checques were cashed in for over six hundred dollars, and four were never recovered.
Both men deserted from the CEF.312
When the reorganized 97th embarked for Great Britain, its financial situation 
remained unsettled. The financial dealings of the 97th in England paralleled its actions in 
Canada as outstanding debts to local grocers amounting to hundreds of pounds caused
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more controversy for the battalion. Sometime in October 1916, the 97th’s Lieutenant 
Charles Stewart Brady crossed the Atlantic Ocean back to Canada in order to settle the 
battalion’s affairs before a Department of Militia and Defence Board of Inquiry. In the 
preliminary hearings, the military court determined “that the internal affairs of the 97th 
Battalion were allowed to become badly disorganised from the lack of proper supervision 
by certain officers in charge of the battalion.” On November 2, 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jolly was found responsible for this condition and subsequently court martialed along with 
Majors A. B. Mason and B. C. Pitman. The Board concluded its investigation on May 12, 
1917, in Seaford, Sussex County, England and recommended that Lieutenant Brady assist 
in collecting the outstanding debts of the battalion. Brady was “anxious to settle matters” 
because as an American citizen he wanted to immediately transfer to the U. S. Army. As 
late as 1927, former American Legionnaires of the 97th Battalion compensated the 
Canadian government for the misappropriated funds even for amounts as little as five 
dollars.313
In October 1916, it appeared possible that the 97th might serve on the Western 
Front, but Canadian and British officials feared aggravating the United States government 
as the Presidential elections of 1916 approached. On October 10, 1916, economist John 
Meynard Keynes, British Treasury Secretary, warned the British Cabinet to avoid irritating 
the Wilson administration stating that it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
carry through financial operations on a scale adequate to our needs” with the loss of 
American capital.314 Canadian officials concurred with this British sentiment and decided
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that it would be better for foreign relations to disband the American Legion instead of 
deploying the regiment to the Western Front which would further aggravate the Wilson 
administration. During the last half of the month, the Department of Militia and Defence 
began dismantling the reorganized battalion. The Legionnaires were shocked, believing 
they had been tricked by the British who had no intention of permitting the American 
Legion to serve as a unit in the CEF. The reorganized 97th protested to the British War 
Office, but it was to no avail. Initially, three hundred men were transferred to the CEF’s 
4th Overseas Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, as reinforcements; and on 
October 22 and 27, 1916, 150 and 120 men were respectively transferred to the Royal 
Canadian Regiment on the Western Front, which was deployed near the French city of 
Courcellette as a part of the 7th Brigade, 3rd Division. The remainder of the unit, 428, 
either transferred to the Royal Canadian Regiment or Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry on November 1, 1916, one week before the 1916 Presidential Elections. The 
97th officially disbanded on April 5, 1918, in accordance with Privy Council Order 
Number 532.315
The 211th and 213th continued to recruit and mobilize American citizens until 
both of the battalions embarked for Great Britain from Halifax, Nova Scotia, on December 
20, 1916, once again aboard the Olympic. The two battalions arrived in England the day 
after Christmas, the 211th with twenty-five officers and 662 men and the 213th with five 
officers and 184 other ranks. Both the 211th and 213th were transported to England in 
order to disassemble the battalions and reassign the officers and men to other CEF units.
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On January 20, 1917, the 26th Canadian Reserve Battalion absorbed the 211th, which 
transferred to the Canadian Railway Troop Depot on February 16, 1917. One month 
later, on March 21, 1917, the Canadian Railway Troops were amalgamated with the 218th 
Overseas Infantry Battalion, ending the existence of the 211th.316 The 213th’s officers and 
men were absorbed by the 25th Canadian Reserve Battalion in two separate drafts, one on 
January 26, 1917, and the other on February 7, 1917. This battalion was not officially 
disbanded until September 15, 1920, by the Department of Militia and Defence’s General 
Orders 149, although it had contained no soldiers since the February draft.317 Thus, 
sixteen days before the United States government entered the war against Germany and its 
allies, the Canadian Expeditionary Force eliminated the American Legion by dispersing the 
remainder of its troops among other CEF units. This allowed the Canadian government to 
disassociate itself from any military formation connected with the United States or its 
citizens.
Although the CEF’s American Legion caused administrative and financial 
difficulties for Canadian authorities and the Department of Militia and Defence, not all of 
its history should be regarded as disreputable or ignoble. In an attempt to solicit more 
recruits and in honor of the formation, Prime Minister Borden declared July 29, 1916, 
“American Legion Day.” The celebration, held throughout Canada, acknowledged 
“Canada’s appreciation to the Americans who have taken up the sword of Justice.”318 The 
event was marked by fireworks, parades, and “Base Ball” games. During the summer of 
1916, the American Legion frequently participated in the “American Pastime” in order to
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stimulate morale among Canadian citizens and American Legionnaires, whose rate of 
desertion were the highest from May to September 1916. For example, on August 4,
1916, the 237th played a game against a team from the town of Digby to commemorate 
the second anniversary of the declaration of war - the 237th won six to five.319
Although the 97th acquired a notorious reputation for fighting in Toronto’s 
taverns, Mrs. O. B. Shepherd, a respected member of Toronto’s community and a member 
of the American Legion’s Auxiliary, frequently entertained the members of the battalion at 
her home - she was nicknamed “The Mother of the Legion.”320 The American Legion 
Auxiliary, mainly composed of wealthy Toronto women, provided the Legionnaires with 
personal effects, including socks and towels, and arranged numerous social activities to 
ease the boredom of being detained in Toronto during the cold winter months.321
Desertion from the American Legion was a primary concern for its recruiters, 
commanding officers, and particularly for Sir Sam Hughes, its architect and leading 
Canadian advocate. Most men deserted because they either wanted serve in the Punitive 
Expedition in Mexico, had used the Legion as a haven for the winter of 1915-1916, or 
feared that remaining in the American Legion would not be the quickest means to the 
front. Meanwhile, loyal American Legionnaires, who never wavered in adversity, 
exhibited great enthusiasm for their battalions. Frequently, this excitement was displayed 
on the parade grounds of the mobilization centers and in the neighboring cities of the 97th, 
211th, 212th, 213th and 237th’s headquarters. The 97th outfitted a fifty man drill squad 
and a full regimental band, both of which frequently performed in Toronto and
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surrounding Ontario communities. The “American Legion March,” composed by John
Philip Sousa, could be heard in every American Legion camp in addition to the lyrics of a
separate American Legion song:
Not because our homes are threatened, Or our country calls to the fight.
We’re fighting because we want to, Because we love both Fight and Right.
There’s Tommy, and Mikey, and then Scotty, too, Canadi-an, Australi-an, 
and the Hindu, English, and Irish, and Scottish, all swank,
Turn out, look us over, for we are the Yank.
If the Legion was not singing, the American Legionnaires could read about themselves in
the 97th’s The American Legion Magazine or the 211th’s Legion Weekly323
The American Legion corresponded to a number of other Canadian Expeditionary
Force infantry battalions. Under Hughes’ administration as Minister of Militia, the CEF
organized more than 260 overseas infantry regiments and battalions; forty-eight served on
the Western Front and two (259th and 260th) in Siberia, Russia. The remaining infantry
units either remained in Canada as a part of the home defense or their officers and men
were absorbed or drafted by other CEF formations as replacements. Therefore, when the
reorganized 97th and the 211th and 213th journeyed to England and were redeployed into
different CEF units, the American Legion resembled hundreds of other CEF infantry
battalions that were disbanded before being deployed to Western Front.324 Often
battalions were shown favoritism from Hughes, especially those regiments commanded by
Hughes’ friends, like the American Legion, which endured months of objections from
Canadian officials to its organization through Hughes’ close relationship with Bullock.325
Transferring American Legionnaires to other CEF infantry units as replacements followed
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the Department of Militia and Defence’s decision to reinforce its forces using regiments 
recruited and dispatched from Canada as ‘“draft-giving battalions.’” For example, the 
79th Overseas Infantry Battalion refilled its ranks five different times and supplied the CEF 
with 1,020 officers and men as reinforcements.326
Canadian military historian Ronald Haycock has described the American Legion as 
a “dismal failure.”327 No doubt the five battalions of the American Legion encountered 
political and diplomatic obstacles in their recruitment and mobilization, exhibited 
inadequate leadership which in turn caused multiple problems, and never engaged in 
combat on the Western Front as a unit under American commanders. Nevertheless, the 
Minister of Militia and Defence had authorized the establishment of the American Legion 
as a “method of facilitating recruiting and training.”328 Therefore, despite the number and 
degree of difficulties the American Legion encountered, it met its main objective of 
facilitating the recruitment of an undetermined number of American citizens to serve in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force. With the aid of Reverend Bullock, Hughes accomplished 
this, enlisting a total of 2,746 Americans into the CEF, a number far short of the sixty 
thousand “volunteers from the neighborhood of the American Republic” Hughes 
expected.329 The British Ambassador, Spring-Rice, and the British Foreign Office 
contended that the American Legion was an embarrassment before the United States 
entered the war. An “embarrassment” may have been an exaggeration because on May 
30, 1917, soldiers of what had been the American Legion presented the 97th, 211th,
212th, 213th, and 237th5 s regimental colors to the wife of King George the Fifth, Queen
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Mary, at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, England. After the war, the official regimental 
colors of the American Legion were donated to various locations: 97th to Sulgrave 
Manor (ancestral home of George Washington’s family in Hants, England); 211th to the 
United States National War Museum; 212th to the Canadian War Museum; 213th to the 
King Albert I of Belgium, and 237th to the French government.
The American Legion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was a novel plan to 
recruit American citizens in order to supply Canada, whose population was only eight 
million, with a supplemental source of volunteers. Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, 
enchanted by the possibility of enticing a large number of Americans to enlist in his Legion 
scheme, inspired men like Reverend Bullock to help him achieve his aim of establishing a 
brigade of American citizens in the CEF. As Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes was 
entrusted by the Canadian government to raise a volunteer army. From October 22, 1915, 
to March 16, 1917, the Department of Militia and Defence invested enough resources to 
establish five “American” infantry battalions which provided the CEF with needed 
manpower, and the fact that the American Legionnaires were United States citizens and 
only amounted to twenty-seven hundred made no difference to Hughes or the CEF 
because Canada wanted more soldiers. Although the American Legion caused the 
Canadian and British governments political and diplomatic difficulties, experienced 
organizational, administrative, and financial debacles, and violated British military law and 
international agreements, it achieved Hughes’ aim of facilitating volunteers from the 
United States for service in the trenches of France and Belgium.
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Chapter Four
American Combat Experiences in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1915-1917.
Over forty-one thousand American citizens enlisted and served in Canada’s 
expeditionary force, and 19,966 of those Americans experienced the carnage of the 
Western Front in the First World War before the United States entered the war on April 6, 
1 9 1 7  3 3 1  Thereafter most Americans enlisted in the American Expeditionary Force 
(AEF).332 Although the CEF was much smaller than the enormous armies of France, 
Germany, Russia, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Great Britain, British 
commanders Field Marshal Sir John D. P. French and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 
often assigned the CEF to trenches where it more frequently encountered Germans than 
did any other British Imperial units of comparable strength.333 This persuaded Canadian 
military historian C. P. Stacey to characterize the CEF as the “spearhead of the British 
Army.”334 American citizens who fought in the many offensive and defensive campaigns 
waged by the CEF, experienced some of the greatest battles of the First World War. A 
few of these Americans recounted their wartime adventures in autobiographies and 
newspaper and periodical articles; a larger number of Americans revealed their thoughts of 
the war in personal letters, and Canadian military records document the military 
achievements of Americans in the CEF.335
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Americans abounded in the battalions of the CEF from listening posts inside “No- 
Man’s Land” to reserve bivouacs miles behind the front lines. American citizens serving 
with the CEF in the trenches represented a cross section of American society from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific: farmers, writers, engineers, university students, soldiers of fortune, 
millionaires, and army, navy, marine corps, and national guard veterans. Americans in the 
CEF told various anecdotes about their different experiences in the war. Descriptions of 
their fears and thoughts, accounts of Canadian offensive and defensive operations, and 
chronicles of heroic individual actions evoke images of what all soldiers in the trenches 
endured. But the American point of view from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, presents 
an unusual, and rarely recognized perspective on the First World War to the extent that 
American history textbooks infrequently acknowledge that twenty thousand American 
citizens in the CEF fought against the German army while the United States government 
remained neutral.
Numerous books by American citizens who served in the armed forces of the 
United States discuss and evaluate the American war experience after the United States 
entered the war. Most accounts by Americans who enlisted in a foreign army before the 
United States government declared war on Germany, like Arthur Guy Empey’s 
autobiography Over The Top, usually recount the American experience in the British 
armed forces, French Foreign Legion, or French Air Force. This neglect by historians of 
American participation in the CEF occurs primarily because few publications address the
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experience of Americans who served in the CEF on the Western Front before the United 
States entered the war or at any other time.
From March 1915 to April 1917, Americans and Canadians in the CEF fought 
together in the trenches of Belgium and France against the Germans. At first glance, the 
CEF’s soldiers appeared to be a part of the British Expeditionary Force because their 
dress and equipment were so similar and the command structure between the CEF and 
BEF. The difference between the British and Canadian apparel was the Canadian jacket, 
web equipment, and rifle, but by the end of 1916 these variations were replaced by British 
models because they were more suitable for the conditions of trench warfare.336 The only 
way to detect a CEF soldier from a BEF soldier visually was to look for the woolen CEF 
patches on the upper sleeve of the uniform and an insignia sometimes on the helmet, 
although in the winter, the CEF’s troops could be distinguished from their British 
counterparts by their goatskin jerkins. The CEF’s distinguishing markings indicated a 
soldier’s division, brigade, and battalion.337 The command relationship between the CEF 
and BEF was intricate. The British High Command maintained the authority over the 
CEF’s four divisions, meaning they assigned the CEF’s position on the battlefield.
Because Canada had few Canadian-born men who were professional soldiers in the British 
Army or Canadian Militia, the Department of Militia and Defence appointed British Army 
officers to command the CEF.338 From September 25, 1914, to June 8, 1917, Britain’s 
Lieutenant-General Sir E. A. H. Alderson and Lieutenant-General Sir Julian H. G. Byng 
commanded the CEF. For the remainder of the war Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur W.
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Currie, a Canadian, commanded the CEF. Throughout the war, sixteen British Army 
officers were appointed to command divisions and brigades of the CEF.339
On the night of March 8, 1915, the CEF’s 1st Division under the command of 
Alderson, mobilized in Canada from August to December 1914, crossed the English 
Channel and entered the trenches in the British zone of the Western Front. Already in 
France were the troops of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), who had 
been sent overseas on October 3, 1914, as a demonstration to the British government of 
Canada’s determination to fully support Great Britain’s war effort.340 At the time the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force was assigned to the front lines, a series of trenches 
partitioned by a single strip of land - commonly known as “No-Man’s Land” - divided the 
belligerents from the Swiss border to the North Sea. There the German Army faced the 
armies of France, Belgium, and Great Britain on a battlefield marked by extensive 
defensive fortifications which made very difficult the waging of successful offensive 
campaigns. As Canada’s expeditionary force entered the lines assigned to the British 
Expeditionary Force, it encountered warfare heretofore unknown to Canadian military 
strategists.341 The initial efforts of the CEF in 1915 reflected that predicament as 
Canadian and British commanders accepted the strategy of sacrificing soldier’s lives in 
order to kill enemy soldiers and capture tactically advantageous ground.342 Unfortunately 
for the CEF’s commanders and the men in the trenches, the CEF “learned” trench warfare 
“in a bloodbath of confusion and misdirection.”343
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The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s first action on the Western Front occurred on 
March 10, 1915, at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle. In one day of fighting, two CEF 
infantry battalions assigned to British reserve trenches observed the battle and seldom 
encountered the Germans. The Second Battle of Ypres, from April 22 to May 25, 1915, 
was the first battle in which the entire 1st Division of the CEF encountered the Germany 
Army. The first two days of this battle, remembered as the first “Gas Attack” on the 
Western Front, the German 38th Landwehr Brigade and 2nd Reserve Ersatz Brigade of 
the 26th and 27th Reserve Corps discharged chlorine gas at the 1 st Division in an effort to 
disorient their defensive measures. The Canadians managed to hold on to most of their 
front lines at Gravenstafel Ridge against the German offensive, earning a distinguished 
combat reputation in its first battle. The 1st Division bravely closed a potentially 
disastrous gap in the line on the CEF’s left flank after a unit of French Colonials (45th 
Algerian Division) and Britain’s 87th Territorial Division retreated from their positions. 
Although the Canadians held their ground, their efforts cost the division 6,035 casualties, 
two thousand of whom were fatalities.344 This battle “introduced” Canadians to “those 
dreadful lists of casualties.”345
Romeo Houle of New Bedford, Massachusetts, served with the 14th Overseas 
Infantry Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, CEF, during the first days of the Second 
Battle of Ypres.346 Houle recounted his memories of the Second Battle of Ypres in a New 
York Times article of June 4, 1916, in which he declared his intention to enlighten the 
American public about the horrors of trench warfare. He wrote of his disgust at the rats in
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the trenches and suggested that the famous American poet, Edgar Allen Poe, “could have
got new inspiration from their dirty hordes.” He also related his great fear of mines and
told about the events at Ypres and in other Allied campaigns of 1915. Houle’s two most
perceptive descriptions of battle were of the German chlorine gas attack and of the CEF’s
defense of the Canadian’s exposed left flank at Ypres. Of this gas he remarked,
Gas? What do you know of it, you people who never heard earth and heaven 
rock with the frantic turmoil of the ceaseless bombardment? A crawling yellow 
cloud that pours in upon you, that gets you by the throat and shakes you as a huge 
mastiff might shake a kitten, and leaves you burning in every nerve and vein of 
your body with pain unthinkable; your eyes starting from their sockets; your face 
turned yellow-green.347
When the 45th Algerian Division began to abandon its fourth line trenches in the 
face of the German offensive, it unthinkingly endangered the CEF’s left flank. Houle’s 4th 
Company responded by positioning two machine guns, a British-made Vickers and a 
French constructed Hotchkiss, to repel the advancing Germans. Houle noted his 
admiration of the Germans’ fortitude in attacking and said he would “never forget” them. 
Further remarking that “when our guns suddenly spoke their front line melted; their 
second crumpled before this destruction; but on, on, on they came, unflinching, marching 
with even steps into certain death.” In response to the CEF’s defense of Gravenstafel 
Ridge at the Second Battle of Ypres, German artillery bombarded Houle’s position 
causing him to be hurled twenty yards from one of the explosions. Narrowly escaping 
death, Houle was one of only sixteen out of the company’s original five hundred who 
remained alive after 1915. He was subsequently honorably discharged from the CEF after 
American authorities proved that he was under age when he enlisted.348
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Houle was not the only American serving in the CEF at the Second Battle of 
Ypres, but his testimony exemplified his passion for what was occurring on the Western 
Front and how little most Americans understood the nature of the conflict. Unlike Houle 
who expressed contempt for the United States government’s neutrality and for having 
removed him from military service in the CEF, Henry Lapierre wrote an article about the 
Second Battle of Ypres two months after the first gas attack occurred. Lapierre, who 
served with the CEF’s 13th Overseas Infantry Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, 
perceived this battle differently because his battalion served in the advance trenches, 
whereas Houle’s battalion had fought in the support trenches. Under orders, Lapierre’s 
battalion attacked the German lines before the gas shells disoriented the Canadian advance 
until “all at once our men began to totter and crumple up by scores. On all sides the 
soldiers dropped with hardly a sound and with no sign of injuries.” Lapierre and his 
battalion confronted the enemy without gas masks and took heavy losses as 150 men 
survived out of 1,100. Although Lapierre suffered from gas inhalation, he continued to 
serve in the trenches until his mother obtained his honorable discharge from the British 
War Office. The reason or date for his dismissal can not be ascertained from Lapierre’s 
account, but most likely he was discharged for being underage when he enlisted in the 
CEF.349
Houle’s and Lapierre’s personal accounts capture the sentiment experienced by 
many soldiers in the CEF at Ypres on April 22 to 23, 1915, but the most distinguished 
American citizen who participated in the battle was Tracy Richardson. Before serving in
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the CEF, Richardson, who had been bom in Broken Bow, Nebraska, on November 21, 
1892, had served in numerous armies and wars in Central and South America where he 
had earned an honorable reputation as a soldier of fortune in the banana republics from 
1909 to 1914. His service as a full Colonel and Major respectively in the Nicaraguan and 
Mexican revolutionary armies are legendary and fantastic war stories. For example, 
Richardson single-handedly captured Managua, Nicaragua, for General Luis Mena by 
erroneously convincing the capital city’s defenders that they were surrounded by Mena’s 
forces. In Mexico, he contended that he personally negotiated a retraction of a 10,000 
dollar bounty for his life from rival Mexican revolutionary General Francisco “Pancho” 
Villa. Besides Richardson’s ability to talk his way out of a difficult situation, he acquired 
an equally deadly capability to operate various models of machine guns with uncanny 
proficiency - a skill acquired under the tutelage of fellow banana republic mercenary Lee 
Christmas.350
When Canada entered war on August 4, 1914, Richardson left Mexico and enlisted 
as a private in the CEF with Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. His low 
enlistment number, 865, attests that Richardson acted immediately to see action early in 
the European War.351 With the PPCLI he participated in several small battles from 
December 1914 to April 1915. Unlike Houle and Lapierre, Richardson experienced more 
of the Second Battle of Ypres than the days of the first gas attacks on April 22 to 23,
19 1 5.352 Richardson’s observations focused on the battle’s “bloody attrition.” Before he 
entered the trenches Richardson had been billeted in the old Belgian cavalry barracks at
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Ypres, where under bombardment he recalled “you would hear a most unearthly scream, 
then a gigantic explosion, and a big building would go down in a pile of brick and dust, 
burying whoever might be near.”353
On May 4, 1915, when German artillery incessantly shelled Richardson’s machine 
gun section in the British trenches, Richardson believed that his unit had received “special 
attention from the German artillery.” From this experience of being “shelled,” he stated 
that “time and again our guns were dismounted, buried, dug out and brought into action 
again. Our numbers began to decrease; our trench became a shambles full of dead, 
wounded, broken guns and equipment. It did not seem possible that a human being could 
live.” Before the Germans destroyed all of his unit’s guns on the front line, Richardson 
suffered three wounds, but was able to crawl through a communication trench to a 
dressing station. Eventually he walked back to the city of Ypres under heavy German 
artillery fire. He was subsequently discharged as a result of his three wounds, one of 
which was caused by shrapnel that hit him between the shoulders and tore his back open 
to his hips.354 After his recovery, Richardson reinlisted with the CEF’s American Legion - 
97th Overseas Infantry Battalion - upon passing a medical examination from the 
battalion’s lenient CEF physician, Captain B. S. Hutcheson. He was commissioned as a 
Lieutenant on September 28, 1916, and commanded the 97th’s machine gun section.355 
Possibly exhausted from his wounds acquired from years of infantry service, Richardson 
later transferred to the British Royal Naval Air Service and in 1918 transferred to the 
American Expeditionary Force’s Signal Corps as a pilot.356
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For the remainder of 1915, the CEF continued to engage the Germans, but 
achieved relatively little offensive success as its front lines remained virtually unaltered.
The Canadian Expeditionary Force attacked the Germans in their trenches by a series of 
offensives towards their defensive fortifications (trench, dugout, or pillbox) in order to 
“breakthrough” their lines and expose a gap through which further offensives might 
produce a strategic advantage. But, the development of the machine gun, the Allies’ lack 
of military technology to counter this weapon, and the absence of new offensive 
techniques created few opportunities for successful offensive campaigns in 1915, 1916, or 
1917.357
As a result, the CEF rarely engaged the Germans in 1915 and participated in only 
three more battles after the Second Battle of Ypres: Festubert (May 17 to 25), Givenchy 
(June 15 to 16), and Loos (September 25 to October 8). In none of the battles did the 
CEF achieve its objectives. At Festubert the CEF gained six hundred yards and lost 2,323 
soldiers. Later, in two days of fighting at Givenchy, the 1st Brigade’s 3rd Battalion, “to 
whom the attack had been entrusted,” suffered 866 casualties out of one thousand men.358 
The Battle of Loos witnessed the first battle in which the CEF’s 1st and 2nd Divisions 
engaged the Germans. At Loos British and Canadian artillery bombarded German 
trenches with chlorine gas in retaliation against the German Army for having used poison 
gas at the Second Battle of Ypres. The offensive, celebrated by a story of one British 
battalion’s dribbling of a soccer ball across “No-Man’s Land,” resulted in further failure
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due to the changing wind altering the gas’s direction towards the Allies, the Germans’ 
position on higher ground, and the marksmanship of the German machine-gunners.359
In 1916, the Canadian Expeditionary Force continued to operate in the Ypres 
Salient. From October 1915 to March 1916, the CEF did not fight in any large scale 
battle because the winter weather restricted offensive campaigns. Instead, the Canadian 
Corps, aware that the stagnation of the winter months might reduce morale, aggressively 
harassed the Germans by raiding their trenches with small infantry detachments, sniping, 
and “surprise artillery shoots.”360 In the spring of 1916, the CEF confronted two German 
offensives at St. Eloi Craters (March 27 to April 16) and at Mount Sorrel (June 2 to 15), 
in which the Canadians suffered nearly twice as many casualties as the Germans.
Inclement weather, poor communications, and seven enormous pits of artillery shell holes 
caused disastrous consequences for the CEF at St. Eloi in less than one month’s fighting. 
The Battle of Mount Sorrel initiated the CEF’s newly formed 3rd Division, but German 
attacks on the Canadians inflicted almost ten thousand casualties. Both German assaults 
attempted to delay Canadian and British preparations for the Somme offensive, “which the 
enemy well knew to be impending.”361
In an effort to relieve the German offensive directed since February 1916 at the 
French Army near Verdun, the CEF along with the British, Belgian, and French armies 
assaulted the German Army’s position around the Somme River from July 1 to November 
18, 1916. This massive offensive made very small advances into German-occupied 
territory, but experienced numerous tactical failures and a devastating loss of lives. The
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CEF, under the command of Lieutenant-General Byng since May 29, 1916, fought the 
Germans throughout the Battles of the Somme from the initial assault near Albert on July 
1, 1916, to the capture of Beaumont Hamel on November 18, 1916. The CEF lost 7,230 
lives at Flers-Courcelette (September 15 to 22, 1916) and obtained recognition for its 
achievements in the battle at Thiepval Ridge (September 26 to 28, 1916). At times the 
battle saw entire battalions being sacrificed with each attack and counter-attack, and the 
CEF’s inexperienced 4th Division, which had entered the trenches in September 1916, 
endured heavy losses of manpower and encountered “German troops whose orders were 
explicit: any officer who gave up an inch of trench would be court-martialed; and any 
sector of lost trench must be counter-attacked immediately.”362
One American who experienced the harsh winter months of 1915-1916, the 
defense of the CEF’s positions in the spring of 1916, and the battles of the Somme was 
Herbert W. McBride. McBride recounted his adventures, observations, and memories of 
his CEF service in two autobiographies: A Rifleman Went To War and The Emma 
Gees 363 The first book emphasized his different experiences as a soldier in trench 
warfare, and the latter described the engagements of his battalion’s machine gun unit.
Bom on October 15, 1873, in Waterloo, Indiana, McBride resigned his commission as a 
Captain in the Indiana National Guard and traveled to Ottawa in order to obtain a 
commission in the Canadian Expeditionary Force from the Minister of Militia and Defense, 
Major-General Sir Sam Hughes. He received the rank of Captain in the 38th Overseas 
Infantry Battalion on February 1, 1915, and served as a “musketry instructor” with the
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21st Overseas Infantry Battalion, which was commanded by Hughes’ brother Lieutenant-
Colonel William St. Pierre Hughes. Discovering that the 38th was to be assigned to
Bermuda instead of France, McBride resigned from this battalion on March 19, 1915, and
reinlisted as a private in the 21st’s machine gun company on April 3, 1915.364
McBride’s battalion, a part of the CEF’s 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, entered the
trenches before the Battle of Loos in September 1915, but his unit remained “outside of
the immediate sphere of the action.”365 From October 1915 to March 1916, McBride
served as both a fierce trench raider and expert sniper. Familiarity with firearms since his
youth helped McBride become a marksman with rifles, revolvers, and machine guns.
Utilizing his skill with the Canadian-made Ross rifle - the standard CEF weapon for its
infantry troops until being replaced in August 1916 by the more reliable British-made Lee-
Enfield - from December 1 to 16, 1915, McBride accounted for twenty-five observed hits
out of thirty-nine shots, eight of which were reported to have killed Germans. McBride
described several of his adventures as a sniper; in one of these McBride’s spotter located a
German officer standing directly in front of a tree with the morning sun to his back.
I had passed him over several times, but, when my attention was called to it, I saw 
him quite plainly - through my glasses. When I tried to pick him up through the 
sight, however, I had considerable difficulty in locating him, but, finally by noting 
certain prominent features of the surrounding background, I managed to find the 
right tree and got him centered in the sight and cut loose. I got him.366
During the “wet” winter months of 1915-1916, McBride contended that the
“greatest game in the world” was raiding German trenches. This required maneuvering
back and forth across “No-Man’s Land” in the dark under the watchful eye of German
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lookouts, who sporadically discharged flares. A trench raider had to avoid German
countermeasures, such as barbed wire, and “Boche patrols” in order to invade German
trenches and capture information, prisoners, or supplies. McBride participated in
numerous trench raids and thoroughly recounted his experiences as a trench raider,
exemplified in his detailed account of his lone, successful capture of a booby-trapped
German regimental flag, in what was considered a military coup by all soldiers on either
side of “No-Man’s Land.”367
When spring arrived in 1916, the Germans renewed their offensive by attacking the
Canadian positions near St. Eloi on March 25, 1916. At the Battle of St. Eloi Craters, the
CEF, including McBride’s 21st Battalion, repeatedly attempted to advance and occupy the
seven craters of artillery shell holes, between the Germans and Canadians, in the face of
German artillery which incessantly bombarded the area. McBride vividly described the
landscape of this battle and the CEF’s struggles to capture the craters:
Alternating by brigades, we took and re-took the various craters and lost them.
We could get in all right, but could not stay there long enough to consolidate the 
positions effectively against the heavy enemy artillery fire. Soon the whole terrain 
where the front lines had been and for nearly a half-mile behind them became a 
desolate waste. No trenches, no roads, no trees - nothing but a barren stretch of 
muddy ground, so thickly pock-marked with shell-holes that they were interlocked 
over the whole area. Our ‘line’ was merely an irregular series of detached posts, 
established in shell holes.368
After receiving a commission as a lieutenant in command of the 21st’s machine gun
section on May 31, 1916, and after a short encampment in Sandling, England, as an
instructor for the CEF’s 4th Division, which entered the Western Front in September
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1916, McBride returned to France in time to participate in the Somme offensives of 
October and November.369
The offensive undertaken by the British and the Imperial forces from July to 
November 1916, occurred on a front more than fifty miles wide in an effort to 
“breakthrough” the German defenses. McBride commanded the battalion’s machine 
gunners through most of the CEF’s Somme campaigns. The 21st’s Emma Gees370 
supported the offensives and defended the CEF’s trenches against formidable German 
counter-attacks. Except for an off-duty infraction in Canada as an officer of the 38th 
Overseas Infantry Battalion, McBride received good remarks as an officer for his 
command of the 21st’s Emma Gees in the battles of the Somme. For example, during one 
of the CEF’s Somme engagements, McBride with a few other brave gunners crawled to 
the aid of one his men, who was the sole survivor from an advance trench, and continued 
to fire the abandoned machine guns of this advance trench, which saved the trench and 
preserved the gains of the attack.371 The date of McBride’s dismissal from the CEF 
remains uncertain. His military records contain two different dates, February 1917, and 
the date on which his overseas service ended, April 15, 1917. Nevertheless, McBride won 
one British and two French medals, and received seven combat wounds while serving in 
the CEF. After his discharge, he returned to the United States and reinlisted in the US 
Army.372
The battles of the Somme ended for the Canadian Expeditionary Force near Ancre 
in late November 1916. Similarly to the previous winter, the CEF did not participate in
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any large battle during the winter months, as the troops again limited their fighting to small 
engagements like trench raids. The first notable action of 1917 for the CEF occurred on 
March 24 to 29, as the CEF cautiously advanced through miles of devastated land toward 
the “Hindenburg Line,” a system of defensive fortifications under construction since 
September 1916 and to which the Germans retreated approximately twenty-five miles.
This rapid movement engendered a false sense of hope in the Canadians and the rest of the 
Allies that such newfound mobility would lead to open warfare. But, the CEF’s 
commanders discovered these new German defenses to be more concentrated and less 
vulnerable because the German command had reduced the length of its defensive lines by 
eliminating most salients. As a result, the CEF concentrated its first offensive of 1917 in 
one region - Arras.
At the Battle of Arras, April 9 to May 4, 1917, occurred the most distinctive CEF 
offensive operation during the first five days at Vimy Ridge. All four Canadian divisions 
attacked at once for the first time towards what was considered to be an impregnable 
German defense. By April 14, 1917, the CEF advanced nearly three miles (4,500 yards) 
capturing an “important tactical feature,” German artillery, weapons, and prisoners. This 
victory, considered to be one the CEF’s greatest achievements in the war, cost the CEF 
10,602 casualties, 3,598 of whom died; nonetheless, the “losses were a marked 
improvement over the Somme,” concluded Canadian military historian Bill Rawling 
despite the fact that sixteen percent of the Canadians engaged in the battle of Vimy Ridge 
were killed or wounded.373
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The actions at Vimy Ridge not only constitute a turning point in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force’s trench warfare tactics but in the relationship of the Americans 
serving in the CEF with the Allied war effort. Three days before the CEF assaulted Vimy 
Ridge, on April 6, 1917, the United States government declared war on Germany 
primarily in response to the German government’s declaration of unrestricted submarine 
warfare on February 1, 1917, against all Allied and neutral shipping in the Atlantic Ocean. 
Therefore, at the Battle of Vimy Ridge, Americans in the CEF were truly Allied soldiers 
and no longer citizens from a neutral country serving in a foreign army. American citizens 
who served in the CEF at Vimy Ridge on April 9 to 14, 1917, represent those Americans 
who voluntarily enlisted before the United States entered the war. After this battle it 
becomes difficult to ascertain which Americans enlisted in the CEF before the United 
States entered the war and fought on the Western Front because some Americans chose to 
enter the CEF after the United States government declared war on Germany.374 Their 
insights facilitate an understanding of one of the last battles where thousands of Americans 
who enlisted before the United States entered the war and served in the CEF on the 
Western Front. Not only do American observations of Vimy Ridge reveal the CEF’s 
combat achievements, but they anticipate and express the attitudes of many Americans 
about the United States government’s course of action regarding Germany’s submarine 
warfare.
At the battle of Vimy Ridge, one American distinguished himself by carrying the 
Stars and Stripes on his bayonet onto the battlefield. Different New York Times articles
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reported two separate men who claimed to have achieved this feat: Bob Davis and 
William Clancy. This newspaper unofficially reported on April 12, 1917, that a “young 
Texan” wounded from the encounter was responsible for charging on Vimy with the 
American flag aloft, but the article failed to mention his name. Based on the speculation 
of a newspaper from Temple, Texas, the New York Times reported that the people of that 
town understood that a man from Texas went into the battle with the American flag and 
knew that Bob Davis from Temple, Texas, was killed or wounded in that battle, and 
therefore, the people from Temple “put two and two together” and proclaimed Davis to 
have been that hero. Confusion arose when the New York Times published a letter from 
William Clancy, who was bom in Boston, Massachusetts, but had given his home as Texas 
when asked by reporters in the hospital. Clancy declared that he “put the good ‘Old 
Glory’ on the battlefield at Vimy Ridge on April 9, 1917.” Clancy reported that on the 
morning in question he tied the flag to his bayonet and charged the redoubt, stating “it was 
the happiest day of my life, I assure you.” He further recounted that during this battle he 
had held a wounded comrade from Newark, New Jersey, who before he died kissed 
Clancy’s flag. The detailed description offered by Clancy appears to legitimize his story as 
the first American to carry the American flag on the battlefield in the First World War.375
Americans, like Sylvester Chahuska Long Lance and Bob Elston, who had enlisted 
with one of the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s American Legion battalions, fought at 
Vimy Ridge. From October 1916 to March 1917, the American Legion’s 97th, 211th, and 
213th battalions disbanded and their troops were assigned to other CEF regiments. This
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reassignment of troops allowed hundreds of former Legionnaires to participate at Vimy 
Ridge. Long Lance, who had originally enlisted with the CEF’s 237th battalion and briefly 
served with the 97th after the two regiments were amalgamated on September 12, 1916, 
served at Vimy Ridge with the CEF’s 38th Overseas Infantry Battalion. According to 
Long Lance’s biographer, Donald Smith, during this battle Long Lance was “accustomed 
to seeing men ‘gutted and lacerated day in and day out,’ choked with the stench of blood, 
iodine, cordite, burnt flares and mud.” Although Long Lance escaped Vimy Ridge 
without injury, he was later wounded three times, once in the head on May 22, 1917, and 
once in each thigh in June 1917. According to Smith, several American newspapers, 
including New York’s Sun and World, told of Long Lance’s service in the CEF and 
emphasized the fact that Long Lance was a full-blooded American Indian and twice 
inaccurately reported him as a lieutenant, most likely because in letters to former Carlisle 
schoolmates Long Lance had promoted himself to that rank in a poem.376
Bob Elston enlisted with the American Legion’s first battalion, the 97th, on 
October 30, 1915, and served for a year in Canada and England. When the 97th 
disbanded on October 31, 1916, he transferred to the Royal Canadian Regiment, but 
always considered himself to be an American Legionnaire. Recalling his memories of 
Vimy Ridge in a six-part article for the Canadian periodical, Liberty, Elston detailed the 
action of the combat. With disgust he first pointed out that just days before the Vimy 
Ridge offensive started, while the imminence of the attack was obvious to both 
belligerents, an unidentified Legionnaire from Chicago, who served with Princess
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Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, deserted and crossed “No-Man’s Land” with the intent 
to inform the Germans of the advance. Elston indicated that the treasonous Legionnaire 
could not have known the date or hour of the impending attack because orders had not 
been issued.
On the morning of Easter Monday, April 9, 1917, Elston “shivered from the
driving wet snow,” and shared a last cigarette with his sergeant, reminiscing that before
the assault “the bated stillness was like the hanging palpitant quiet of Palm Sunday
morning in a great city.” The silence ended at 5:30 a.m. when the Canadian artillery began
to bombard German strong points. In his article, Elston vividly described his experiences
in the CEF’s infantry charge toward Vimy Ridge:
. . . stumbling blindly forward on the slow awful walk . . .  a man swayed against 
me, clutching the stump of his arm. His mouth was wide open. He fell backward 
and was swallowed in the deep slime of an old mine. A potato masher bounced off 
my shoulder. It exploded harmlessly somewhere behind. I was on my hands and 
knees then, fighting off concussion. There was nausea and a madhouse of 
confusion. The corporal beside me was yelling something. A livid splash smashed 
his face away.
What followed this incident, Elston stated, would be “etched on my mind forever.” He 
witnessed a “Hun” stomping the face of a CEF soldier as he laid on the bottom of a hostile 
German trench. The German soldier noticed Elston and targeted him with his Luger 
revolver. Suddenly, Elston recalled, “a bayonet thwacked into the Hun’s throat. The Lee- 
Enfield rifle spat flame at the same time, [and] tore out the back of his neck.” Just before 
reaching the heights of Vimy Ridge a German sniper wounded Elston in the leg as he 
began to take aim at an eager German scout toward the end of the first day of fighting.
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Elston estimated that he crawled nearly twenty-five hundred yards before he received 
medical attention for his injury. Subsequently, Elston returned to the Royal Canadian 
Regiment after his wounds healed and remained in the CEF for the rest of the war.377
Although Elston’s observations provide a picturesque, first person account of the 
battle of Vimy Ridge, his story of the engagement emphasized his combat experiences 
rather than depicting the political circumstances surrounding the event. In fairness to 
Elston, he did acknowledge the entrance of the United States into the war, noting that on 
the night of April 7, 1917, several of the more than four hundred Americans in the Royal 
Canadian Regiment at Vimy Ridge wildly celebrated the news and stated that “there was a 
new pride in the stride of the Legionnaires” serving in the CEF’s trenches before 
“Canada’s most famous fight.”378 But, the letters of Lieutenant Edwin Austin Abbey 
capture what many Americans in the CEF discussed after February 1,1917- the 
probability of the United States entering the war against Germany.
Abbey, who was bom in Kilmacolm, Scotland on September 22, 1888, enlisted in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 2nd Overseas Infantry Battalion on October 2, 1915. 
Before enlisting in the CEF he worked as a civil engineer in various locations in Ontario, 
although he was an American citizen from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where his parents 
lived on 523 Chestnut Street. As a Lance Corporal, Abbey arrived in France on March 8, 
1916, and was “wounded in the left shoulder from a piece of shrapnel, very early, about 
12.30, Easter morning,” April 23, 1916. After staying in a hospital in London, England, 
and briefly returning to Canada, Abbey rejoined the CEF in Flanders in August 1916, and
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shortly thereafter was promoted to Lieutenant on November 25, 1916. Transferring to the 
4th Canadian Mounted Rifles on December 2, 1916, and training in England throughout 
December 1916 and January 1917, Abbey reentered the CEF’s trenches on January 20, 
1917.379 At Vimy Ridge, he lost his life on the night of April 9, 1917. According to two 
letters, one from Abbey’s commanding officer, Major A. P. Menzies, and the other from a 
Major Herzeberg to Abbey’s parents, he was shot in the heart while attempting to return 
to an advanced trench post under his command after spending the preceding four hours 
carrying an unidentified lieutenant to safety. Abbey apparently wandered into the 
German’s advance trenches where he was shot, dragged further behind German lines, and 
stripped of everything except his “identity disc.”380
Despite Abbey’s heroics and unfortunate death at Vimy Ridge, his letters to his 
parents from the front lines offer a number of insightful observations on the deteriorating 
political situation between the United States and Germany.381 From his first letter home 
on May 12, 1915, to his last on April 6, 1917, in addition to informing his parents about 
his welfare and commenting about the war in general, Abbey repeatedly reviewed the 
United States government’s position regarding the war and speculated about when 
America would enter the war. Abbey’s most revealing letters appear just before the 
German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, and the entry 
of the United States into the war nine weeks later. For example, on January 23, 1917, in a 
letter to his father, William Burling Abbey, he stated that “the Germans are very consistent
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with their high sea offensive, and we [Americans] cannot underestimate the seriousness of
the situation.” In the same letter he continued,
there is no question but that Germany will launch forth her U-boat warfare at the 
first good opportunity, and then the United States will either be involved or sit still 
and suffer a virtual blockade. If only our farseeing statesmen would understand 
how they could secure their own safety, as well as that of Europe and the world, 
by closing in and taking the bull by the horns and helping us wipe out this menace 
to the world.382
Remarkably well informed for a soldier serving in the trenches, thanks to the 
periodicals and newspapers sent to him by his mother, Abbey instantly criticized American 
politicians for their inaction in response to the German submarine warfare policy. On 
February 3, 1917, Abbey wrote, “Any one who can see no threat to the U. S. in the 
avowed submarine intentions of Germany must be blind. Why wait till the crash comes 
before acting?”383 An anxious Abbey longed to read or hear that the United States had 
declared war throughout February 1917, but by the next month his eagerness turned to 
frustration as German submarines started to sink American merchant ships. His 
disappointment climaxed when news of the Zimmerman telegram reached him. Abbey’s 
letter to his father on March 11, 1917, voiced his concern that “the frank admission by the 
German Government of their plot to embroil Japan and Mexico with the United States, 
now unanswered except by bickering in the Senate as to the advisability of arming 
merchantmen, is an absurdity.”384 On the day the United States government declared war 
on Germany, April 6, 1917, Abbey wrote to his parents before the assault at Vimy Ridge 
“in case by God’s will” this would be his last letter: “To-day the news came to us here 
that the United States had joined the Allies, so I go with the happy consciousness that I
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am, and you are, fighting for our dear flag, as thousands of Americans have before us in 
the cause of Liberty.”385
After America’s entry into the war, the British War Office, the Ministry of 
Overseas Military Forces of Canada in London, England, and the American Embassy in 
London received a number of requests from Americans in the CEF either to transfer to an 
American armed force upon its arrival in Europe or to be discharged from the CEF in 
order to travel to the United States to enlist and serve in its armed forces. Such requests 
commenced as early as February 1917, but the majority of the inquiries were forwarded to 
the Canadian, British, and American governmental agencies after the United States 
government’s declaration of war against Germany.386 It quickly became evident to the 
new Minister of Militia and Defense, Sir A. E. Kemp, Chief of the General Staff, Major- 
General W. G. Gwatkin, and Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Sir G. H. 
Perley, that they would have to establish a policy toward the Americans who had enlisted 
and served in the CEF before the United States entered the war. This threesome primarily 
considered how discharging or transferring more than ten thousand Americans - the 
Department of Militia and Defense’s estimation according to Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend 
Bullock on April 25, 1917 - from the CEF would affect its ability to perform its 
obligations and keep its ranks filled, especially on the battlefield.387 On June 20, 1917, 
Kemp indicated that the “solution to this question depends very largely on one fact, Viz.: 
as to whether these applications are bona fide, and whether the discharge will be in the
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nature of a transfer, i.e. followed up by enlistment in the United States Army.”388 And on
July 3, 1917, Perley advised Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden that:
I decided that it would not be wise to entertain any application unless it came from 
the United States Government asking for an officer by name; any such request 
made officially would receive serious consideration and the person applied for 
would be released, provided that could be done without affecting the efficiency of 
the CEF, as it will be the object of the Canadian authorities to render every 
possible assistance to the United States Government.389
Furthermore, Gwatkin concluded on July 29, 1917, that a definitive policy would be a
“mistake” because so many Americans were serving in the CEF and that a large number of
whom may ask to be discharged. Gwatkin believed that transfers of American citizens
from the CEF overseas posed numerous difficulties. On the other hand, Americans
serving in Canada who applied for a discharge in order to transfer to United States’ armed
forces should not be retained against their will because “most of them [will] desert.”390
Kemp’s, Perley’s, and Gwatkin’s recommendations eventually helped define the
Department of Militia and Defense’s policy towards Americans who enlisted and served in
the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States entered the war on April 6,
1917. All requests for discharge from these American citizens were directed to Militia
Headquarters in Ottawa, where the Department of Militia and Defence reviewed each
application individually and either rejected or approved a request depending on whether or
not the discharge of the American in question would in any way disorganize his battalion.
Discharge applications accompanied with an official request from the United States
government were more likely to be accepted. Moreover, Americans who were deployed
overseas had a lesser chance of being discharged than Americans still serving in Canada.
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No records are available to indicate exactly how many applications for discharge the 
Department of Militia and Defence accepted or refused. Nonetheless, weekly lists of 
rejections distributed to CEF’s battalions starting in August 1917, indicate that a large 
number of applications were not approved.391 Furthermore, the United States War 
Department would not request the discharge of an American serving in the CEF “except in 
special cases, and where the transfer ‘is plainly in the interest of the United States.’” The 
War Department adopted this policy because it believed that American citizens in the CEF 
had enlisted for “patriotic motives” and that it would not matter whether they remained in 
the CEF or transferred to the AEF, “since they would be fighting for the same cause.” 
Besides, American transfers from the CEF to the AEF “might seriously disorganize [the 
former’s] units.” This policy applied only to Americans who served as enlisted men in the 
CEF and not to Americans who held CEF commissions.392 Therefore, most Americans 
who enlisted and served in the CEF before the United States government entered the war 
remained with the CEF as did Bob Elston. But other Americans like Tracy Richardson 
and Herbert McBride returned to the United States and reinlisted in its army.
A definitive policy concerning the Americans in the CEF was not formed until 
August 15, 1917, because Americans who had enlisted in the CEF from August 4, 1914, 
to April 6, 1917, lost their American citizenship by taking the oath to King George the 
Fifth when they enlisted in the CEF.393 The Department of Militia and Defence passed its 
policy two months before the United States government repatriated those Americans who 
voluntarily enlisted in the CEF before the United States entered the war with President
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Wilson’s signing of the Repatriation Act on October 5, 1917. Nonetheless, from April 6 
to October 5, 1917, the American government appears to have eased its limitations for 
Americans expatriated due to foreign enlistment, allowing American citizens who served 
in the CEF to enlist in the AEF despite the fact that technically they had expatriated 
themselves and were aliens who should not have been admitted into the United States.394 
For example, Herbert McBride was released from service in the CEF on April 15, 1917, 
but he returned to the U. S. Army as a Captain of the 139th Machine Gun Battalion, 38th 
Division, in August 1917.395
The American citizens who fought for the Canadian Expeditionary Force on the
J
Western Front were regarded by Canadians and British as astute trench warfare 
combatants. An unknown correspondent with the British armies suggested the Americans 
in the CEF “all have fought with a pluck and determination which have won them 
universal respect and admiration.”396 The greatest admirer of the Americans serving with 
the CEF in the trenches of Belgium and France was Lord Northcliffe. In the spring of 
1917, Northcliffe journeyed to see for himself if a large number of Americans were indeed 
serving in the CEF. Afterward, he published an article which appeared in a number of 
newspapers and periodicals about his investigation of the Americans in the CEF.397 
Northcliffe praised the fighting spirit and heroic deeds of these Americans, and asked all 
Americans in the United States who sympathized with these men to send them 
newspapers, magazines, chewing gum, woolen comforts, tobacco, or “any portable and 
preserveable little luxuries” to show appreciation for “these fine boys.”398
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Notwithstanding, Lord Northcliffe’s efforts to celebrate the service of American 
citizens in the CEF on the Western Front, five Americans who enlisted before the United 
States entered the war distinguished themselves for “most conspicuous bravery and 
devotion to duty” on the battlefield and earned the highest military honor in the Canadian 
or British armed forces, the Victoria Cross: Corporal Frederick George Coppins, 1st 
Division Cavalry; Captain Bellendon Seymour Hutcheson, Canadian Army Medical Corps, 
75th Overseas Infantry Battalion; Lance-Corporal William Henry Metcalf, 16th Overseas 
Infantry Battalion; Sergeant George Harry Mullin, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry; Sergeant Rapheal Louis Zengel, 5th Overseas Infantry Battalion. Seventy-six of 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 628,964 troops, or approximately one in 8,276 earned 
a Victoria Cross. Out of the 41,078 Americans serving in the CEF, one in 8,216 was 
decorated with a Victoria Cross. Therefore, five of the seventy-six, or one in fifteen 
Victoria Crosses were bestowed upon an American citizen. This contradicted the initial 
impression of Canada’s Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, who stated that 
“American citizens do not always make the best of soldiers.”399
Sergeant Mullin was bom on August 15, 1891, in Portland Oregon. He enlisted at 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, on December 14, 1914, and was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) 
for his actions on October 30, 1917, at the Battle of Passchendaele. Mullin single-handily 
attacked and captured a “pill-box” by throwing hand grenades at its sniper post, and then 
crawling on top of the pill-box to shoot the two machine gunners with his pistol, and 
forcing ten Germans inside the garrison to surrender.400
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At the Battle of Amiens on August 9, 1918, Sergeant Zengel advanced two 
hundred yards ahead of his platoon, captured a German machine gun emplacement; after 
killing its crew, he turned the German-made Maxims against the Germans to save his 
battalion’s right flank. Zengel was bom on November 11, 1894, in Fairbault, Minnesota 
and had entered the CEF at Shomcliffe, England, on July 16, 1915.401 Corporal Coppins 
who registered his place of birth as London, England, on his attestation paper, was in fact 
was bom in San Francisco, California on October 25, 1889.402 Coppins, who enlisted at 
Valcartier, Quebec on September 23, 1914, earned his VC on the same day in the same in 
the battle as Zengel. At Amiens, Coppins, “without hesitation, and on his own initiative,” 
persuaded four men to follow him and assault numerous machine gun emplacements. 
Although the four men with Coppins died in the attack, Coppins “reached the hostile 
machine-guns alone, killed the operator of the first gun and three of the crew, and made 
prisoners of four others, who surrendered.” Despite having been wounded in the assault, 
Coppins continued to serve throughout the attack on August 9, 1918, and did not leave 
the trenches until he was ordered to receive treatment for his wounds.403
Captain Hutcheson, bom on December 16, 1883, in Mount Carmel, Illinois, and 
Lance-Corporal Metcalf, bom on January 29, 1889, in Waige, Maine, each received a 
Victoria Cross for their deeds on September 2, 1918, at the Battle of the Drocourt-Queant 
Line. Hutcheson repeatedly treated and carried wounded soldiers “under terrific machine- 
gun and shell fire” and often “in full view of the enemy.” Metcalf, “recognizing that his 
battalion’s right flank was not being held up,” rushed in front of a British tank and directed
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it with a signal flag as he walked in front of the tank “in a perfect hail of bullets and 
bombs” until German strong points were overcome. Hutcheson had enlisted at Toronto, 
Ontario on December 14, 1915, and Metcalf had signed his attestation papers on 
September 23, 1914, in Valcartier, Quebec.404
It is nearly impossible to ascertain what effect, either in morale or military 
achievements, American citizens serving in the CEF on the Western Front had on their 
Canadian comrades in the trenches. Based on the number of Victoria Crosses received, 
Americans on the battlefield distinguished themselves at an almost identical rate to 
Canadians. Americans were well received by Canadian and British officers and ranks.
After interviewing the Royal Canadian Regiment, with which over four hundred 
Americans served in February 1917, Lord Northcliffe asserted, perhaps with some 
exaggeration, that Americans were “having a perfectly corking time, despite the mud,” and 
that their commanding officers were in “happy and pleasant relations” with their American 
soldiers.405 One example that displays how Americans in the CEF influenced the Canadian 
Army appears in the leisure activities of the soldiers. In June 1917, when the CEF’s 1st 
Division relieved the 3rd Division in the trenches, the 1st Division’s reserve encampment 
contained nine baseball fields, a testimony to the popularity of a distinctively American
406passion.
In memory of the Americans who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and 
who died while in service, Canada’s Prime Minister, W. L. Mackenzie King, asked 
President Calvin Coolidge on May 9, 1925, for permission to erect a memorial at
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Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia. Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B.
Kellogg approved of the monument designed by Canadian architect Sir Reginald
Bloomfield on June 12, 1925. Two years later on June 23, 1927, a site was chosen at
Arlington, two hundred and fifty feet northwest of the Memorial Amphitheater - Section
46, Grid 0-24. The monument, named the “Canadian Cross” or “Cross of Sacrifice,” was
constructed by Canadian contractor D. T. McIntosh and funded by the Canadian
government at a cost of ten thousand dollars.407 On November 11, 1927, the Canadian
Cross was unveiled in an Armistice Day celebration commemorating the end of the First
World War, and the official presentation of the memorial by the first Canadian Minister to
the United States, Vincent Massey, to Kellogg. The event, attended by Canadian, British,
and American authorities and units of the Canadian and American armed forces, featured a
number of speeches and musical performances. Canadian Minister of National Defence J.
L. Ralston characterized the “Cross” as “our ‘stone of help,’ to keep forever vivid in your
hearts our sense of the comradeship, courage, and faithfulness of these your sons, who
came to us.”408 United States Secretary of War Dwight Davis declared,
this monument will always be a source of pride to the citizens of the United States. 
It shall constantly remind us of the friendship and cordiality extending along our 
northern boundary, guarded Only by the common love of liberty and justice in the 
hearts of the people of both Canada and the United States.409
The “Cross of Sacrifice” stands twenty-four feet, three inches high on a fifteen foot broad
octagonal base that rests on three receding octagonal steps. Composed of Canadian gray
granite with a bronze sword imposed on the front face of the cross, the inscription on the
east face reads: “Erected By The Government Of Canada In Honour Of The Citizens Of
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The United States Who Served In The Canadian Army And Gave Their Lives In The 
Great War 1914-1918.”410
The experiences of American citizens who served in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force on the battlefields and in the trenches of the Western Front before the United States 
entered the war, seldom differed from those of Canadian officers and enlisted men at the 
Second Battle of Ypres, the Somme, or Vimy Ridge. Except for the question of when the 
United States would enter the war, most Americans in the CEF before April 6, 1917, were 
preoccupied with the hardships of surviving trench warfare as were British, French, or any 
other soldier who endured the First World War. Nevertheless, extraordinary is the fact 
that before the United States entered the war, over forty-one thousand American citizens 
enlisted in the CEF and nearly half of them served in the trenches at a time when the 
United States government was trying to remain neutral in the war.
Unfortunately for American historiography this fact continues to be disregarded or 
overlooked in most published accounts of American history depicting August 1914 to 
April 1917. Perhaps the contribution of American citizens to Canada’s war effort before 
the United States entered the war remains so unfamiliar to Americans and Canadians today 
because American historiography of the war focused on those Americans who wanted the 
United States government to remain neutral in the war, and ignores those American 
citizens who early on supported the Allied war effort and advocated the entry of the 
United States into the war. This occurred because eventually the United States did enter 
the war on the side of the Allies, which justified the efforts of Americans, like those
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serving in the CEF, who had been supporting the Allies before the American entry. But 
inexplicably their efforts have been underappreciated by American historians who have 
usually preferred to write about those Americans who disagreed with the Wilson 
administration’s decision on April 6, 1917, to enter the war, about the state of 
preparedness of the American military before the war, the American peace movements, or 
occasionally about famous objectors to Wilson’s neutrality policy, like President Theodore 
Roosevelt. Of those Americans who preceded the United States government’s decision to 
join the Allies, most have not been recognized for their service in the CEF, despite the 
appreciation of the American contribution to the CEF expressed here and abroad during 
and immediately after the war and despite the monumental reminder still standing in 
Arlington National Cemetery.
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Conclusion
When the United States government entered the war against Germany and its allies 
on April 6, 1917, most American citizens no longer viewed Canada or its armed forces as 
an opportunity to serve in “the war to end all wars.” Except for approximately three 
hundred Americans who traveled to Canada in order to enlist in Great Britain’s Royal 
Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service, like Bogart Rogers and Oliver LeBoutillier, 
and for Americans who enlisted in the CEF, such as Raymond Chandler, in the aftermath 
of the American declaration of war, most American citizens willing to volunteer for 
military service entered the American Expeditionary Force commanded by General John J. 
Pershing.411
Indeed, many Americans who were serving in the CEF at this time wished to 
transfer or discharge from the Dominion’s forces to the United States Navy, Marine 
Corps, or Army in order to serve their native country, although few were allowed to do so 
by Canada’s Department of Militia and Defence. In response to American citizens in the 
United States entering British or Canadian armed forces, Americans serving in the CEF 
who preferred to transfer to the AEF, and a large number of Canadians and Britons living 
in the United States, on July 30, 1918, the governments of the United States, Canada, and 
Great Britain “permitted voluntary reciprocal military service of their subjects and
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citizens.”412 This allowed Americans who had enlisted in the CEF before the United 
States government entered the war to transfer to the AEF without interference from the 
Canadian or British government.
On November 11, 1918, at five o’clock in the morning the fourth and final 
armistice was signed by representatives from Germany and the Allies in the Forest of 
Compiegne, France, which effectively ended the war on the Western Front. When the 
fighting ceased six hours later, 2,138 American citizens had died while fighting for the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force. This represented four percent of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force’s 61,112 total deaths.413
In general, the service of Americans in the Canadian Expeditionary Force before 
the United States entered the war did not irritate the Wilson administration. Nonetheless, 
the CEF’s recruitment, particularly American Legion recruiters like Reverend Bullock, of 
American citizens in the United States and the CEF’s American Legion recruiting stations’ 
misuse of “Old Glory” and other American emblems associated with Canada’s 
expeditionary force was an irritant to the United States. The United States government 
also was angered by the mere existence of the American Legion in the CEF, which was 
specifically designed by Hughes to recruit and train American citizens for infantry service 
on the Western Front.
The Wilson administration, through the State Department, repeatedly asked the 
British ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, in Washington and the British Foreign Office in 
London to terminate all recruiting efforts in the United States, including newspaper
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advertisements, and to prohibit the American Legion from being deployed to the Western 
Front. The United States government’s appeals to the British from January to October 
1916, eventually contributed to the American Legion’s disbanding, but once the American 
Legionnaires were assigned to different Canadian units beginning in October 1916, the 
Wilson administration had no objections to their service in the CEF. Regardless of how 
many American citizens served in a CEF regiment before the United States government 
entered the war, the Wilson administration never objected, as long as that unit did not 
officially associate itself with the United States. No doubt without American protests the 
American Legion most likely would have served on the battlefields of the Western Front, 
and given the number of former American military veterans in the American Legion, they 
would have fought with great courage, pride, and resiliency.
The British response to American citizens serving in the CEF was clear, but for its 
American Legion was often contradictory and ambiguous. The British War Office 
accepted all Americans who volunteered for military service in the CEF. But Great Britain 
did not want the CEF’s recruitment of Americans to violate the United States 
government’s policy of neutrality or its Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, which could 
provoke the Wilson administration into cutting off American financial aid that helped 
sustain British needs for its war effort. Britain’s War Office had no objections to 
Americans enlisting and serving in the CEF or in any of its Imperial forces, and neither 
War Ministers Kitchener nor Lloyd George disapproved of the American Legion, despite 
the fact that it violated the British Army Act of 1870’s and The Hague Convention of
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1907’s agreements pertaining to military formations created for and composed of foreign 
or neutral volunteers.
Confusion arose when the Foreign Office delegated the authority over the 
American Legion in August 1914 to Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law and to 
Canada’s Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, who was also the commander-in- 
chief of Canada’s armed forces. The Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General 
Sir Sam Hughes, who had had his proposal for an all American regiment approved by 
Kitchener and King George the Fifth in October 1914, believed that he controlled the fate 
of any American formation. Therefore, when Spring-Rice conveyed the United States 
government’s disapproval of the American Legion and its recruiting practices from 
January to October 1916 to Connaught and Bonar Law, it was unclear who maintained the 
authority to discipline or disband the American Legion. Pressure from British officials, 
who feared aggravating the United States government’s neutrality, influenced Canada’s 
decision to disband the American Legion and assign the Legionnaires to other CEF units. 
Great Britain needed American capital, particularly after the failure of the Somme 
offensive in November 1916, to maintain its war effort more than it needed five infantry 
units of Americans in the trenches.
From the beginning of the war, the Canadian Expeditionary Force accepted 
American volunteers with open arms. Seven American citizens enlisted in Canada’s first 
overseas unit, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.414 The Dominion of Canada’s 
population in 1914 was small in comparison to the European belligerents and as a result
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the CEF did not turn away those Americans who were anxious to fight in the war. When 
Hughes recognized that a large number of Canada’s “neighbors” would be willing to 
volunteer for the CEF, he authorized recruiting schemes to attract more Americans. This 
was a resourcefully innovative discovery because it potentially provided Hughes with a 
vast number of volunteers, as long as he could induce American citizens to enlist in the 
CEF. His most aggressive recruiting idea for Americans was the American Legion, which 
he entrusted to his friend Reverend Bullock. Without Hughes’ involvement and 
development of the American Legion and his consistent advocation of American citizens 
as volunteers, perhaps fewer Americans would have enlisted with the CEF before April 6, 
1917.
Unfortunately for Connaught, Borden, and Hughes’ Militia staff, the American 
Legion caused difficulties amongst themselves and with the United States government. 
Caught in the middle of the American Legion’s existence and misdeeds were Connaught 
and Borden. The Governor-General persistently attempted to control the abuses which 
aggravated the Wilson administration, but was uncertain to the degree of his power over 
domestic concerns in Canada, especially military affairs. By contrast, the Prime Minister 
allowed Hughes to subvert military procedures and apparently disregard Connaught’s and 
his Militia staffs suggestions to terminate the American Legion’s grievances which 
aggravated the Wilson administration. This caused a political dispute between Connaught 
and Borden and it intensified diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Canada with 
ihe United States. Although the American Legion frustrated supporters and detractors of
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the unit, the regiment did not impact Canada’s appreciation for the Americans who served 
in the CEF before the United States government entered the war. This would best be 
exemplified by the Canadian government’s memorial, “Cross of Sacrifice,” to the United 
States.
The Americans who enlisted and served in the CEF before April 6, 1917, were not 
unique to the First World War, as hundreds of American citizens enlisted in other Allied 
armies and presumably a few served in the forces of the Central Powers. What is 
uncommon is the fact that at least forty-one thousand, and perhaps many more, voluntarily 
enlisted in the CEF while the United States government remained neutral for thirty-two 
months. As Robert Lansing noted on August 22, 1914, “it had always been the right of 
individuals to enter the army of a foreign nation,” and he recalled “no war . . .  in which 
there were not numerous foreigners in both armies and often so-called ‘foreign 
legions.’”415 But what may be more intriguing is the fact that more American citizens 
volunteered with the CEF for this war from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, than for any 
other nation’s army at any other time in military history. As a result of their enlistment 
and service in the CEF, a precedent was established for the Second World War when 
“some 30,000 Americans” enlisted and served in Canada’s army, navy, and air force from 
September 3, 1939 to December 6, 1941.416
In 1917, French author and journalist, Paul Louis Hervier, suggested that the 
experiences of the Americans who served in the armies of Great Britain and France’s 
Foreign Legion “will later be jewels in American history.”417 A more appropriate
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euphemism would have been a “diamond in the rough” because the Americans who served 
in the CEF are rarely noted in American history textbooks for their passion, which led 
more than forty-one thousand men to enlist in Canada’s army during the First World War 
at the risk of losing their citizenship, if not their lives. Personal motives for enlistment 
varied from a desire to experience the war to defending the world’s democratic 
institutions, but regardless of American reasons to enlist in the CEF, all Americans in the 
CEF who volunteered before the United States government entered the war refuted 
President Wilson’s myth that Americans were “too proud to fight.” At least twenty 
thousand Americans served in the CEF’s trenches on the Western Front and fought just as 
courageously as any other nationality that braved the elements and conditions of trench 
warfare from 1914 to 1917.
The more than forty-one thousand American citizens who voluntarily enlisted and 
served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force surely facilitated Canada’s war effort to a 
modest extent. Seven percent of the CEF’s volunteers were American citizens. Yet 
twenty-seven hundred American Legionnaires caused more political, diplomatic, and 
military difficulties for the governments of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States 
than did the remaining thirty-eight thousand Americans scattered among the CEF’s four 
divisions of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and specialized units. During the first thirty-two 
months of the First World War, these thirty-eight thousand Americans in the CEF served 
with near anonymity to the United States government, the Department of Militia and
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Defence, and the CEF, although their American origin was probably known to their 
Canadian comrades in the ranks.
The objective of this thesis has been to polish Hervier’s “jewel in American 
history” in order to spotlight the incomplete scholarly accounts by American historians 
who have been inclined to overlook the contribution of American citizens to Canada’s and 
the Allies’ war effort before April 6, 1917. Certainly both American scholars and military 
buffs of the First World War have much to learn from studying the motives and combat 
experiences of Americans in the CEF, the CEF’s recruitment and enlistment of Americans, 
and the political, diplomatic, and military repercussions of the American Legion from 
August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917.
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Appendix
Concise History of the CEF’s American Legion
97th Overseas Infantry Battalion
Commanding Officer: Colonel L. E. LeBatt (10-22-15 to 10-29-15)
Lieutenent-Colonel A. B. Clark (10-30-15 to 1-18-16) 
Lieutenent-Colonel W. L. Jolly (1-19-16 to 12-24-16) 
Headquartered: Toronto, Ontario 
Formed: October 22, 1915 
Authorized: December 22, 1915 
Transported to England: September 19, 1916
Transferred: October 1916-300 men to the 4th Overseas Infantry Battalion 
Drafted: October 22, 1916 - 150 men to the Royal Canadian Regiment 
Drafted: October 27, 1916 - 120 men to the Royal Canadian Regiment 
Drafted: November 1, 1915-428 men to the Royal Canadian Regiment and 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.
Disbanded: April 5, 1918
211th Overseas Infantry Battalion
Commanding Officer: Lieutenent-Colonel W. M. Sage
Headquartered: Vancouver, British Columbia
Formed: February 15, 1916
Authorized: July, 15, 1916
Transported to England: December 20, 1916
Absorbed: January 20, 1917 to the 26th Canadian Reserve Infantry Battalion 
Transferred: February 16, 1917 to the Canadian Railway Troop Depot 
Amalgamated: March 21, 1917 to the 218th Overseas Infantry Battalion 
Disbanded: March 21, 1917
212th Overseas Infantry Battalion
Commanding Officer: Lieutenent-Colonel E. C. Pitman 
Headquartered: Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Formed: February 15, 1916 
Authorized: July 15, 1916
Amalgamated: September 12, 1916 to the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion 
Disbanded: September 12, 1916
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213th Overseas Infantry Battalion
Commanding Officer: Lieutnenet-Colonel B. J. McCormick
Headquartered: St. Catharines, Ontario
Formed: February 15, 1916
Authorized: July 15, 1916
Transported to England: December 20, 1916
Drafted: January 26, 1917 and February 7, 1917 to 25th Canadian Reserve 
Infantry Battalion 
Disbanded: September 15, 1920
237th Overseas Infantry Battalion
Commanding Officer: Lieutenent-Colonel Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock 
Headquartered: Susssex, New Brunswick 
Formed: May 15, 1916 
Authorized: July 15, 1916
Amalgamated: September 12, 1916 to the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion 
Disbanded: September 12, 1916
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